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THE CZECH LIBERAL PARTY AND ITS POLITICAL ACTIVITY, 1891-1897

by

Ⓒ MARIE L. NEUDORFL

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
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ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the parliamentary and public activity of the Czech Liberal Party between 1891 and 1897, when it was the leading force in the Czech political life. In this period, the Party acted as a unifying force of the Czech national and political life. Its intensive political activity is viewed as significant for the increase of political awareness and education of the Czech nation and its capability for responsible political work.

In the Viennese Parliament, the Czech Liberals were in the forefront of those who strove for the decentralization of the Habsburg Monarchy, and other progressive political reforms. During 1891 and 1897, the Czech Liberal Party was in opposition to the Viennese government. This position allowed the Party's deputies to expose and analyze grave economic, social, political and national problems of the monarchy. Since their analyses, prognoses and suggestsions for a solution of some of those problems are considered rather realistic, the Party's parliamentary activity between 1891 and 1893 is under special scrutiny. These three years were also very significant for public political life in the Bohemian Kingdom because more political freedom was maintained than in the rest of the decade.

The period 1894-96 was mainly marked by political oppression in Bohemia, and by a search by Czech politicians for new political concepts. The Czech Liberal Party, frustrated by unfavourable political developments and by its own lack of success, gradually shifted its endeavour for

broader national aims to partial concessions, of which linguistic ones were most important. This change in the Liberal Party's political position was expressed by the concept of a "policy of gradualism" accepted by the Party at the end of 1896. Although this policy combined with the policy of cooperation with the government brought the Party more immediate success than the previous strategy, in the long run the Party was to lose not only linguistic concessions but its role as a unifying force of Czech political life as well.

PREFACE

The need for historical studies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire based on detailed research into the non-ruling nationalities has been recognized for more than a decade. Although some valuable works have been published in recent years, the number is far from sufficient. This thesis provides a contribution to the research into the political realities in Bohemia and the strivings of the Czechs at the end of the nineteenth century, a time when the Czech political movement assumed many features which remained prominent in the decades which that followed.

While the thesis is based on a wide range of primary and secondary sources, the emphasis of the research is on a systematic investigation of the press, particularly the major newspapers and political journals. Despite a call from Czech historians for the last half-century, this kind of time consuming work has been neglected in books in the field.

It should also be mentioned that the meanings of terms such as "The Habsburg Monarchy," "Austria," and "the Austro-Hungarian Empire," will be clear from the context. In the case of names of people and places, the original form was usually used. Only in the case of a city with a firmly established English name (like Prague, Vienna), was the English form used. In some cases, the German name of a town or city in Bohemia and Moravia is in parentheses. All other terms which could lead to some confusion are explained either in the text or in the footnotes.

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INTRODUCTION

Between 1848 and 1918, when constitutionalism, parliamentarism and public political life gradually developed in the Habsburg Monarchy, the Czechs established several political parties. But for the greater part of this period, their political life was shaped by the National Party, which lost its dominance in 1891. Then the Czech Liberal Party, founded in 1874, became a leading political force for more than a decade. Between 1891 and 1897, while in opposition to the Viennese government, the Liberal Party's deputies became one of the most active and progressive groups in the Viennese parliament. At the same time, during this period the party had the greatest influence upon the political development of the Czech nation.

So far only two books have been published on the topic of the Czech Liberal Party. More detailed and informative is that of Bruce M. Garver, The Young Czech Party 1874-1901 and the Emergence of a Multiparty System (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978). Garver describes major aspects of the Czech cultural, economic and social development in the nineteenth century, making a link between the overall advancement of the Czech nation and the development of the Czech political parties. The author describes in detail the social foundation of the Czech Liberal Party, its development and its relation to the Viennese government and to other existing and emerging Czech political parties. He also gives considerable background information of many prominent Czech Liberals. Although Garver describes the major objectives of the Party's endeavour, his study is less concerned with the major issues of the Party's public and parliamentary activity than with other issues. He uses a wide range of primary sources, mostly Czech; however, he did not make a systematic investigation of the contemporary Czech political press or of the parliamentary and public speeches of the Liberal Party's deputies, as has been done in this thesis.

The second book devoted to the Czech Liberal Party is that of Tomáš Vojtěch, Mladočeši a boj o politickou moc v Čechách (Prague: Academia, 1980), which covers the period from 1861 to 1891. Vojtěch's book is not a history of the Czech Liberal Party; it is more an interpretative study, concentrated on Czech political forces competing for political power in Bohemia between 1861 and 1891. However, the author's endeavour to be objective and to employ for his interpretation the Marxist concept of social classes as decisive for political developments, makes his book, at times, rather unclear and vague. In particular, his terminology needs some clarification. More information can be found in older Czech historical literature, particularly in Zdeněk Tobolka, Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby (1848-1918), 4 volumes (Prague: Československý Kompas, 1932-36) and in Adolf Srb, Politické dějiny národa českého 1861-1895, 3 volumes (Prague: F. Šimáček, 1899-1901).

There are several good articles relating to the Liberal Party's activity. Of particular interest are H. Gordon Skilling, "The Politics of the Czech Eighties" in Peter Brock and H. Gordon Skilling (eds.), The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 254-81; Stanley B. Winters, "Kramář, Kaizl and the Hegemony of the Young Czech Party, 1891-1901," Ibid., pp. 282-326; and "The Young Czech Party (1874-1914): An Appraisal," Slavic Review 28 (1969): 426-44; Tomáš Vojtěch, "Organizační vývoj mladočeské strany do roku 1891," Český časopis historický 15 (1977): 554-84. Vojtěch gives a good review of the organizational development of the Liberal Party up to 1891; Tomáš Vojtěch, "Vítězství mladočeské strany v Čechách v roce 1891," Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20. století 4 (Prague: Ústav československých a světových dějin, ČSAV, 1977), pp. 3-62. In this article Vojtěch elaborates, in rather general terms, on the causes of the Young Czechs' electoral victory in 1891. An interpretative review of the most important literature relevant to the period under discussion and dealing with economic, social and national developments in the Bohemian Kingdom was compiled by Gary B. Cohen, "Recent Research on Czech Nation-Building," Journal of Modern History 51 (December 1979): 760-72.

This thesis attempts to investigate the major areas of the Liberal Party's activity, its significance for the level of political awareness of the Czech population and, to some degree, it elaborates on the general political conditions in the Western part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, since these conditions played an important role in the Party's activity and strategies. The decisive aspect of these conditions between 1891 and 1893 can be described in terms of considerable political freedom which allowed the victorious Czech Liberal Party to put to use its democratic traits and investigative spirit. Between 1894 and 1897, political repression became a more discernible feature of Czech political life and this made the Liberal Party reconsider its concepts and strategy.

There are two major themes in this thesis. The first one is the Party's intense public activity which is viewed as very important for the increase of political awareness and education of the Czech population and for evolving its capability for responsible political participation. The second theme is the Liberal Party's parliamentary activity. Although the Liberals' analytical and to-the-point speeches significantly contributed to the illumination of the monarchy's grave economic, political, social and national problems, the impact of their speeches upon the policy and decision-making process was negligible, because the monarchy's political system was inflexible, shaped to preserve the status quo established in 1867.

CHAPTER ONE

THE RISE OF THE LIBERAL PARTY AND MAJOR FEATURES OF THE CZECH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 1848-1891

It will be the purpose of this chapter to document the establishment of the Liberal Party and to show how the rise of this party partly fostered the development of Czech political self-awareness in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The major concepts developed by the Liberal Party grew out of a need to expand Czech political activity in order to achieve certain national and political objectives. The National Party, from which the Liberal Party developed, had failed to seek more effective means to solve the existing social and economic problems and, as a result, the greater responsiveness of the Liberal Party to popular as well as national needs brought it to a dominant position in 1891.[1] The Liberal Party's activity in the last decade of the century had an important and ongoing effect on the political awareness and maturity of the entire Czech population. It is for this reason that the period 1891 to 1897 is an important time in the process of Czech nation-building.

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[1] Although a review and a brief evaluation of existing historical literature about the Czech Liberal Party was presented in the Introduction to this thesis, relevant studies should probably be mentioned once more at this point: Bruce M. Garver, The Young Czech Party 1874-1901 and the Emergence of a Multiparty System (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1978 [hereafter cited as Garver, The Young Czech Party]); T. Vojtěch, Mladočeši a boj o politickou moc v Čechách (Academia, 1980 [hereafter cited as Vojtěch, Mladočeši]); T. Vojtěch, "Organizační vývoj mladočeské strany do roku 1891," Český

One of several tasks of this thesis is to show that Czechs, at the peak of their national and political activity between 1891 and 1897, strove for substantial changes in the political system. One of their main goals was greater political independence for the Bohemian Kingdom in the framework of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.[2] Czech political development was assisted by the overall conditions of the empire, of which parliamentarianism and constitutionalism as established in the 1860s became the most important factors. The impact of

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1 (cont'd)Časopis historický 15 (1977): 554-84 (hereafter cited as Vojtěch, "Organizační vývoj"; T. Vojtěch, "Vítězství mladočeské strany v Čechách v roce 1891," Sborník k dějinám 19. a 20 století 4, (Prague: Ůstav československých a světových dějin CSAV, 1977): 3-62; H. G. Skilling, "The Politics of the Czech Eighties," in P. Brock and H. G. Skilling, eds., The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970): 254-81; S. B. Winter, "Kramář, Kaizl and the Hegemony of the Young Czech Party, 1891-1901," Ibid., pp. 282-326; S. B. Winters, "The Young Czech Party (1874-1914): An Appraisal," Slavic Review 28 (1969): 426-44. An interpretative review of the most important literature relevant to the discussed period was compiled by G. B. Cohen, "Recent Research on Czech Nation-Building," Journal of Modern History 51 (December 1979): 760-72. The author points out certain shortcomings of existing literature and a need for more empirical research, particularly in the light of the fact that "A priori assumptions about linkages between changes in economic, society, and political systems have been a common failing of theories of modernization." Ibid., p. 762.

[2] Western historians use the terms "Bohemian Kingdom," "Lands of the Czech Crown," "Lands of the St. Wenceslas Crown," and "Czech Lands," interchangeably in describing the political status of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. All terms will be used in this thesis. Czech publications and records do not use the words "Bohemia" and "Bohemian," in fact, these words do not exist in the Czech language. The expression for Bohemia in Czech is "Čechy," and for Bohemian "český."

Austrian parliamentarianism upon policy-making reached its culmination in the early 1890s,[3] when popular involvement in political life became greater than at any time since the 1848 revolutions. Conflicting national interests and deep-seated socio-economic and political problems came fully into the public eye. Contrary to opinions often found in historical literature, however, the general awareness of the existing conflicts and problems do not seem to have fostered either destructive intentions toward the monarchy's existence, or cynicism as to the possibility of resolution of this crisis.

This interpretation coincides with that of Hans Kohn, who strongly opposes the view that "the principal cause" of the monarchy's collapse was "domestic conflict of the nationalities," in the sense that these nationalities, in the pre-War period, were striving for independence at the expense of the empire's destruction.[4] Kohn argues that it was only when the ruling strata of the empire failed to solve chronic internal political, national and social problems, concentrating instead on expansion, that the nationalities seized their opportunity to liberate themselves from the rule which no longer seemed to be in their interest.

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[3] That parliamentarianism was in decline in the Habsburg Monarchy after 1900 is maintained by Irene Collins, "Liberalism in Nineteenth-Century Europe," in Eugene C. Black, ed., European Political History, 1815-1870 (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 121; and by Solomon Wank, "Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in Austria-Hungary 1867-1914," in Austrian History Yearbook (Houston: Rice University 1967), 3, Pt. 3, p. 52, (hereafter cited as Wank, "Foreign Policy").

[4] Hans Kohn, "Was the Collapse Inevitable?" Austrian History Yearbook (Houston: Rice University, 1967), 3, Pt. 3, pp. 250-63. His view opposes most of the views expressed at the international conference on "The Nationality Problem in the Nineteenth Century Habsburg Monarchy," held at the University of Indiana in 1966. The opinion that the empire had "strength" and "ability" to continue the existence is also maintained in Joachim Remak, "The Healthy Invalid: How Doomed the Habsburg Empire," Journal of Modern History 41 (June 1969), pp. 128-143. He believes that considerable assimilation of all nationalities was happening, and holds the Ballhausplatz responsible for the fate of the empire.

Although the increased political activity of the Czech public from the beginning of the 1890s was a part of the overall political development in the monarchy, the relatively high level of Czech political awareness was mainly a result of the work of both the National Party (Narodni strana), the most prominent political organization after 1860, and the Liberal Party (Narodni strana svobodomyslna). The National Party was primarily concerned with the cultural advancement of the Czech nation and by the 1880s it had brought Czech cultural development to the level enjoyed by the Germans within the monarchy. But the rather narrow scope of its activity became a source of increasing criticism on the part of some of its prominent members. These individuals, often called the Young Czechs (Mladocesi), eventually established themselves as the Liberal Party at a Congress held in December 1874. The Liberal Party differed from the National Party not only in its more democratic convictions and greater ability to respond to the economic and political interests of the Czech population, but also in its zealous determination to elevate the political education of the Czech nation. The Liberal Party's work strengthened both the general democratic outlook of the Czech people and their capacity for responsible political participation.

The long-lasting efforts of Czech politicians to achieve greater autonomy for the three crownlands of the Bohemian Kingdom, Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, were brought on not only by the desire to do justice to the historical and legal position of the kingdom and the Czech nation, but also by the awareness that Czech economic, cultural and social development no longer seriously lagged behind that of the Germans.[5] This change, they argued, should be reflected in the political system. Furthermore, they demanded that the political system respect the demographic distribution. Numerically, Czechs were the second largest nation in Cisleithania, forming 23.3 per cent of its population in 1890. In Bohemia and Moravia they formed approximately two-thirds of the population. Distribution of population in

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[5] The most recent and detailed English description of the social and cultural background of the Czech political scene in the late 19th century is in Garver, The Young Czech Party, pp. 6-28. He describes the intensive advancement of Czech culture and educational institutions and rapid economic growth as the most important prerequisites of the intensive political development. At the same time he assumes that "national and class conflicts" in the monarchy "accentuated economic conflict and outweighed any common material interests." The economic aspects of Czech national development during the last three decades before the First World War have been most recently discussed in English in Jan Havránek, "The Development of Czech Nationalism," Austrian History Year Book (Houston: Rice University, 1967), 3, Pt. 2, pp. 223-60. In German, the most recent detailed review of social, economic and political developments in the Bohemian Kingdom in the second half of the nineteenth century is in Friedrich Prinz, "Die böhmischen Länder von 1848 bis 1914," in Karl Bösl, ed., Handbuch der Geschichte der böhmischen Länder, 4 vols. (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1968), 3. The social aspects of Bohemian development are discussed by Friedrich Prinz, "Nation und Gesellschaft in den böhmischen Ländern im 19. und 20. Jahrundert," in F. Prinz, F.J. Schmale, and F. Seibt, eds., Geschichte in der Gesellschaft: Festschrift für Karl Bösl zum 65. Geburtstag (Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1974), pp. 333-49. National aspects of the Czech development in the nineteenth century are described in František Červinka, Český nacionalism v XIX stoleti (Prague: Svobodné slovo, 1965). A considerably broad approach to the monarchy's nationality problems is in Robert A. Kann, Das Nationalitätenproblem der Habsburgermonarchie, 2 vols. (Graz and Cologne: Bohlau, 1964).

Cisleithania in 1890 according to nationalities was as follows:[6]

Number of inhabitants

Nationality	Cisleithania	Bohemia	Moravia	Silesia
Czechs	5,472,871	3,644,188	1,590,413	129,814
Germans	8,461,580	2,159,011	664,168	281,555
Poles	3,719,239		5,039	178,114
Others	6,241,723	39,895	17,260	16,166
Total	23,895,413	5,843,094	2,276,870	605,649

Differences between the National Party or the Old Czechs, as its members were usually called, and the Liberal Party or the Young Czechs, can be traced to the revolutionary year of 1848. The leaders of the National Party, František Palacký (1798-1876) and his closest collaborator and son-in-law, František Ladislav Rieger (1818-1903), maintained more democratic political attitudes at this time than two decades later. The Old Czechs, like the Young Czechs, up until the early 1880s, were also in favour of the "national [i.e., ethnic] principle," balanced by strong powers of land diets, as a basis for a federal reorganization of the empire. Some of the future Young Czechs, like Alois Pravoslav Trojan (1815-1893), worked closely with the public organizing the most important public political meeting in Prague. Trojan contributed to the establishment of a tradition which was carried on later by all prominent

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[6] Theodor Živanský, "Vývoj českého a německého obyvatelstva v Čechách," *Obzor národohospodářský* (1904), pp. 176-77. Živanský used the official Austrian population census, which abandoned the traditional term "native language" and replaced it by "language of communication." In a footnote on page 179, he states that he included bilingual school children among the Czechs, because Germans very rarely learned Czech.

Young Czechs. His experience as one of the two Czech leaders in the Association for the Promotion of Industry in Bohemia, the only organization in which some political activity was permitted by the Viennese government before 1848, was an excellent foundation for his organizational work during 1848. Karel Sladkovský (1823-1880), a successful lawyer, seized the opportunity in 1848 to get involved in politics. He participated in all public events, including the Czech revolution. As a result of his revolutionary activity he was sentenced to death in 1849, but this was commuted to twenty years hard labour, and he was released in 1857 as part of a general amnesty. Although his health was to fail him, he devoted the rest of his life to Czech politics. His courageous political performance and righteous character made him the Liberal Party's most respected authority until his death in 1880. His devotion to democratic ideals and his writings championing them contributed considerably to the Liberal Party's ideological formation.[7] Karel Havlíček Borovský (1822-1856), one of the most brilliant Czech political thinkers, established a high-quality, informative and educational newspaper in his Národní Nowiny (National Newspaper). Its spiritual legacy was taken over by the founders of Národni listy in 1861. Julius Grégr (1831-1896), the first editor of Národni listy, and a prominent Young Czech, maintained the informative and educational quality of the paper until his death, despite frequent persecution including several arrests.[8]

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[7] Servác Heller, ed., Výbor z politických řecí a úvah Dr. Karla Sladkovského (Prague: J. Otto, 1899), pp. 8-20.

[8] The money required for the deposit fee of Národní listy, 10,500 gulden, was contributed by several prominent members of the National Party: Palacký, Rieger, Brauner, Purkyně, J. Grégr and E. Grégr. Until 1878 the paper made no profit at all. In the first years, five to six thousand copies of Národní listy were published daily. Karel Hoch, "České novinářství od r. 1860 do doby současné," Českovenská vlastivěda (Prague, 1935), 7, p. 453. Later the number of copies published daily reached over ten thousand. Vojtěch, "Organizační vývoj," p. 567.

During the turbulent years of 1848-49 the Habsburg Monarchy, under pressures "from below," made its first half-hearted attempt to bring the empire a step closer to the more politically developed countries of Western Europe. Constitutional government and a parliamentary system were established. Despite the short duration of the experiment and the renewal of absolutism for almost a decade afterwards, the experience which the peoples of the empire acquired during 1848-49 became an inseparable part of their political legacy up to the First World War. The success of the Vienna and Kroměříž (Kremsier) Parliament of 1848-49, which represented all nationalities except the Magyars and the Italians, in working out a satisfactory scheme for the introduction of a federal system established a precedent. The non-ruling nationalities hoped that the opportunity to implement a similar federal scheme would return. In the case of the Czechs, the political programme formulated by František Palacký[9] and by the St. Václav Committee in Prague at the end of March 1848[10] remained the basis of their political programme until 1918.[11] It aimed in the main, at: 1) Legislative and administrative unity of the Lands of the Czech Crown (Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia); 2) A separate parliament for the Czech Lands chosen on the widest possible basis by free elections -- the narrow, estates-bound social basis of the traditional Bohemian Diet was explicitly rejected; 3) Equality of the Czech language with the German in all branches of the political and judicial administration and in education in the Bohemian Kingdom; 4) A separate ministry for the Lands of the Czech Crown. The Viennese government, presided by Count Franz Anton Kolowrat, promised in a Cabinet Letter of April 8, 1848 to fulfill these demands, with the exception of immediate autonomy.[12]

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[9] František Palacký, "O centralizaci a národní rovnoprávnosti," Národní Nowiny, 23 December 1848.

[10] St. Václac Committee, elected by a public assembly of several thousand inhabitants, who met in Prague at St. Václav Baths on March 11 at six o'clock in the evening. See more about the meeting and the committee's activity in Stanley Z. Pech, The Czech Revolution of 1848 (Chapell Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969), pp. 47-78.

[11] Ibid., p. 121.

In contrast to the flurry of political activity in 1848-49, the reaction which followed blocked all Czech political activity for almost a decade. Politically oriented newspapers, such as Národní Nowiny and Slovan, both edited by Havlíček, were suppressed, and the political persecution of prominent politicians and journalists followed, resulting in the premature death of Havlíček in 1856. Other politicians, like Palacký, avoided persecution by their complete withdrawal from political activity.[13] But his scholarly work and social contacts during the years of neo-absolutism had a permanent impact on Czech national development. Palacký established friendly relations with the most important Bohemian federalist nobles, although he himself was descended from a miller's family. His Protestant father had sent him to good Catholic and Protestant colleges, but Palacký's broad and excellent education was mostly a result of his own intensive studies, admirable diligence and self-discipline. His initiative and the quality of his scholarly work helped him to win over many Bohemian aristocrats for the Czech national cause, and his monumental study in the history of the Czech nation gained him international recognition. He remained the official historian of the Bohemian Kingdom as well as the leader of Czech politics until his death in 1876. During the reactionary era of the 1850s Palacký devoted himself to continuing, in Czech now, rather than in German, his History of the Czech Nation.[14] Indirectly, he was accomplishing a major political task for the Czechs because his history, contributing to the nation's self-knowledge, became one of the most important factors in establishing modern Czech national consciousness and sense of identity. In particular, his interpretation of the Hussite movement and the Czech Reformation inspired national pride and gave the Czechs a hitherto unknown sense of historical continuity. The humanitarian ideals of the Czech Reformation of the fifteenth century seemed to harmonize well with the liberal and humanitarian thinking of the eighteenth and early nineteenth century West European philosophers, whose influence was just beginning to be felt in the Austrian Empire.[15] Thus, neo-absolutism, although preventing implementation of political reforms and blocking all overt political activity, encouraged an introspection that actually contributed to the increase of national sentiment and to the popularization of a federal ideal among the non-German nationalities.

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[12] Ibid., p. 72.

[13] Even several decades later T.G. Masaryk was critical of Palacký for withdrawing so completely from politics after 1849. T.G. Masaryk, Česká otázka (Prague: Čas, 1895), p. 102.

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[14] Because of rigid and persistent censorship, Palacký gave up the idea of continuing his work beyond 1526, the year in which the Habsburgs became the ruling dynasty in the Lands of the Czech Crown.

[15] The most important of Palacký's ideas will be discussed later in this chapter.

The establishment of constitutional rule in the 1860s improved political conditions for the entire empire, but the establishment of Dualism in 1867 divided the multinational empire into two parts and its rule between the Germans and the Magyars; this increased fears among other nationalities of Germanization and Magyarization. Efforts to improve the existing political system were only partly successful. Although the political system moved toward gradual democratization, the privileges of some social groups and nationalities remained intact. A parliamentary system was established, but without true ministerial responsibility to the parliament, since the emperor and the government reserved crucial decision-making powers for themselves, and the government remained essentially dependent on the Crown, and not on parliamentary majorities. The parliamentary majority was achieved most often as a result of bargaining with and making concessions to certain parliamentary groups by the Minister-President, who was himself named by and responsible to the emperor. The tradition of parliamentary majority dependency on the government considerably restrained parliamentary initiative independent of the cabinet. The efficiency of the parliamentary system was further reduced because the Viennese parliament, Reichsrat, (Imperial Council) was not a truly representative body; it granted excessive representation to the aristocracy and the Germans. Non-German nationalities made numerous, largely unsuccessful, efforts to implement substantial changes in the political system, including the electoral law.

The basic electoral law for the Reichsrat's elections was established in 1861 by Anton von Schmerling (1805-1893), a conservative able bureaucrat with a liberal reputation, who introduced the principle of of centralism into the Austrian constitution. His programme called for a bicameral parliament and an electoral system based on representation of social and economic interests. The electoral districts were gerrymandered in such a way as to handicap the non-German nationalities. The most privileged groups were the great landowners and the Germans. "Individual votes in some districts weighed five times as much as in others."[16]

The Reichsrat had 343 members. Of these, Bohemia received fifty-four seats, Moravia twenty-two and Silesia six. The Bohemian Czechs received twenty seats and the Moravian Czechs four,[17] even though they constituted in Bohemia and Moravia approximately two-thirds of the population. Gradually, however, the number of their seats increased. Elections to the Reichsrat were indirect through the land diets until 1873, when a law introduced direct elections to neutralize federalists in the Bohemian Diet and to weaken their influence in the Reichsrat. In 1882 the franchise was extended from those paying ten gulden to those paying five gulden of direct tax. This did not include a military tax. In 1896 a "fifth curia" of universal suffrage was introduced. Finally in 1907 universal male suffrage was introduced. In all of these laws the privileged political position of the Germans was preserved. Article 14 of the Basic Law gave the government and crown the power of temporary emergency legislation when the Reichsrat was not assembled. This power was used increasingly after 1900.

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[16] Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 328-29.

[17] Karel Kazbunda, "K otázce české korunovace r. 1861," Český časopis historický 33 (1927): 99.

The monarchy's political system had very little flexibility and it became commonplace for the Viennese government to attempt the implementation of substantial political reforms only at times of extreme internal pressure, as in 1848 for example. Such reform might also be attempted at times of grave international failures, such as the lost war with Italy in 1859, the lost war with Prussia in 1866 or on the occasion of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, when a French victory was expected.

During the first half of the 1860s, hope for the implementation of a federal scheme was still nourished by the government; but after the resignation of Minister-President Count Belcredi[18] in September 1865, developments in Austria proceeded rapidly to the establishment of Dualism. Austria's defeat by Prussia in 1866 made the emperor and the Viennese government acquiescent to the Magyar demands, and Dualism was established in March 1867. Although Dualism was accepted by the new Viennese Parliament, its two-thirds German Liberal pro-government majority did not reflect the prevailing attitudes among the majority of nationalities who were against the division of the empire's rule between the Germans and the Magyars. The Bohemian and the Moravian Diets, having federalist majorities,[19] resisted the establishment of Dualism. But the government, aware that these diets would elect a majority of federalists to the *Reichsrat*, dissolved the diets on March 1, 1867. Through extensive pressures exerted upon the large landed gentry during the new elections at the end of March 1867, the government was able to obtain a majority, and the new parliament was willing to vote for the government's scheme for a dualistic establishment.[20]

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[18] When Count Belcredi visited Prague, Czech politicians presented him with a memorandum calling for greater autonomy for the Lands of the Czech Crown and for substantial changes in the electoral law for the diets of the Bohemian Kingdom. Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 2, p. 87. Czech politics of the Belcredi period is analyzed by Karel Kazbunda in "Česká politika na počátku éry Belcrediho," Český časopis historický 39 (1933): 102-19.

Most of the nationalities reacted to Dualism with bitterness. This was exarcerbated by the German and Magyar opposition to any further federal reorganization.[21] The political liberties and rights of the 1867 December Constitution were generally welcomed; however, they proved to be the more vulnerable aspects of that constitution than did the principles of Dualism and centralism. Article 19 of the 1867 Constitution became the focus for the controversy between Czech political representatives and the government. The article guaranteed equality of all nationalities and their languages. The problem arose out of the interpretation of this article. The government and the Germans insisted that the article applied only to individual citizens, while Czechs insisted that it applied to entire nations as well.[22] With the exception of the electoral law, whose foundation became increasingly more democratic with the reforms of 1882, 1896 and 1907, when it became universal for men aged twenty years (with one year residence in a particular electoral district). The principles of the 1867 December Constitution were not changed until 1918.

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[19] The Czech Diet in February 1867 consisted of: fifty Czechs and twenty-nine Germans representing rural areas, forty-one Czechs and forty-six Germans representing urban areas, and seventy landowners federalists. The Moravian Diet had fifty-six federalists and forty-four centralists. Tobolka, *Politické dějiny*, 2, 137.

[20] The government's pressures included various kinds of threats to the voters, confiscations of electoral proclamations of the opposition and zealous convincing of voters that voting for the federalists would be interpreted as an expression of disloyalty to the Emperor. Adolf Srb, *Politické dějiny národa českého od roku 1861*, 3 vols. (Prague: F. Šimáček, 1899-1901), 1, pp. 173-77, (hereafter cited as Srb, *Politické dějiny*). See also Jan Heidler, *České politické strany v Čechách, na Moravě a ve Slezsku* (Prague: J.R. Vilímek, 1914), p. 6 (hereafter cited as Heidler, *České politické strany*), and William Jenks, *The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 13.

[21] Beust, when justifying his opposition to a federal reform, argued that most Germans were centralists, disappointed with Dualism. Therefore, if greater decentralization were implemented, they would be further alienated and more susceptible to the influence of the Prussian and "Pan-Germanic" ideas. Tobolka, *Politické dějiny*, 2, p. 120.

Recent historical literature links the stagnation of the empire's political system and the insufficient initiative of the ruling strata in implementing badly needed political reforms more to Austrian foreign policy than did older historical literature. The domestic developments of a state are always interlocked with foreign policy, but in the case of the Habsburg Monarchy, the tie between foreign and domestic affairs after 1866, and particularly after the conclusion of a treaty between the monarchy and Germany in 1879, seems to have contributed strongly to the course of problems in domestic politics. This circumstance is probably more responsible for the break-up of the monarchy in 1918 than any other.[23] Austria's defeat at Sadowa in 1866 resulted in substantial changes in the empire's international position as well as in its internal political structure. German frustrations caused by Austria's exclusion from Germany in 1866 were only partly appeased by the provisions of the 1867 Constitution, which secured their dominant political position in Cisleithania. As a minority in Cisleithania, it was only natural that the Germans hoped for some kind of renewed ties with Germany to increase their feeling of security and prestige. Although the French defeat by the Germans in 1870-71 thwarted their hopes for a renewal of Austria's influence in Germany, the two countries soon began to strengthen their relations. It was Germany, however, not Austria, which gradually assumed the leading role in this alliance. The Austro-German ties formed by the military alliance of 1879 probably became the most decisive factor contributing to the strengthening of German opposition to further decentralization of the monarchy. The Austrian Germans became determined to preserve their privileged political position at any cost, despite the fact that forces favouring substantial political changes were strong.

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[22] Kann, History of the Habsburg Empire, pp. 339-40.

[23] The interaction between the monarchy's foreign and internal policy is analysed in detail by Wank, "Foreign Policy," pp. 37-56. His major thesis is that after 1867 the monarchy's foreign policy had to be adjusted to the domestic situation - namely, to the existence of Dualism. This development eventually led to the monarchy's collapse. Two of the most recent books on foreign policy of the Habsburg empire, Barbara Jelavic, The Habsburg Empire in European Affairs, 1814-1918 (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969) and F.R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo (London and Boston: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1972), do not specifically elaborate on relations between the monarchy's foreign and domestic policy.

Czech politicians were in the forefront of the struggle for the decentralization of the empire from 1848. At various periods different tactics were used to reach this goal. In 1848 Czech political representatives were very active in the Kroměříž Parliament, which had as its major aim the establishment of federalism. Between 1861 and 1879 the Czech National Party allied itself with the Bohemian federalist nobility in hopes of achieving the implementation of the federal reform through passive resistance, i.e. boycott of the Bohemian Diet and the Reichsrat. Between 1879 and 1890 the same party cooperated with the government and vied for partial national and cultural concessions. It was between 1891 and 1897 that the Czech Liberal Party, while in opposition to the government, used the floor of the *Reichsrat* to gain more parliamentary support for the federal idea and at the same time attempted to involve the broad strata of the Czech population in politics. After 1896 the so-called "policy of gradualism" was promoted, and when the Liberal Party started its cooperation with the Viennese government in April 1897, its position became approximately the same as that of the National Party between 1879 and 1891.

Although Czech politicians in 1848 had favoured the national (ethnic) principle for the establishment of federalism in the monarchy, in the early 1860s the National Party accepted a concept based on the special historical position and the rights of the individual crown lands. The position of the Bohemian Kingdom was theoretically defined by traditional laws and the Bohemian Constitution, called the Bohemian *Staatsrecht*. It consisted of a series of compacts, issued by Ferdinand II in 1627 and Charles VI in 1720, which were approved by the Bohemian, Moravian and Silesian Diets.[24] The Bohemian *Staatsrecht* provided legal justification for the indivisibility of the Bohemian Kingdom, the contractual nature of its relation to the Habsburg Monarchy and the right to legislative and administrative independence. From the Czech point of view centralism was not only impractical, but legally unjustifiable, because it developed as a result of insufficient respect for laws on the part of the monarchs. The explanation of reasons why the Czech politicians accepted the "territorial" concept for establishing federalism in the monarchy provides a starting point for the examination of the initial significant differences between the National Party and the Young Czechs.

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[24] The first proponents of the territorial concept for Austrian federalism were the Magyar politicians, led by Count Eötvös. Jan Kapras, "K českému politickému programu do převratu," *Sborník věd právních a státních* (Prague: Česká akademie věd a umění, 1932), p. 698.

The Czech National Party made its first major political move in June 1860 when it demanded Czech representation in the Vienna parliament and diets and Czech language rights. The petition that the party sent to the Emperor Franz Joseph was the only avenue open for its members to make the emperor and the *Reichsrat* aware of "needs" of the Czech nation. In 1860, there was yet no cooperation between the Czech politicians and the Bohemian nobility, who made no effort to represent Czech interests in the *Reichsrat*.[25] Twelve spokesmen of the National Party led by Palacký and Rieger asked for representation for all strata of the Bohemian population in the Bohemian Diet and for the introduction of Czech as the language of instruction for all Czech schoolchildren. They also demanded the foundation of a Czech national theatre and daily newspaper, equality of Czech with German in "internal" state and judicial administration in Czech regions, and the renewal of the contract of 1627 between the emperor and the Lands of the St. Wenceslas Crown. The latter request implied the coronation of Franz Joseph as a Bohemian King.[26] This demand, as well as that for equality of the Czech language in the Bohemian Kingdom, remained unfulfilled until the break up of the monarchy. The petition of the National Party was to become the party's programme for many years to come, although its platform soon became based more definitively on principles of the Bohemian Staatsrecht than on ethnic, liberal and democratic principles.

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[25] The petition was formulated primarily by F.L. Rieger, who was assisted by Count Rudolf Taxis and Jan Jeřábek. Other signataries were J.E. Purkyně, Hanke, F.A. Brauner, Count Thurn, F. Pštross, J. Macháček, J. Jelínek, J. Šimek, P.J. Řezáč, Kodym and J. Palacký. A detailed summary of the petition is in Tobolka, *Politické dějiny*, 2, 21-23.

[26] The Emperor Ferdinand I was the last Austrian monarch crowned as Bohemian King (September 7, 1836).

Since the petition failed to have any practical result, the National Party had to seek other means to advance its programme. As the Austrian authorities objected less to the principle of historical-territorial entities for decentralization than to the national principle, the cooperation between the National Party and the Bohemian federalist nobility seemed to provide optimum conditions for advancing the Czech national interests. Although the privileged political position of the nobility added the needed political strength to the National Party, some serious problems in this alliance were evident. The feudal basis of the aristocrats' federal concept was alien to the social and political feelings of Czech politicians. Nevertheless, they gradually accommodated their policy to the views of the Bohemian federalist nobility, led by Count J.J. Clam-Martinic (1826-1887). In return, some aristocrats became supportive of the Czech national and cultural aspirations. In the 1860s Counts K. Schwarzenberg, J. Harrach, Prince J. Lobkowicz and Baron R. Hildenbrandt were the most prominent members of this group.[27] But the majority of the Bohemian nobles in the Reichsrat, led by Count Carlos Auersperger (1814-1890), were uninterested in federalism. The cooperation between the National Party and the Bohemian federalist aristocrats was first apparent in January 1861, when their common programme was formulated. It aimed at the "restoration of the independence of the Bohemian Kingdom" in the framework of the monarchy, and for the "equality of the Czech language in administration and schools."[28] Their efforts for decentralization intensified after publication of the Emperor's February Patent of 1861 which in comparison to the October Diploma of 1860 resulted in increased centralization.

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[27] Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 2, 39.

The struggle against centralism was keenly felt in the Reichsrat which in this period had 343 members, twenty-four of whom were Czechs. The majority of the Reichsrat was pro-government and hostile to any federal reorganization of the empire. The "Right," a group of thirty-five to fifty federalists, was in a very difficult position. Its members were often not even allowed to express their opinions or to finish their speeches, although they represented the majority view in the empire. The Bohemian federalists were opposed not only to centralism but also to Dualism which, owing to Magyar pressures upon the government, was gaining acceptance. It was under such conditions that the Bohemian federalists speculated that if they followed the Hungarian example and left the Reichsrat the government would take them more seriously and meet some of their demands. Although the idea of "passive resistance" was not favoured by some prominent members of the National Party, for by such action the opportunity for improvement of Czech schooling, economy and culture would be decreased, the National Party joined the nobles in abstention from the Reichsrat and the Bohemian Diet from June 17, 1863 until 1879. Czech deputies from Moravia followed their Bohemian colleagues a year later, but ended their passive resistance earlier in 1874.[29]

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[28] Heidler, České politické strany, p. 5; Kapras, "K českému politickému programu do převratu," p. 700.

[29] Stanley Z. Pech, "Passive Resistance of Czechs, 1863-1879," Slavonic and East European Review, 36 (1957-58): 437.

Despite popular sentiment and strong opposition Dualism was established in March 1867 and together with centralism it became the major feature of the empire's political system for the rest of its existence. It seems, however, that in the early 1860s it was still feasible to implement changes in the political system to encourage more mutual trust and respect among the empire's nationalities and more flexibility for solving existing problems. There was a general awareness of the possible consequences of centralism and Dualism; indeed, the forces opposing them were strong and articulate in expressing their views.

František Palacký took pains to analyze these consequences in relation to the internal stability of the monarchy. His analysis appeared as a series of articles in 1865 in Nårod under the title "The Idea of the Austrian State."[30] He preserved his basic ideas of 1848, still considering the monarchy a useful bulwark against German and Russian expansion. Since the Czechs had "nowhere to go" if the empire collapsed, it was in their interest to make all possible efforts to preserve the monarchy as a whole and to strive for internal reforms. The implementation of true constitutionalism and federalism, claimed Palacký, was the major prerequisite for the prevention of serious trouble. He believed that Dualism would greatly weaken the Austro-Slavic concept in the monarchy because the majority of Slavs would remain in Hungary, and the Prussian influence upon the western part of the empire would increase. He was afraid not only of the increase of Germanization and Magyarization but also of the "birth of Pan-Slavism in its least desirable form" as a result of the weakened position of the Slavs in the empire.[31]

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[30] František Palacký, Idea stắtu rakouského (Prague: I.L. Kober, 1865). Palacky's early political ideas are summarized in T.G. Masaryk, The Meaning of Czech History, ed. and with an Introduction by René Wellek, trans. Peter Kussi (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), pp. 122-42.

But Palacky's attempts to influence those involved in the political decision-making process were without success. Germans continued to perceive themselves as the only true safeguard of the monarchy's existence and, moreover, they denounced any attempts to grant decentralization or equal political and national rights to other nationalities as separatist tendencies and a threat to the empire's existence.

The failure of the empire's federalists to prevent the establishment of Dualism doomed the National Party to a continuation of passive resistance. The party's subordination to the aristocrats' stand met with stubborn opposition from the younger members who feared not only political inactivity but the influence of conservatism and clericalism upon the party. They were particularly afraid that the democratic orientation of the party and its understanding of social problems would be diminished. As the National Party continued to lend support to the nobility, internal dissension within the party grew rapidly.

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[31] Ibid., p. 67. Palacký was partly right about the rebirth of Slavophilism and Russophilism among Czechs. Both occurred to some degree after the establishment of Dualism. For example, Palacký's and Rieger's participation in the ethnographic exhibition in Moscow in May and June 1867 was a manifestation of both. A fine monograph on the subject of Russian Panslavism, which describes the Slavs Congress in Moscow, has been written by Michael B. Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856-1870 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956). Participation of Czechs at the Congress is dealt with by Karel Kazbunda, Pouť Čechů do Moskvy a rakouská diplomacie (Prague: Orbis, 1924). Nevertheless most Czech politicians, including Palacký and Rieger, remained very critical of Russian political realities and of the Russian understanding of Panslavism, based on Orthodoxy and a common Russian language. They used Panslavism mostly to press the government for concessions, but without any success. Národní listy from time to time published Slavophile and Russophile articles, which probably had some impact on a segment of its readers. The origins of Panslavism among smaller Slavic nations are treated in considerable details by Hans Kohn, Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology, 2nd ed., rev. (New York: Vintage Books, 1960). Hugo Hantsch analyses specific problems of Pan-Slavism in "Pan-Slavism, Austro-Slavism, Neo-Slavism: The All-Slav Congresses and the Nationality Problems of Austria-Hungary," Austrian History Yearbook, 1 (1965): 23-37. Czech Panslavism and Russophilism is analyzed by Stanley B. Winters in "Austroslavism, Panslavism, and Russophilism in Czech Political Thought, 1870-1900," Intellectual and Social Developments in the Habsburg Empire from Maria Theresa to World War I, eds. Stanley B. Winters and Joseph Held (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp. 175-202. His article gives a good review of existing historical literature on the topic.

The first serious division of opinion in the National Party occurred in relation to the Polish uprising against the Russians in 1863. The Young Czechs, admiring the courage of the Poles, openly criticized Palacký and Rieger who considered the Polish action rather irresponsible. The Young Czechs were so irritated by the attitude of Palacký and Rieger that Count Rudolf Taxis suggested the establishment of a new political party. But his proposal was rejected by other Young Czechs, such as J. Grégr, K. Sladkovský, J. S. Skrejšovský and A. O. Zeithammer, since the Young Czechs were not numerically strong yet.[32] Since Národní listy sided with the Young Czechs, Palacký and Rieger founded a new newspaper Národ (The Nation), which became representative of the more conservative opinions in the National Party.

The most serious point of friction between the core of the party and the Young Czechs was the policy of passive resistance. Not only did the Young Czechs consider passive resistance harmful to Czech cultural and economic development, but they completely disagreed with the Old Czechs' belief that passive resistance combined with vigorous Czech public opposition to Dualism would force the government to agree to further decentralization of the empire.[33] As the Young Czechs felt that their arguments against passive resistance were increasingly more justified, the idea of founding a new party began to gain momentum. Nevertheless, the formal unity of the party was preserved until 1874. The most significant action of the party after 1867 was the Declaration of August 22, 1868 addressed to the Bohemian Diet.[34] The rejection of Dualism was its major theme. Czech politicians justified this position by the fact that Dualism was established by a Reichsrat majority that did not represent the prevailing opinions of the empire's nationalities. The Reichsrat's disregard for the rights and powers of land diets came under the special scrutiny of the National Party, which did not see centralism sufficiently compensated by constitutional rights and freedoms because the relevant laws were deliberately formulated in vague terms.

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[32] Srb, Politické dějiny, 1, p. 64-65.

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[33] The Viennese government employed highly oppressive methods to suppress Czech public demonstrations against Dualism, which often took the form of so called "tábory" gatherings of several thousand people at some historical point of interest. A state of siege in Prague and environs lasted for six months, a considerable part of the Czech press was suppressed, and numerous editors and politicians were arrested. In Prague alone 144 people were sentenced to a total of 81 years, 11 months and 22 days. Ernst Denis, Čechy po Bilé Hoře, trans. Jindřich Vančura, 2 vols. (Prague: Šolc and Šimáček, 1905), 2, p. 481; see also František Roubík, Bibliografie českého časopisectva z let 1863-1895 (Prague: Česká akademie věd a umění, 1936), pp. IX and 267. The repressions committed by the Viennese government in 1867-1877 against the Czechs were described by Jakub Arbes, in his two-volume book Pláč koruny české (Prague: F. Bačkorský, 1894). Some aspects of this persecution are mentioned by Arthur J. May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 52.

[34] The full text of the Declaration with the signatures of eighty-one Czech political representatives is in Srb, Politické dějiny, 1, pp. 220-27. All other numerous documents published in subsequent years and addressed to the emperor and the government usually referred to the Declaration. This applies, for example, to an extensive "Address" to the emperor supplemented by a "Commemorative Document" sent by the Bohemian Diet on September 14, 1870. Ibid., pp. 281-97.

In 1870 the Bohemian federalists took new hope from the prospect of a French victory over Prussia, because Louis Napoleon had a reputation of being favourably disposed to the struggle of non-ruling nationalities.[35] Negotiations for greater autonomy for the Bohemian Kingdom began between Count Alfred Potocki's government and Bohemian representatives when the war between France and Prussia broke out in July. The talks lasted more than a year. The emperor as well as several members of the cabinet, including both Minister-President Count Potocki and Count Siegmund Hohenwart, were sincerely interested in weakening the German Left (centralists) in the Reichsrat and in cooperation with Czech political representatives. The international situation at the beginning of the negotiations insured that German resistance to them was less pronounced. The negotiations were underlain by the content of the Emperor's Rescript of September 26, 1870, addressed to the Bohemian Diet.[36] The Rescript was slightly moderated by a new one issued on September 12, 1871. Franz Joseph recognised in both of them the Bohemian Staatsrecht, promised his coronation as Bohemian King and pledged a reform of the electoral law to ensure Czechs a majority of seats in the Bohemian Diet. Most important was his promise to establish the Bohemian Kingdom as an historical and political entity with specifically defined political rights and to increase the powers of the Bohemian Diet.

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[35] F.L. Rieger attempted to influence Napoleon III through a "Memorandum" sent to him in June 1869. He tried to gain Napoleon's sympathy for a federal reorganization of the monarchy, which in his view would help to decrease the influence of Prussia in Austria, and thus would work also for the interest of France. Detailed content account of the Memorandum is in Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 2, pp. 174-75.

[36] The full text of the Rescript is in Srb, Politické dějiny, 1, pp. 304-306. The Bohemian Diet had at this period 241 members of whom 236 were elected: seventy represented large landowners, seventy-two cities (which were still mostly German) and seventy-nine rural inhabitants. Denis, Čechy po Bílé Hoře, 2, p. 643.

The Emperor's Rescripts, however, were never implemented, mainly because of vigorous German[37] and Magyar[38] opposition to any further decentralization of the empire.[39] The German victory over France was probably the single most instrumental factor in strengthening the Austro-Germans' opposition to any reduction of their privileged political position, and thus all serious attempts to bring the empire's political structure closer to its national, cultural and economic realities ended in the early 1870s in frustration. Dissatisfaction was to persist until the dissolution of the empire. The Emperor's Rescript of 1871 became not only a permanent reminder of de jure recognition of the Bohemian

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[37] The early 1870's are viewed by some historians as the period that gave birth to the Pan German movement in Austria. The rise of Austro-German self confidence to previously unknown heights was mainly the result of the German victory over France and the unification of Germany. This is the view, for example, of Arthur May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914, p. 59. The whole issue of Pan-Germanism is dealt with in Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1955). The Austrian Pan-Germanism was most recently analyzed by Andrew G. Whiteside, The Socialism of Fools (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1975).

[38] The most traditional explanation of Magyar opposition to greater independence for the Lands of the Czech Crown is that such a reform would serve as an undesirable example for Slavic nationalities in Hungary: May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914, p. 61.

[39] The most detailed analysis of the failure to implement a federal reform in 1871 is in Karel Kazbunda, "Ke zmaru českého vyrovnání," Český časopis historický 37 (1931): 512-73. Kazbunda maintains on the basis of previously unavailable sources that German and Hungarian opposition to further decentralization, and not excessive Czech demands, was the major cause of failure. This goes against the commonly accepted belief found in older Czech historical literature.

Staatsrecht by Franz Joseph, but also a bitter precedent to which Czech politicians made reference for decades in their effort to implement federal reform. While it gradually became clearer that to gain support for federalism from the German politicians was an unrealistic goal, most of the Bohemian federalists were loath to abandon their belief that passive resistance would eventually gain substantial concessions from the emperor and the Viennese government.

The Czech policy of passive resistance, as the only significant formal response to political developments after 1871, remained in force until 1878, despite growing disagreement between the Young Czechs and the Old Czechs about its usefulness. Already in 1874, the issue of passive resistance precipitated the complete rupture between the Young Czechs and the National Party. When the National Party's deputies from the Bohemian Diet met in Prague on November 24, 1873 and decided by forty-seven to thirty-five votes against participation in the diet, twenty-nine out of eighty-four Czech deputies resigned their seats in disagreement.[40] The Young Czechs decided to seek voters' support independently of the National Party, with the plan of entering the Bohemian Diet after the elections. They did not intend to enter the *Reichsrat*, because their attitude to Dualism did not differ from the National Party's official stand and, moreover, they knew that their presence in the *Reichsrat* would make no difference in parliament where the German centralists formed the majority, however artificially.[41] Because of the great prestige of Palacký and Rieger, the Young Czechs' act of independence, which upset the unity of the Czech political movement was only partly appreciated by the public. Only seven of the twenty-nine deputies who had resigned were re-elected in July 1874.[42] They entered the Bohemian Diet immediately and focused their work on economic issues, cultural development, Czech schooling and agitation against passive resistance.[43] Gradually they broadened the scope of their activity, particularly intensifying their communication with the Czech public.

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[40] The split between the National Party and the Liberal Party is described from the Old Czechs' point of view by Karel Mattuš, *Paměti* (Prague: Svatobor, 1891), pp. 89-91. From the Young Czechs' point of view it is described by Eduard Grégr, *K objasněni našich domácich sporů* (Prague: Eduard Grégr, 1874). Grégr pointed to the liberalism of the Young Czechs and their opposition to the National Party's passive resistance as the major underlying reason for the split.

The split between the Young Czechs and the Old Czechs culminated in the founding of a new political party at the first Congress of the Young Czechs on December 22, 1874, in Prague. It came into existence under the name of the Liberal Party (Národní strana svobodomyslná). The party programme was worked out by a few of the most prominent Young

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[41] The Viennese government destroyed the influence of the federalist majority in the Bohemian Diet upon the Reichsrat by introducing, in 1873, direct elections into the Reichsrat. This action was a violation of constitutional Austrian law, because the government completely excluded the land diets from sharing the legal responsibility for such a change of law.

[42] The Young Czechs had thirty-three candidates, of whom six were elected in rural areas and one in an urban area. Srb, Politické dějiny 2:465. Several months later two more Young Czechs were elected. Despite their numerical weakness in the Diet, the statistics showed that around one-third of the Czech electorate in Bohemia supported the Young Czechs at the beginning of their independent career. Václav Škarda, Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program (Prague: Beaufort, 1897), p. 5, (hereafter cited as Škarda, Národní strana svobodomyslná).

[43] Tobolka, Politické dějiny 2:332. The Young Czech deputies were: J. Pražák, E. Grégr, P. Trojan, A. Mayersbach, J. Hruška, Husák and Nittinger. Srb, Politické dějiny 2: 465.

Czechs, including Karel Sladkovský and Julius Grégr, who also organized the congress.[44] It was accepted by the majority of eight hundred congress participants, and it remained the basis for the Liberal Party's work until 1889, when a new, more far-reaching programme was adopted.[45]

The 1874 programme was based on the assumption that a small nation could maintain its existence only if a great number of its people were well educated and enlightened. The party's emphasis on work with the mass of the population was partly a reaction to the National Party's neglect of such work. The programme stressed the party's intention to struggle for political freedoms, for equal rights for all, for greater autonomy for the Bohemian Kingdom on the basis of the Staatsrecht, for universal male suffrage and for abolition of indirect voting in rural areas and the division of voters into curiae. Other important parts of the programme concerned educational reform. The Liberal Party was to aim for free elementary and secondary schooling, and for the foundation of a Czech university in Prague. The Young Czechs were also to strive for improvements in agriculture and industry as well as for improved economic and working conditions for the working class. The abandonment of the passive resistance of the National Party was proclaimed the most pressing goal. It was felt that full Czech participation in representative bodies would give the Czechs a voice and allow for policies more favourable to the nation's cultural and economic advancement.

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[44] Karel Tůma, Život Dr. Julia Grégra (Prague: Beaufort, 1896), p. 249.

[45] All programmes of the Liberal Party between 1874-1897 are to be found in Škarda, Národní strana svobodomyslná. Garver in The Young Czech Party considers the programme of 1874 to be the most important and does not elaborate much on later programmes. This does not accurately reflect the ideological development of the Liberal Party after 1889.

The formal division of the Czech political camp in 1874 was accompanied by wrangling between the Old and the Young Czechs, lasting until 1878, when the latter returned to a united front. František Rieger, the leader of the Old Czechs after Palacký's death in 1876, retained his predecessor's opinion that any disruption of Czech political unity would endanger national development. The "renegades," therefore, were under continuous attack in the National Party press. Rieger's condition for ending hostilities against the Liberal Party was the Young Czechs' resignation of their mandates and their subordination to the leadership of the National Party.[46]

Although the Young Czechs were eager for reconciliation, they were not willing to abandon their basic political attitudes and opinions. One of their most prominent personalities, Eduard Grégr (1827-1907), actively worked for the renewal of understanding between the parties. Prominent in Czech politics from 1861 when he gave up his practice as a physician, he favoured a more democratic, liberal and anticlerical direction for the National Party than that promoted by Palacký and Rieger. He was a deputy in the Bohemian Diet from 1861 and in the Reichsrat from 1883 until his death in 1907. Grégr never agreed with the subordination of the National Party to the Bohemian federalist nobility. Until 1882 he considered the national-ethnic principle for decentralization of the monarchy as more beneficial and realistic than one based on historical territories. From 1872 he vigorously agitated against the policy of passive resistance and, being a good orator, his speeches had considerable impact.[47] Although he was in the forefront of those favouring the split between the Young and the Old Czechs, he believed that both parties should seek understanding and cooperation to be more effective in their work for the benefit of the Czech nation.

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[46] Mattuš, Paměti, p. 95.

Grégr expressed his views about the state of Czech politics in an open letter to Rieger in 1876.[48] Grégr described himself as non-partisan, yet most of his views may be taken as representative of the Young Czechs. Grégr held passive resistance to be responsible for the relative stagnation of Czech economy and culture. The failure of the National Party to realize the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* through passive resistance was viewed as a sign that the major course of Czech political activity had to be changed. Grégr argued that participation in representative bodies would make possible more effective work in the cultural, economic and political spheres. Moreover, he considered the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* as a less realistic basis for decentralization of the monarchy than the national principle, which would enlist the cooperation of the other non-German nationalities in the struggle for federalism. He also criticized the narrow social basis of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* and urged the National Party to include in its programme considerations for the economic, political and social needs of the majority of Czechs. He emphasized the need for a consistent democratization of the political system, and urged the political parties to involve themselves in the process of educating the masses, especially in the political sphere. He suggested that cooperation between the National Party and the Liberal Party start by ending passive resistance and working out a new, more farreaching approach to Czech politics. Grégr's broader understanding of the political situation had a more realistic basis than the radical Staatsrecht position of the National Party, despite his overestimation of the possibilities for a decentralization of the empire on the basis of the national principle. His belief that it was possible to involve the broad strata of the Czech population in political education and participation was proven feasible by the Liberal Party in the following decades.

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[47] From Zdeněk Tobolka's introduction to Eduard Grégr, *Denník*, 2 vols. (Prague: Český čtenář, 1908 and 1914), 1: III-XIV.

[48] Eduard Grégr, *Naše politika* (Prague: Eduard Grégr, 1876). This publication was preceded by a smaller brochure in which Grégr agitated against passive resistance: Eduard Grégr, *Má-li se jíti na sněm* (Prague: E. Grégr and F. Dattel, 1873).

Although by 1878 both parties wished to end passive resistance, their motives for welcoming the opportunity at that time, when Count Edward Taaffe (1833-1895) became prime minister, were different. While the Liberal Party was mainly interested in parliamentary work, the National Party hoped to receive substantial concessions for the Czech nation through its cooperation with the government. Since the German Left withdrew its traditional support from the government over the issue of the occupation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, because the new territory meant a considerable increase in the number of Slavs in the empire, the government was inclined to make some concessions to the Czechs in return for their support. In the Speech from the Throne in 1878, the legal nature of the historical position of the Bohemian

Kingdom was recognized in principle,[49] and Count Taaffe promised the appointment of one Czech minister without portfolio and to increase the representation of the Bohemian nobility in the Reichsrat by ten seats.

The leadership of the National Party did not consider these promises sufficient because Count Taaffe did not respond to Rieger's demand for several Czech positions at Charles University in Prague, the division of the Bohemian School Board along national lines and the coronation of Franz Joseph as the Bohemian King.[50] Rieger's demand for greater "autonomy" of the kingdom also remained unsatisfied because of German opposition; however, Taaffe promised that concessions would come gradually, in a step-by-step approach.[51] Since the Liberal Party believed in achieving positive results by its work in representative bodies, it did not share Rieger's insistence on the fulfillment of Czech demands as a condition for ending passive resistance and entering the Reichsrat. As the rapprochement between the Old Czechs and the Young Czechs was within sight, the latter exerted great pressure upon Rieger to soften his rather unrealistic position. After weeks of negotiations between the Czech political spokesmen and the government, the National Party officially ended passive resistance without any concrete concessions from Taaffe. This development was accompanied by renewed cooperation between the Old Czechs and the Young Czechs,[52] which in reality meant subordination of the Young Czechs to the leadership of the National Party in a common "club" of deputies until 1887. Nevertheless, the most prominent Young Czech promoter of reconciliation, Eduard Grégr, disagreed with the terms of reconciliation, and discontinued his membership in the "club" until 1883.[53]

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[49] Heidler, České politické strany, p. 8.

[50] Pech, "Passive resistance of Czechs," p. 449.

[51] Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 2:394.

[52] Mattuš, Paměti, p. 27.

Czech representatives to the Reichsrat from Bohemia and Moravia formed the "Czech Club" of fifty-three members. The "club" cooperated with the Poles, Hohenwart's Catholic Club and, together with the Slovenes, the Croatians from Dalmatia and the Romanians from Bukovina, formed the so-called "Iron Ring" of 168 deputies of the Right, supporting Taaffe's government.[54] The opportunity for "exercising pressures" on Taaffe in the future was, however, diminished by his threat to turn back to the German Liberals for support if the "Iron Ring" became too demanding.[55]

The Czech Club of deputies, under the leadership of the National Party, immediately urged concessions for the Czech nation. Theoretically, the party still strove for the fulfillment of the Bohemian Staatsrecht, but in practice the Staatsrecht was mentioned only in the regular addresses to the emperor read at the beginning of the Reichsrat's and diet's sessions. More attention was given to formulating more practical changes to benefit the Czech nation. As early as November, 1879, four memoranda were sent to the emperor, asking for the establishment of equality of the Czech language with the Germans in the Bohemian political and judicial administration, at the University of Prague and in secondary and business schools. Czech politicians also wanted Charles-Ferdinand University to be divided into Czech and German faculties, an increase of Czech schools in Bohemia and Moravia.[56] Although the memoranda reflected the Czech endeavour to correct only the most glaring symptoms of the inequitable position of the Czech nation in the monarchy, the National Party gradually achieved the fulfillment only of its most moderate demands.

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[53] Introduction by Z. Tobolka in Grégr, Denník 2, p. XXVI.

[54] The Taaffe "era" is explored by W.A. Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, 1879-1893 (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 1965).

[55] Ibid., p. 53.

As in the past, the political methods of the Old Czechs became a target of increasing criticism on the part of the Young Czechs. While in practice they subordinated their views to the majority of the Czech Club, in theory they retained their distinct programme, reconfirmed at the Liberal Party's Third Congress in Prague on September 4, 1879.[57] The Liberal Party's more democratic orientation was the most visible difference from the National Party. The major aims of the party were formulated in terms of the equality of Czech and German in the Bohemian Kingdom, an extension of the kingdom's autonomy, introduction of true political freedoms, universal suffrage, and the passage of laws to improve the economic situation of the workers. The Young Czechs intended to resist clericalism, and on the issue of occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina they were to take a position that would not differ from the attitude maintained by the population of both provinces to the occupation.[58]

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[56] Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 3, Pt. 1: 33-36. Also Srb, Politické dějiny, 2: 565-66.

[57] The Proclamation is published in full in Škarda, Národni strana svobodomyslná a její program, p. 23-24.

[58] The Young Czechs decided to abstain from voting on the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the Czech Club in the Reichsrat decided, with some reservations, to vote for the governmental proposal, Srb, Politické dějiny, 2:573.

As the Young Czechs did not succeed in persuading the majority of the Czech Club to accept some of their views, tensions between the Young Czechs and the Old Czechs remained unresolved, despite the fact that the Czech Club did gain some valuable concessions during the first years of Taaffe's administration. Although the Stremayer linguistic decrees of 1880[59] did not allow for the complete equality of Czech and German in the Bohemian Kingdom, they did introduce the Czech language into usage between the administration and the public and, to some extent, into inner administrative communication; henceforth records were to be kept in the same language as the application originally handed to the office. In Moravia and Silesia the use of Czech was broadened only slightly in comparison with Bohemia.[60] The language decrees made possible greater penetration of educated Czechs into the administration.[61] Electoral reform, introduced on October 4, 1882, however, was far from meeting Czech demands. The new law only extended the franchise from those paying ten gulden of direct taxes to those paying five gulden. In October 1885 a similar electoral reform affecting the Bohemian Diet was slightly more democratic, because the five gulden tax included the extraordinary military tax. Although in rural areas elections remained indirect, one elector was elected for two hundred fifty primary voters rather than for five hundred; the principle of representation of interest groups was preserved. German representatives resisted such reform for the diet, because from 1885 on the Czechs were able to hold a majority of seats. The Moravian Germans succeeded in preventing the introduction of a similar reform for more than a decade.[62] In 1882 the government fulfilled another Czech demand. The division of the Charles-Ferdinand University in Prague into separate Czech and German institutions was accomplished. But in response to vigorous German opposition to the move, Germans received "preferential treatment" in "dividing the physical assets of the institution."[63]

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[59] The full text of Stremayer's linguistic decrees is available in Srb, Politické dějiny, 2:575-76.

[60] Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 3, Pt. 1:46. The resistance of Germans to the Stremayer decrees is described in Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, pp. 90-103.

[61] The process of "Czechization" of governmental and judicial administration in Bohemia was later recognized as very important for Czech national and political development. Josef Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách v letech 1878-1918, 2 vols. (Prague: Český čtenář, 1930-31), 1:28. In more recent literature Skilling elaborates on this issue: Skilling, "The Politics of the Czech Eighties," p. 258.

Improvements in the position of the Czech nation, however, considerably contributed to increased tensions between the Bohemian Germans and the Czechs. Each concession to the Czechs met with strong opposition of the German political representatives. Having lost a part of their political position as a consequence of the German Liberals' shift to the opposition in 1878 in the Reichsrat and the loss of their majority in the Bohemian Diet after 1885, they incorporated the demand for the division of Bohemia along national lines as a permanent part of their programme[64] in order to secure their remaining political privileges. At the same time they wanted German to be the official language of Cisleithania. Their basic platform was formulated in a proposal of 1883, which became a basis for numerous, yet fruitless, negotiations between the Czech and German representatives until the end of the 1880s.[65] The more energetic conduct of the Young Czechs evoked vigorous resistance to reforms favourable to the Czechs. The leader of the German Liberals, Ernst von Plener (1810-1908), even maintained that "the Young Czechs were aiming at an independent Czech national state,"[66] to justify the Liberals' struggle for preservation of the Germans' dominant position in Bohemia. Since the demand for division of Bohemia along national lines became a permanent part of all German programmes, the Czech Liberal Party came to appreciate the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* as the legal safeguard for the unity of the lands of the Czech Crown. It is mainly for this reason that the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* was included as a fundamental part of its programme from the early 1880s.

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[62] Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 3, Pt. 1: 105-106.

[63] Although the "state appropriation for the German institution were disproportionally large," the number of students at the Czech University soon considerably exceeded enrollment at the German institution. May, The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 196. In 1892 the Czech University had 2,240 students and 108 professors; the German University had in the same year 1,457 students and 110 professors. "Školství v říši rakousko-uherské," Národní listy, 9 September 1892.

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[64] Kamil Krofta, *Byli jsme za Rakouska* (Prague: Orbis, 1936), p. 379. Kann in *History of the Habsburg Empire*, p. 440, states that this German demand was made in response to the Czech demand for the establishment of Czech as "the only official language throughout the two crownlands, even in German districts." This is rather improbable, because Czechs never made such a demand. More likely, German demand was a result of the German failure to prevent the introduction of the Stremayer linguistic decrees in 1880, and the failure to press German as the official language of the western part of the empire, as moved in the *Reichsrat* by Herbst and Wurmbrand in May 1880. For more about these motions see Jenks, *Austria Under the Iron Ring*, p. 90.

[65] Kamil Krofta, *Němci v Čechách* (Prague: Orbis, 1927), p. 28.

[66] Andrew Gladding Whiteside, *Austrian National Socialism before 1918* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), p. 16.

As a result of the gradual democratization of the Austrian political system,[67] Czechs began to view their numerical superiority in the Bohemian Kingdom as a kind of guarantee that their national, cultural and economic development would not be suppressed. There was no longer a need to sacrifice the unity of the kingdom in order to preserve the national identity of the Czechs.[68] Satisfied with their intensive cultural development, which by the 1880s was very close to German cultural development,[69] their ambitions turned towards obtaining political equality with the Germans in the Bohemian Kingdom. Meanwhile, failure to forestall the recent Czech gains, and fear that these encroachments on their traditionally dominant position would continue, led the Germans to adopt a course of passive resistance in the Bohemian Diet.

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[67] Whiteside elaborates on this. Ibid., pp. 11-13. But he elaborates for the most part on the positive aspects of the democratization of the monarchy's political system, although the shortcomings of this process became more important in relation to the monarchy's destiny. For example, Whiteside considers as a sign of growing democracy the fact that the German Liberals "continued to hold key posts in administration, finance and industry" even after they declined to insignificance" in the Reichsrat." This is a questionable evaluation, considering their political attitudes, particularly in relation to the monarchy's other nationalities.

[68] The idea of dividing Bohemia and Moravia on national lines originated with the Czechs, who had tried unsuccessfully to implement it in 1848 and 1871 because, at the time, they were afraid of Germanization. In the 1880s, however, they no longer favoured the idea. Now they saw bilingualism as more advantageous to the Czech national development, since the Czech intelligentsia was already bilingual. Moreover, Czechs no longer felt that it was necessary to divide the Bohemian Kingdom to preserve their nationality. Since Germans were not bilingual and felt the obligation to learn Czech an imposition, the division of Bohemia on a national basis seemed to them to be the only way to prevent further "Czechization" of the kingdom.

[69] Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, p. 274.

The abstention of all German deputies from the Diet still allowed it to function because a two-thirds majority was preserved, composed of Czechs and representatives of the nobility; however, national tensions in Bohemia increased and some difficulties were created for the government which gradually became inclined to bargain with the Germans in hope of ending their passive resistance.[70]

The government's conciliatory attitude to the demands of the Bohemian Germans at the end of the 1880s contributed to the growing difficulties of the National Party. Following the intial years of Taaffe's administration, when several concessions were made to the Czechs, the government became reluctant to grant them any more privileges. The National Party's failure to achieve an increase in the number of Czech secondary schools in Moravia[71] and its inability to prevent the abolition of several Czech schools in Bohemia[72] further diminished its popularity.

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[70] German efforts to strengthen their political position at the Bohemian Diet during the first half of the 1880s are described in Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 2, Pt. 1: 119-38.

[71] In Moravia a total of 1,508,000 Czechs had eleven secondary schools, and 629,000 Germans had thirty-two. Karel Kazbunda, "Krize české politiky a vídeňská jednání o tzv, punktace roku 1890," Český časopis historický 40 (1934): 85, (hereafter cited as Kazbunda, "Krize české politiky").

[72] Several Czech secondary schools in Bohemia were abolished in 1887 by Minister of Education, Paul Gautsch, who justified the closures by pointing to the economic crisis. Ibid. The failure of the National Party to prevent these closures weakened the support of the Czech electorate for the party. Zdeněk V. Tobolka, ed., Česká politika, 5 vols. (Prague: Jan Laichter 1906-13), 3: 467-71, (hereafter cited as Tobolka, ed., Česká politika). Karel Kramář, who was to become a prominent Young Czech in the 1890s, wrote that only schools which were not needed were actually abolished, Ibid., p. 471.

The Liberal Party escalated its criticism of the National Party for its unfulfilled promises, "missed opportunities" and lack of concern for the lower classes and their economic well-being.[73] The personal sacrifices of the Old Czechs could no longer compensate for their failure in politics.[74]

František Rieger continued his efforts to deal with the government, which occasionally justified those policies unfavourable to the Czechs by pointing to the increased Slavophilism among the Czechs.[75] Rieger tried to persuade Taaffe that such an approach in dealing with the Czech nation would not only intensify Slavophile feelings among the Czechs, but that it would soon also lead to the disintegration of the Czech Club in the Reichsrat, an event, he reminded Taaffe, which would bring about an increase in popular support for the Young Czechs.[76]

Rieger's attempts to improve the government's attitude to the Czech nation had no positive results, and many Czechs had difficulty understanding why the leader of the National Party insisted on supporting the government under existing conditions.[77] The flow of information between the Czech political leaders and the Czech public had traditionally been rather weak, and Rieger made no attempt to explain his position to the public. He had no doubt that the empire's internal situation was seriously influenced by the course of its foreign policy,[78] and that it had become increasingly dependent on Germany since the military alliance between the two states was concluded in 1879. Primarily he was concerned that the opposition of the Czech Club in the Reichsrat to the government could lead to a governmental change. Taaffe's administration was more favourably disposed to Czech national aspirations than earlier governments had been, and Rieger feared bringing the German Liberals back into power. This would only create a climate less favourable for Czech national development.[79]

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[73] For example, the Old Czechs' regular support of the government's tax increases and military expenditures, to the neglect of serious economic difficulties in the 1880s, caused much opposition among the Czech population. Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 3, Pt. 1: 6.

[74] Most of the prominent Old Czechs, including Rieger, spent their personal wealth for national purposes. Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách, 1: 67-68.

[75] Traditionally, Rieger negotiated with Taaffe through the Czech minister (without portfolio) Alois Pražák. František Kameníček, ed., Paměti a listář Dr. Aloise Pražáka, 2 vols. (Prague: Česká akademie věd a umění, 1926-27), 2: 308-309.

[76] Kazbunda, "Krize české politiky," p. 105.

Rieger's unfriendly attitude to any suggestion for a change of the National Party's position in the Reichsrat only intensified tensions between the Young Czechs and the National Party. The Liberals did not share his worries over the fate of Taaffe's government. Disagreements between the two groups worsened when Eduard Grégr returned to the Czech Club in 1883. He opposed the Club's "fixed position" in the Reichsrat, and began to promote the policy of a "free hand" which would allow bargaining with other Reichsrat parties.[80] Moreover, he favoured opposition to the government. Although most of the Young Czechs supported Grégr's stand, their views remained subordinated to that of the National Party's leadership in the Czech Club until 1887. They tried without success to strengthen their position in the club by demanding changes in its regulations which would give more freedom to individual members in voting. It was not this controversy, however, that brought about the definite split in the Czech Club, but rather Rieger's anger over indiscreet remarks about his performances in the Czech Club made by Eduard Grégr in May of 1887.[81] Following these remarks, Grégr, Count Václav Kounic and Jan Vašatý were expelled from the Czech Club, and together with Emanuel Engel (who voluntarily joined them), they formed an independent Liberal Party Club on January 29, 1888.

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[77] Even members of the Rieger's family, usually very loyal to him, could not understand the motives for his support of the government, which was not favourably disposed to the strivings of the Czech nation. Ibid., p. 107.

[78] Ibid., p. 107-108.

[79] Ibid., p. 108.

In the following year the Young Czechs focused exclusively on political work with the Czech public. They naturally wanted to gain greater popular support in the next election, but they also sincerely believed in the benefits to be gained from intensive communication between politicians and the public. They were particularly interested in elevating the overall level of political awareness of the Czech public.

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[80] Grégr, Dennik, 2, Introduction by Z. Tobolka, pp. XXXV-XXXVII.

[81] Grégr was instrumental in having published in Národni listy Rieger's statement that Czech politicians must acquire rights for the Bohemian Kingdom by bits and pieces, even if they had to forage for such crumbs under the table. Mattuš, Paměti, p. 205.

It was during this work that their political attitudes and aims crystallized, finding their expression in the electoral proclamation of the Liberal Party for the elections to the Bohemian Diet in June 1889.[82]

In its proclamation, the Liberal Party first enumerated basic differences between its political attitudes and those of the National Party. Its devotion to democratic principles, and to the idea of greater autonomy for the Bohemian Kingdom through the implementation of the Bohemian Staatsrecht were to be the major premises of its political platform. The Liberals pledged to oppose any German attempt at dividing the Bohemian Kingdom along national lines, as well as any attempt to introduce German as the only official language of the monarchy. The Liberal Party disapproved of the National Party's undemocratic political attitudes and its cooperation with the nobility. Its current cooperation with the government and its implicit support of the dualistic system were described as incompatible with the major and traditional political orientation of the Czech nation. On a more concrete level, the Liberals intended to renew the struggle for increased power for the diets and the the parity of Czech with German in the Bohemian Kingdom, to cultivate more intensive cultural contacts with other Slavic nations and to resist clericalism. They also intended to strive for greater civil freedoms for all people, as well as the abolition of political privileges and the introduction of universal suffrage. Their promises in the cultural and economic spheres were less specific but exceeded those hitherto formulated by the National Party. They aimed for the economic betterment and protection of the urban lower and middle classes and the peasantry. In the cultural sphere, their efforts were to be focused on educational reforms.

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[82] "Národe český." Národní listy, 25 June 1889. Also in Škarda, Národní strana svobodomyslná, pp. 25-35.

The electoral proclamation of the Liberal Party was actually its programme, as formulated at the party congress in mid-June 1889. The Young Czechs viewed this programme as a continuation of the original National Party programme abandoned at the beginning of the 1860s, when the Old Czechs subordinated their goals to those of the nobility.[83]

The elections to the Bohemian Diet in July 1889 revealed, quite unexpectedly, a substantial shift in Czech political attitudes. The Liberal Party increased the number of its deputies from ten to thirty-nine.[84] Thirty were elected in rural districts while nine came from cities including Prague, where the National Party's influence still prevailed. The National Party still held the majority of Czech representatives in the Bohemian Diet, but only by two seats.[85] Cooperation with the federalist nobility from Bohemia, however, gave the National Party Club a total of fifty-eight deputies.[86] Considering that each rural deputy represented 50,555 people, whereas one urban deputy represented 15,000 people, the election results meant that the Liberal Party actually received more popular support than the National Party.[87]

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[83] Eduard Grégr's speech at the Liberal Party Congress in June 1889. Národní listy, 18 June 1889.

[84] "Význam minulých voleb," Národní listy, 7 July 1889.

[85] "Výsledek voleb," Národní listy, 6 July and 7 July 1889.

[86] Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 3, Pt. 1: 253.

[87] "Výsledek voleb," Národní listy, 6 July and 7 July 1889.

Supporters of the National Party traditionally came from the well-to-do farmers, industrialists and practicing Catholics. Supporters of the Young Czechs were mainly members of the intelligentsia, artisans and farmers.[88]

The decline in popular support of the National Party reflected popular disagreement with its political orientation and the scope of its work, which was limited to the Reichsrat and negotiations with the Viennese government. Since tensions between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia had intensified in the late 1880s, the leaders of the National Party began to believe that the solution of national problems should be the main thrust of their endeavours. Consequently they paid insufficient attention to the serious economic problems of farmers, artisans and workers. The party even neglected the cultural work that had once been at the centre of its activity. Considering that the government was traditionally the most powerful element of policy making in the empire's political system, it is possible to understand Rieger's motives for cooperating with it and with the Reichsrat majority after the failure of the National Party's passive resistance policy. But, with the increased general level of education and political experience, the Czech population by the end of the 1880s was capable of greater political participation and responsibility than the National Party provided. Its prevailing defensive attitude in politics underestimated the strength of the economic and cultural development of the Czech population. Rieger's insistence on national peace in Bohemia as the major condition for more efficient activity in other spheres revealed the narrowness of the National Party's political perception as well as a fundamental inability to discern the future role of the masses in politics. The difficult situation of the farmers, who in the 1880s still formed the majority of the Czech population, accelerated their political involvement, pressing Czech political representatives to work harder for the economic benefit of this class. The leaders of the National Party, unlike the Young Czechs, did not adequately respond to these pressures, and the farmers soon turned to the Liberal Party for political leadership.

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[88] Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 2: 358. Garver, The Young Czech Party, p. 128-29. Garver gives a detailed account of the social background of the Young Czechs and their supporters.

The National Party's attempt to negotiate a settlement between the Bohemian Germans and Czechs in early 1890 proved to be the most immediate cause of its downfall. Aware of its weakening position in Czech politics, the Old Czechs hoped that their success in negotiating an agreement with the Bohemian Germans would not only improve the overall situation in the country, but also strengthen their political position for the future. Their attempt to improve the relationship between the two nationalities in Bohemia in 1890 was unique in the sense that concrete terms of the agreement were actually worked out where earlier attempts had failed.[89] The terms, however, were never implemented with the exception of a few minor provisions.

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[89] During the previous decade several attempts to improve Czech-German relations were made, the most significant being that of May 1879 and August 1883, initiated by Czech politicians, and at the end of 1887 and the beginning of 1888 initiated by the Speaker of the Bohemian Diet, Prince J. Lobkowicz. Srb, Politické dějiny, 2: 549, 629-32, 723-26. But these negotiations did not get very far, largely because of German opposition to the Czech demand for equality of Czech with German in Bohemia, and Czech opposition to the German demand for recognition of German as the official language of the monarchy and the administrative division of Bohemia along national line. From 1883 on the German representatives began to place the issue of the division of Bohemia regularly on the agenda of the Bohemian Diet.

Since the government was increasingly interested in the German deputies' return to the Bohemian Diet, it was eventually willing not only to get involved in controversies between the Czech and German politicians, but also to exert some pressure upon Czech politicians to make concessions to German demands. The invitations to meetings between Czech, German and government representatives was issued by Count Taaffe on January 4, 1890. Taaffe himself presided over fourteen confidential meetings which took place in the following two weeks. The government was represented by Count Taaffe, Baron Pražák, Baron Gautsch, Count Schönborn and Marquis Becquehem. The Bohemian federalist nobility was represented by Counts R. Clam-Martinic, B.K. Kinský and J. Lobkowicz. F.L. Rieger, K. Mattuš and O. Zeithammer represented the Czechs, while the Germans were represented by H. Hallwich, E. Plener, L. Schlesinger and F. Schmeykal. The Constitutional Landowners were represented by Baron M. Scharschmid, Counts A. Schönburg and J.O. Thun.[90]

The negotiations resulted in a settlement whose terms were immediately rejected by most of the Czech Liberals. From the beginning, the spokesmen of the National Party considered the exclusion of the Young Czechs from negotiations as a grave mistake, however, the emperor's insistence on the "elimination of the extreme elements" from the conferences had to be respected.[91] The exclusion of the Young Czechs from the conferences absolved them from any responsibility of the results, and partly conditioned their attitude to the settlement, about which they were informed in detail by Rieger and Mattuš two days before it was made public on January 27, 1890. Moreover, the Liberal Party's position, unlike that of the National Party, was not influenced by a desire to prevent Taaffe's fall or coax the Germans to return to the Bohemian Diet. The major point of the Young Czechs' opposition to the settlement was an argument that it was not in the interest of the Czech nation to enter a reconciliation with the Germans at the cost of jeopardizing the unity of the Bohemian Kingdom.[92]

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[90] Tobolka, *Politické dějiny*, 3, Pt. 1: 152. Constitutional Landowners stood firmly behind the 1867 December Constitution, and its centralistic principle.

[91] Albín Bráf, *Paměti* (Prague: Vesmír,1922), p. 34.

When the text of the settlement was published, its vagueness was obvious. Concessions to the Czechs were not expressed in sufficiently concrete and precise terms, thereby leading to serious divisions between the Czech and the German politicians in respect of the interpretation of the agreement. The most important part of the settlement was the issue of the administrative division of Bohemia, where a substantial concession was made to the Germans.[93] The new political and judicial districts were to include the other nationality as little as possible. Each locality with one-fifth of the eligible voters of the other nationality was to be proclaimed a "mixed locality," and each district with one-fifth of these "mixed localities" was to be a "mixed district." This organization could be applied only to Bohemia, because in Moravia the population was mostly intermingled. Also, the Bohemian Agricultural and School Boards, as well as the Supreme Court and the Chamber of Commerce, were to be divided into German and Czech institutions. A standard Czech demand for years, the equality of the Czech and German languages in the inner judicial and political administration in Czech and mixed regions, was not included in the final draft of the settlement, because German and Czech representatives did not come to an agreement on concessions to be made to the Czechs. The German representatives insisted on the abolition of the Stremayer decrees of 1880, and Rieger demanded recognition of Czech as the inner administrative language in Czech regions; as well as a new electoral law. The definite provisions for the use of German and Czech in administration were to be worked out after the territorial division was drawn up. Rieger was compliant on this issue because he obtained a personal promise from Minister Schönborn that the Viennese government would retain the status quo in the use of Czech and German in the administration.[94] But when Schönborn realized that Czech was actually used more widely than the governmental regulations prescribed, he cancelled his promise.[95] From this point on, the issue of Czech as the inner language of administration in Bohemia and Moravia remained at the centre of controversies among the Czechs, the Germans in Bohemia, and the government. This issue, combined with Czech demands for electoral reform, became the most serious obstacle for implementation of the settlement.[96] Since a two-thirds majority was necessary to make the settlement law, Czech rejection meant that the bill could not pass in the Bohemian Diet. The Viennese government, however, made several attempts to implement some of the provisions by government decrees, which caused further problems. For instance, The Minister of Justic Count Schönborn, issued a governmental decree which divided the Supreme Court in Prague along national lines, and explicitly exempted the members of the German Court from the obligation of learning Czech.[97] This unilateral action was against the spirit of the original agreement, which stated that the settlement would be implemented in its entirety after acceptance by a two-thirds majority of the Bohemian Diet. The government also contributed to growing tensions in Bohemia by its reluctance to make any of the changes in the electoral law which were demanded by the Czechs. Its unwillingness to implement an electoral reform was interpreted by the Czech politicians as compliance with the Germans who did not want such a reform to be introduced in the near future, fearing it would jeopardize some of their privileges.[98] On the whole, the settlement gradually caused more problems than it had attempted to solve, and contributed to greater estrangement between the National Party and the Czech public, whose attitude to the settlement was partly shaped by the Liberal Party press.

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[92] The issue of the Czech-German settlement is described in considerable detail in every extensive Czech historical work related to the period under discussion. Most recent and the most detailed are articles by Karel Kazbunda, "Krize české politiky a vídeňska jednání o tzv. punktace roku 1890," *Český časopis historický* 40 (1934), pp. 80-108, 310-46, 491-528; 41 (1935), pp. 41-82, 294-320, 514-54. The course of negotiations and the major points of the compromise are described in English in Jenks, *Austria Under the Iron Ring*, pp. 239-303. His work is based on German primary sources. Recently, the settlement is described in Garver, *The Young Czech Party*, pp. 147-49. There are, however, some inaccuracies in Garver's description. For example, he does not mention that the issue of electoral reform and of Czech as the inner administrative language played an important role in the Czech willingness to make substantial concessions to the Germans in Bohemia. The full text of the settlement in German may be found in Alois F. Czedik, *Zur Geschichte der k. k. österreichischen Ministerien*, 4 vols. (Teschen: K. Prochaska, 1917), 1: 504-506. In Czech the full text was published, among others, in the newspaper *Česká politika*, 27 January 1890; it is also in Srb, *Politické dějiny*, 2: 772-76.

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[93] Tobolka, Politické dějiny, 3, Pt. 1: 163-64. Even in the so-called purely German districts, the number of Czechs was considerable. Since they were mostly workers, without five years continuous residence at one locality, and not paying five gulden direct tax, they were not eligible voters. Statistics on the percentage of Czechs in German districts are complicated; however, it seems that around 1890 in most of these districts this percentage was rather high, often close to twenty percent and was steadily growing. Most recent account of migration in Bohemia is in Whiteside, Austrian National Socialism, pp. 37-50.

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[94] Kazbunda, "Krize české politiky," p. 515.

[95] Jan Heidler, ed., Přispěvky k listáři Dra. Frant. Lad. Riegra, 2 vols. (Prague: Česká akademie věd a umění 1924 and 1926), 2: 439-40. Rieger to M. Červinka, 7 March 1890.

[96] The evaluation of the compromise differs considerably in historical literature. On the whole, Czech authors do not evaluate it positively. A very positive evaluation, however, can be found in Kann, Multinational Empire 1848-1918, 2 vols., (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), 1: 201. Kann's evaluation is much less sympathetic in History of the Habsburg Empire, p. 440. A still more critical view of the settlement is in Skilling, "The Politics of the Czech Eighties," p. 271; Jenks in Austria Under the Iron Ring, p. 273-74, concludes that the settlement had "dubious value" and that it had no chance for being implemented unless it "guaranteed absolute parity" of both nationalities in Bohemia.

Neither the government nor the Germans had expected the Young Czechs to get involved in a vigorous denunciation of the settlement, but the Liberals mobilized quickly to fight the agreement. The success of the Young Czech agitation was indirectly assisted by the German press, which accepted the settlement enthusiastically and gave the impression that the whole matter was a great victory for the Germans.[99] When Count Taaffe provided financial assistance to the Bohemian Governor Count Franz Thun at the end of January 1890, for use in checking the Liberal Party's agitation, it was too late to reverse Czech public opinion.[100]

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[97] Kameníček, Paměti a listář Dr. Aloise Pražáka, 1: LXXVIII.

[98] The impression that the Viennese government sided with the Germans was reinforced by its lack of opposition to German insistence, that a reform of the electoral law could take place only after implementation of the settlement. Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, p. 270. A leader of the Bohemian Germans, Ernst Plener, proclaimed publicly that it would take years to introduce such a reform. "Řeč poslance Mattuše." Hlas národa, 23 January 1891.

The Liberal Party summarized its official views concerning the settlement in a special detailed document, signed by thirty-five prominent Young Czechs and published on February 21, 1890, in Národní listy.[101] The Liberals objected most strenuously to the intended division of Bohemia and the exclusion of Moravia and Silesia from the compromise, on the grounds that it was perilous to the "thousand years of lasting unity of the Bohemian Kingdom." They also opposed the fact that equality of languages in Bohemia was not established; administrative officers in the German regions were not bound to be able to function in Czech, but German was to remain the inner administrative language in the Czech regions. They were also concerned with the fate of Czech minorities and their schools in German regions. The settlement contained no provision which would secure their rights in the future.[102] The intention of the settlement to divide the seats of the Bohemian Diet into three curiae - Great Landowners, Czechs and Germans - was interpreted by the Young Czechs as a means for securing the Germans' existing political privileges, since no effective political equality of nationalities in Bohemia was established.

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[99] Kazbunda, "Krize české politiky," p. 53. Particularly the influential Viennese daily, Neue Freie Presse, was extremely enthusiastic about the settlement's results. For example, "In Böhmen." Neue Freie Presse, 28 January 1890.

[100] Arthur Skedl, ed., Der Politische Nachlass der Grafen Edward Taaffe (Vienna: Ricola, 1922), p. 477-78. The source does not specify in concrete terms the uses to which the money was supposed to be put. Skedl's collection contains correspondence of Taaffe with Thun, Plener, and other significant personalities.

[101] "Národní strana svobodomyslná o usneseních vídeňské konference." Národní listy, 21 February 1890. The protest is also in Škarda, Národní strana svobodomyslná, pp. 54-77.

The Liberal Party's agitation against the settlement and the lack of impartiality on the part of the government turned the Czech public against the settlement as well as against the National Party.[103] Rieger regarded the movement against the settlement unjustified, mainly a result of "irresponsible" agitation by the Liberal Party and Nàrodní listy.[104] At the same time, however, he had considerable doubts as to whether it was right to insist on its implementation against prevailing public opinion.[105] He hoped that the settlement would bring much needed peace to Bohemia, and divert the satisfied

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[102] The situation of Czechs in the German regions of Bohemia was rather difficult. At times even the Reichsrat had to take steps on their behalf against prejudiced decisions on the part of the local German administration.

[103] During several months in the Spring of 1890 over sixteen hundred public petitions were sent by the Czech voters and political clubs to the Bohemian Diet, protesting the settlement, although police tried to prevent adoption of such petitions, frequently confiscated those already adopted, and persecuted those who signed them. Tobolka, ed., Česká politika, 3: 501.

[104] Bráf, Paměti, p. 40.

[105] Kameníček, Paměti a listář Dr. Aloise Pražáka, 2: 367.

Germans from Pan-Germanic ideas.[106] But Rieger soon became aware that the imprecise formulations of the settlement[107] were working against Czech interests, and he began to resist its German interpretation.[108] Rieger's failure to bring Czech forward as the inner language of communication[109] in administration led to such frustration within the National Party that many Old Czechs began to desert it. Such demoralization of the National Party contributed to public disillusionment with it and to the abandonment of the political course which it promoted.[110] By early 1891 the great majority of the Czech electorate in Bohemia was not only ready to support the Liberal Party, but was also willing to follow its policy of opposition to the government.

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[106] Kazbunda, "Krize české politiky," p. 551.

[107] Rieger and other Old Czechs noticed the excellent expert preparation of the German representatives for negotiations, which was not the case of the Czech representations who learned about the plan a few days before the negotiations started, and did not make proper preparations for negotiations. Bráf, Paměti, p. 37.

[108] Kameníček, Paměti a listář Dr. Aloise Pražáka, 2: 402. Heidler, Příspěvky k listáři, 2: 486.

[109] Rieger realized that if this concession for the Czech language were not obtained, the settlement had no chance of being accepted by the Czechs in the Bohemian Diet. He tried to influence Taaffe to obtain this concession, but without success. Skedl, Der Politische Nachlass des Grafen Edward Taaffe, p. 490-91.

[110] At the end of April 1890, Rieger was asked by the majority of his district's electors to resign his seat in the Diet. "Adresa nedůvěry dru. Fr. Riegrovi." Národní listy, 30 April 1890.

It is unlikely that the implementation of the settlement would have brought peace to Bohemia. It would have satisfied the Germans, but it is probable that the Czechs would not have accepted their marginal status for long. Therefore, the criticism of the settlement by the Young Czechs was justified. But the National Party lacked the freedom to choose a more beneficial course for Czech national development, and the Young Czechs' condemnation of the party did not take this factor into account.[111] Even without the issue of the 1890 settlement, the Liberal Party, in all likelihood, would have increased the number of its deputies in the Reichsrat's elections of 1891, yet the controversies related to the settlement became the most immediate cause for the disintegration of the National Party and its replacement by the Liberal Party in the Reichsrat and the Bohemian Diet.

In summarizing the major features of Czech political development between 1848 and 1890, it can be said that Czech political life was partly shaped by the overall political conditions of the empire and partly by its own aspirations. The establishment of a constitutional and parliamentary system in the monarchy in the 1860s allowed for the existence of limited public involvement in political life, but its framework did not provide sufficient room for the solution of existing national and political problems. The two political parties which dominated Czech political life in this period did not differ so much in their aims, as in their means of achieving them, and in their perception of the role of political parties in relation to the public. While the National Party fostered intensive cultural development for the Czech nation, it functioned mainly as a parliamentary group, not sufficiently responsive to growing pressures from below and without the ambition to involve the broad strata of the Czech population into political activity. It relied mostly on the method of negotiating with the government to gain as many concessions for the nation as possible. The Liberal Party's more democratic orientation was reflected not only in its conviction that the existing parliamentary system provided more room for positive work in the economic, cultural and social spheres than it was evident from the outcome of the National Party's work, but also in its determination to elevate overall political awareness of the Czech nation. Its broader understanding of politics as well as its greater responsiveness to the economic needs and national aspiration of Czechs was the major long-term reason for its rise to the position of the dominant force in Czech political life, accelerated by the National Party's failure to evaluate correctly the overall level of development of the Czech nation and the national and political aspirations of the Bohemian Germans.

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[111] The most detailed critical analysis of the settlement written by a Young Czech is that of Karel Kramář. It is marked by unrealistic expectations as to the National Party's possibilities to "maneuvre" under the existing conditions. Tobolka, ed., Česká politika, 3: 480-504.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE ELECTIONS OF 1891

The March 1891 Reichsrat elections among Czechs were contested by the National Party, the Liberal Party and the Czech Conservative Landowners. These were the major political groups competing for the votes of the Czechs of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia. Following traditional practice, the pre-election activity of the National and Conservative Landowners included more limited communication with the public in comparison to the Liberal Party. The platforms of the two older parties also remained alien to the needs and strivings of the common people. In contrast, the Liberal Party had already established a better rapport with the Czech people through its press and various organizational ties. Of these, no matter how imperfect, the political clubs were the most important.[1] From 1888 onwards the Liberal party had gained the advantage of being supported by the largest farmers' association (Selska jednota). From 1890 the Liberals were further strengthened by their merger with a group of intellectuals called the Realists. Although the group was not numerically strong, it had significant intellectual influence.

The Realists were led by Tomas Garrigue Masaryk (1850-1937), a professor of philosophy for a short time at the University of Vienna and from 1882 at the new Czech university at Prague. He was an exceptionally gifted son of a coachman, who received his university education in Vienna and Leipzig. As a young professor he had already become highly regarded by his students for his openness and concern for students and the quality of their education. On several occasions he had serious difficulties with university authorities. These problems arose especially out of his unorthodox approach to religion.[2] The origin of the Realists and their intellectual development should be examined in greater detail before the pre-election activity of the Young Czechs is discussed, because the Realists greatly influenced the Liberal Party's electoral proclamation, which was to become its most significant programme for years to come.

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[1] Political clubs' membership varied from several dozen people to several hundred. Vojtech, "Organizacni vyvoj," p. 565. Due to strict governmental regulations, it was difficult to establish new clubs and the Liberal Party had only sixty of them by 1890. Ibid., pp. 569 and 563.

The Realists had emerged in Czech university circles during the first half of the 1880's. Their leader, T. G. Masaryk, started to publish themonthly Atheneum, which was distinguished by a refreshing spirit of criticism and frankness, as was the biweekly Čas, founded in 1886. The money needed to start Čas was raised from within the Realist group, but the journal, published for three decades, never became profitable. By calling attention to the political and scientific ideas fresh from England and France, the Realists shattered many long-cherished beliefs and illusions. At the same time, they challenged the narrow scope of work of the established political parties, particularly that of the Old

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[2] T. G. Masaryk during the First World War led the Czechs and Slovaks in their struggle for independence. After the war he became the first president of Czechoslovakia. There is no scholarly biography of Masaryk. The most detailed biography is that of his friend Jan Herben, T. G. Masaryk (Prague: Sfinx, 1930). Memoirs of Masaryk were written by Karel Čapek in co-operation with Masaryk, and published between 1928 and 1935 under the title Hovory s Masarykem (Talks with Masaryk). There are, however, a considerable number of studies dealing with Masaryk's thoughts and works. Some of them will be mentioned in the fourth chapter.

Czechs. As a consequence of the Realists' unorthodox activity, the younger Czech intellectuals became more critical of political authorities and more receptive to the new social, political, philosophical and literary ideas of Western Europe.[3] Masaryk's teaching activity at the Czech University in Prague, as later remembered by his pupils, aimed at the cultivation of an inquisitive spirit, a critical approach and social and political responsibility. Masaryk's concern with a religion based on reason and moral conviction involved students in debates on topics hardly ever broached before.[4]

The uncompromising "search for the truth" led Masaryk to reassess the Královedvorský and Zelenohorský Manuscripts,[5] allegedly discovered by Václav Hanka in 1818. For more than seventy years the Czechs had believed that these manuscripts were the authentic and unique legacy of the old Czech culture and that they proved the superiority of Czech over German culture in an earlier historical epoch. Masaryk's rigorous attack upon the authenticity of the manuscripts, supported by the scientific argument of some of his colleagues, earned him the hostility of all Czech political groups.[6] The manuscripts affair damaged his relationship with a number of prominent Young Czechs, particularly Julius Grégr, as well as the Old Czechs, including František Rieger. In 1889 in a letter to Masaryk, Rieger rebuked him for the "unpatriotic" way in which he conducted the struggle against the Manuscripts.[7]

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[3] Heidler, *České politické strany*, p. 11. The activity of the Realists in 1887-1897 is described from a Marxist perspective by Jurij Křížek in *T. G. Masaryk a česká politika: Politické vystoupení českých "realistů" v letech 1887-1897* (Prague: Ceskoslovenská akademie věd,1959).

[4] Kamil Krafta, *Masaryk a jeho dílo vědecké* (Prague: Česká akademie věd, 1930), p. 21.

[5] The manuscripts are often referred to as the Königshof and Grünberg Manuscripts of 1818.

Problems arising from the National Party's negotiated settlement with the Bohemian Germans contributed to attempts by the Realists and the Young Czechs to overcome their mutual hostility. The Realists wished to engage in practical political activity, but they were neither strong enough nor interested enough to found a new political party.[8] As early as 1889 they had started to negotiate with the Old Czechs about their planned cooperation with the National Party. This occurred at a time when the National Party was far more respected in the Reichsrat and by the Emperor than was the Liberal Party. It also still enjoyed considerable support among the Czech population. However, the National Party's reputation of the previous decades as a fighter for the interests of the Czech nation was compromised at the beginning of 1890 by its attempt to restore workable political conditions in Bohemia through concessions to the Bohemian Germans. The negative response of the Czech public towards this settlement was probably the major reason for the failure of the negotiations between the Realists and the National

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[6] The most detailed work written from the Realists' point of view about their controversies with other Czech political groups is by Jan Herben, Deset let proti proudu 1886-1896 (Prague: Jan Herben, 1898). Despite the title, the book deals only with the 1880s; the second volume, which was supposed to cover the remaining years, was never written.

[7] Jan Heidler, Přispěvky k listáři Dr. Fr. Lad. Riegra, Vol. II, pp. 390-91.

[8] Herben, Deset let proti proudu, p. 7.

Party in March 1890.[9] Rieger and the Old Czechs regretted the decision of the Realists. The Old Czechs felt that the Realists' objections to the National Party's cooperation with the nobility were "unreasonable", calculated to sabotage the negotiations rather than to achieve an agreement.[10] The Realists, however, also insisted on the abolition of the Catholic influence over Czech education and the inclusion of the struggle for increased democratization of the political system in the platform of the National Party. Since the gap between the ideologies of the two groups became unbridgeable, the Realists began to look to a rapprochement with the Young Czechs.

Negotiations between the Realists and the Young Czechs were initiated by the Realists at the end of 1890 and conducted by Karel Kramář (1860-1937). He had graduated in law and economy from the University in Prague and had previously spent some years at universities in Berlin, Strasburg and Paris.[11] He became a Realist and collaborated closely with Masaryk until 1895. His long-lasting sympathies for the Liberal Party (whose leader he became in 1901), plus his diplomatic abilities and even temper, were useful prerequisites for the attempt to bridge the hostility and distrust between Julius Grégr and T. G. Masaryk. In the final stage of the negotiations, Kramář was assisted by Josef Kaizl (1854-1901),[12] a graduate in law and political economy from the University in Prague. Kaizl parted with the National Party in 1887, became a Realist and a close friend of Masaryk until 1895. He did not participate in the opening stage of negotiations between the Realists and the Liberal Party because of his previous ties with the National Party. But once the break-through between both groups had been achieved, he became very active. Deciding upon a common programme was not easy.

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[9] Masaryk's explanation why the Realists made no alliance with the Old Czechs in his electoral speech in Kutná Hora in February 1891, was to a certain degree based on this fact. The unwillingness of the National Party's leadership to change some of its political attitudes was presented as the second major reason. Národní Listy, Příloha, 3 February, 1891.

[10] Albín Bráf, Paměti, Prague 1922, p. 24. Negotiations between the Realists and the National Party are described from the Old Czechs' point of view in Karel Mattuš, Paměti, Prague 1921, pp. 200-211.

[11] S. B. Winter, "Kramář, Kaizl, and the Hegemony of the Young Czech Party, 1891-1901" in P. Brock and H. G. Skilling, eds., The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 283-84.

Julius Grégr was still opposed in principle to formulating a "theoretical program." He did not, however, see any contradictions between the political opinions of the Young Czechs and the Realists' political programme, which was published in November 1890 in Čas.[13] The Realists' programme was broad and based on the assumption that Czech competition with the advanced European nations in economic, cultural and social development was the only way to secure the nation's future existence. The basis of the programme was democratic. The manner in which it was to be attained was through good education for all, including women, rapid economic growth, political freedoms and concentrated efforts to solve the social and economic problems of the lower classes, particularly the workers. The Realist programme also made concrete suggestions as to how to take the first steps toward improving schooling, taxation, economic efficiency and moral attitudes. At the end it claimed that the equality of Czechs and Germans in the Bohemian Kingdom, and a federal reorganization of the Empire, had to be integral parts of the Czech political programme.

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[12] Kaizl soon became one of the Liberal Party's most prominent and respected members. From 1897 until his death he was actually the party's most recognized authority. He was also the first Czech Minister with portfolio in the Viennese government. Winters, "Kramář, Kaizl, and the Hegemony of the Young Czech Party, 1891-1901," pp. 284-85.

[13] "Návrh programu lidového," Čas, IV, 1 November, 1890, pp. 689-94.

It is not entirely clear what Julius Grégr expected to gain from the unification of the Realists with the Liberal Party.[14] It seems probable that the intellectually productive Realists, with their clear political concepts, were considered capable of improving not only the prestige of the Liberal Party, but also its intellectual level as well. Grégr was aware of the generally positive reaction of the Czech press towards the Realists' programme, which was described in some newspapers as the best Czech political plan formulated to date.[15] Its democratic and social aspects were very attractive to the Czech population. Julius Grégr even apologized in a letter to Kramář for the criticism of the Realists' programme[16] which had appeared in *Národni listy*.[17]

The formal announcement of the Realists' admission into the

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[14] A good survey of correspondence and negotiations between Kramář and Julius Grégr is in Karel Kramář, "Vstup Realistů do strany mladočeské." *Půl stoleti Národnich listů 1860-1910*. Almanach (Prague: Akciová tiskárna, 1911), pp. 49-53.

[15] "Glosy ku programu lidovému." *Plzeňské listy*, 13 November, 1890.

[16] The letter was published by Kramář in *Půl století Národnich listů*, p. 51.

[17] *Národní listy*, 11 November, 1890. The newspaper's criticism of the Realists' programme was unfair; it charged that the programme was calculated mainly to win votes in the next elections.

Liberal Party was published in Čas, on 20 December 1890,[18] along with an explanation that the Realists would preserve their own programme, methods of work, and their journal Čas.[19] In practice, this meant that the Realists remained a distinct group within the Liberal Party. Although their independence enriched the party intellectually, it soon became a source of controversy within the Party. Moreover, it contributed to already existing tensions in Czech political life.

Early in 1891 the Young Czechs, now including the Realists, began their electoral campaign for the March Reichsrat election. The campaign, often described as "wild" by contemporaries,[20] was marked by an extraordinary proliferation of electoral meetings, with a high degree of popular participation. Furthermore, in each electoral district there was an unusually large number of speeches. Never before had Czechs experienced such intensive campaigning. They responded to it with equally intensive interest and enthusiasm. The Young Czechs expected to find most of their support in the rural electoral districts where the elections were still indirect and disadvantaged. They expected to win over the National Party only by a slight majority.

A further boost to the Young Czechs came on 26 January 1891, when the Bohemian Governor decreed that all voters had complete freedom of assembly until the completion of the elections on 7 March. This included the right to call electoral meetings without being observed by governmental representatives.[21] The move encouraged freedom of speech, since there was now no danger that a meeting would be dissolved for any "improper" statements.

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[18] "Prohlášení," Čas, IV, no. 51, 20 December, 1890.

[19] After 1889 Čas was published weekly.

[20] K. Kramář, "Dějiny české politiky nové doby," Česká Politika, ed. Z. Tobolka, 5 vols., (Prague: Jan Laichter, 1906-1911), *3*: 523.

During the campaign a controversy arose over the eligibility of certain voters. The electoral law of 1882 enfranchised all adult males who paid over 5 gulden taxes (and had a permanent residence for five years). But according to the Reichsrat decision of January 1891, taxpayers paying less than 5.35 but more than 5 gulden were to be deprived of the right to vote, since the taxes had included in the total an extraordinary war tax.[22] The Young Czechs regarded this decision as aimed at preventing the electoral victory of the Liberal Party, whose greatest support was expected from lower-income citizens. The Young Czechs argued that the decision contradicted a valid law and tradition, because the taxpayers paying 5.35 gulden tax had been allowed to vote in the Reichsrat's elections of 1885 and in the elections for the Bohemian Diet in 1889. Moreover, the war tax had been paid now for thirty-one years, and it was certainly stretching a point to call it "extraordinary."[23] Nonetheless, the Young Czechs were not supported on this issue by other parties, and the decree was enforced.

The Liberal Party was further deprived of support shortly afterwards by an act of the municipal governments of Bohemia. To decrease public participation in political meetings, teachers, whose sympathies for the most part lay with the Young Czechs, were prohibited from participating in the electoral campaign. Participation of non-voters, particularly women, in election meetings was subject to police investigation,[24] because the freedom of assembly for the purpose of the electoral campaign applied only to eligible voters.

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[21] Národní listy, 30 January, 1891.

[22] Národní listy, 1 February, 1891.

[23] Národní listy, 16 March, 1891.

The Young Czechs had traditionally considered the political participation of the public as necessary for the political education and spiritual advancement of the Czech nation. To facilitate the broadcast of information presented at meetings of enfranchised citizens, the Liberal Party's deputies frequently attempted to organize so-called "meetings of the people." Their number was not great, because it was difficult to get official permission for such meetings. Several hundred people usually came to these meetings, but attendance occasionally rose over one thousand. When speeches became too critical of the government, the meetings were dissolved by the governmental officials present. These meetings were significant particularly because they began the political education of a broad strata of the Czech population before it became directly involved in political participation through political parties and elections.

Národní listy provided detailed coverage of the electoral campaign for more than two months. All public political meetings were announced several days in advance. Important and interesting speeches were reproduced almost in full, in spite of their considerable length. The content of these speeches varied according to the expertise, interests and emotional disposition of the candidates, but there were usually several common themes. These were usually found in criticism of the

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[24] Národní listy, 16 March, 1891.

National Party; clarification of the standpoint of the Liberal Party and its future policies; and the condemnation of the social and economic situation of the lower classes.

Criticism of the National Party's policies was the crucial part of the Young Czechs' electoral campaign. Their usual argument was that voting for the National Party meant voting against the Bohemian Staatsrecht, since the Old Czechs' insistence on carrying out the negotiated settlement with the Germans jeopardized the unity of the Lands of the Czech Crown. Attempts were also made to explain in broader terms the National Party's "decadence."[25] But the most serious shortcoming of the National Party, according to the Young Czechs, was its inability to conform to the changed political conditions. The National Party persisted in its subordination to the historical nobility, its conservatism and clericalism and lack of understanding of political democracy. In the view of the Young Czechs, the National Party did not provide any opportunities for public political participation, though in light of the improved educational level of the Czech people such participation was not only possible but necessary for the further political development of the nation. The settlement was generally presented as the culmination of the irresponsible policies of the National Party. The ethnic principle incorporated in the settlement was viewed as antithetical to the concept of the Bohemian Staatsrecht, which was based on the idea of unity of the Bohemian Kingdom. Moreover, the Young Czechs considered the application of the ethnic principle in the settlement unacceptable because it failed to recognize equal rights of the Czechs with the

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[25] Národní listy, 29 December, 1890.

Germans in Bohemia.

Plans for the future political course of the Young Czechs, as they appeared in their electoral speeches, were based on the new party programme which was published in the form of the electoral proclamation of the Liberal Party to the Czech nation in February 1891.[26] This programme was worked out together with the Realists,[27] and reflects the influence of the broader political outlook of the Realists' programme of 1 November, 1890.

The Liberal Party's electoral proclamation and the speeches of its candidates expressed a respect for the existence of the monarchy. Its role in providing international security for small nations in Central Europe was particularly appreciated. But its members disagreed with the National Party's unconditional cooperation with the government. The Liberals did not share the National Party's hope that Taaffe's government would ever fulfil the contents of the 1879 Crown Speech, in which greater autonomy for the Bohemian Kingdom and other concessions were implicitly promised. The Young Czechs intended to preclude cooperation with the *Reichsrat*'s majority if its policies were not in harmony with the interests of the Czech population.[28] The electoral proclamation, however, was formulated mostly in positive terms, and did not include the programme for "consistent" opposition as later applied in the summer of 1891.[29]

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[26] "Celostátní prohlášeni mladočeské strany k českému národu." *Národní listy*, 22 February, 1891. The proclamation was actually published in *Národní listy* several times, together with the list of candidates. It can also be found in V. Škarda, *Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program*, Prague 1897, pp. 77-88.

[27] "Návrh programu lidového," *Čas*, IV, 1 November, 1890, pp. 689-694. In 1903, Masaryk described the influence of the Realists (particularly himself, Kaizl and Kramář) upon the formulation of the Liberal Party's 1891 programme in a study *Nynější krise a desorganisace mladočeské strany*. (Prague: Beaufort, 1903), pp. 8-9.

The Young Czechs planned to oppose any tendencies in the Reichsrat toward the strengthening of centralism and germanization. They pledged to strive vigorously for greater independence of the Bohemian Kingdom and the equality of Czech with German in Bohemia and Moravia, and they proclaimed this goal to be only a part of an ambitious programme of equal rights for all the monarchy's nationalities and the reorganization of the whole empire on a federal principle. The Bohemian Staatsrecht was to serve primarily as a means of preserving the unity of the Bohemian Kingdom.[30]

The Liberal Party promised to struggle for consistent democratization of the political system. The introduction of universal manhood suffrage and substantial changes in the electoral law were to be in the forefront of their endeavours. The Czech deputies in the Bohemian Diet took advantage of parliamentary immunity, which allowed their speeches to be published without censorship, and involved themselves in discussion of all important political issues, in order to inform the public in detail about the political realities. These discussions also highlighted the shortcomings in Austrian law and the government's prejudiced attitude to non-German nationalities.[31]

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[28] The Young Czechs did not share the fear of the National Party that the opposition to the Viennese government in the Reichsrat might cause the fall of Taaffe's cabinet and an even less favourable situation for the development of the Czech nation. Národní listy, 10 February 1891.

[29] The issue will be discussed further in the third chapter of this thesis. Actually, the Young Czechs intended to cooperate on a businesslike and ad hoc basis with the Conservative Germans and the Polish Club to implement policies advantageous to the Czech nation. "Rozmluva s dr. E. Grégrem," Plzeňské listy, 30 December 1890.

[30] The Young Czechs were aware that the legal basis of the Bohemian Staatsrecht was more acceptable to the ruling strata of the monarchy than was the ethnic principle, with its implicit principle of the "natural right" of every nation for its independence. Ibid.

Economic and social problems also figured prominently in the Young Czechs' electoral proclamation and campaign. The Young Czechs linked socio-economic issues both to their long-term aims, particularly the realization of the Staatsrecht, and their day-to-day political efforts in the Reichsrat. Greater political independence of the Bohemian Kingdom would bring with it a greater economic independence from Vienna, consequently more tax revenue could be kept in the kingdom and used for the more rapid development and benefit of the lower classes.[32] The short-term goals of the Liberal Party included substantial tax reform, whose individual aspects were described in considerable detail. The main thrust of this reform was to ease the burden on the lower middle classes and small farmers.[33] Concern was also expressed over the economic and political situation of the workers, and the Liberal Party promised greater protection for this group by the government. The economic platforms and suggestions of the Liberal Party went slightly beyond the current concepts of economic liberalism, which were otherwise favoured by most of the prominent Young Czechs, however, they showed no understanding for the Marxist social democratic movement. The internationalism of this movement was rejected as being as potentially harmful to Czech national development as the deficient national sentiment of the nobles and the clericals.[34]

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[31] For example, Bedřich Pacák examined in detail the existing electoral law in relation to the population and the direct tax census criteria. He proved that the principle of representation of interests was not applied fairly. His findings also showed that the changes of the law proposed by German representatives in the Bohemian Diet would not bring the law closer to the principle of true representation of interests. Národní listy, 18 January 1891.

[32] The Young Czechs claimed that every year Bohemia contributed about 120 million gulden to the state treasury but only 40 million of it returned to Bohemia. "Schůze Sněmu českého království." Národní listy, 1 January 1891. On the basis of the official statistics, the ratio of Bohemian contributions to receipts appears even worse: For example, in 1890 Bohemia contributed, in direct and indirect taxes, over 123 million gulden, but received back only 17 million. Österreichisches Statistisches Handbuch, 1891. K. K. Statistischen Zentral-Kommision. Vienna, 1892, pp. 261-66.

The Young Czechs realized that it would be difficult to work for their programme's fulfilment without political freedoms. As a result, they laid special emphasis on increasing and strengthening such basic civil liberties as freedom of speech, press and assembly. For this reason, they rejected the concept of "higher state interests" promoted by the Viennese government and Germans to restrict the political and national development of individual non-German nationalities. The Young Czechs felt that the concept was invoked by the government to limit basic political freedoms and to strengthen centralism and German supremacy.

The scope of the Liberal Party's 1891 programme was broad, covering all the important areas of political, social and economic life. It is possible to agree with Karel Kramář that the programme remained for years the best formulation of Czech ambitions in virtually every sphere.[35] Credit for its breadth and for clauses dealing with suggestions for economic and social reforms belonged to the Realists, who were more concerned with social and economic problems than were the Young Czechs. They considered the workers' economic demand reasonable and justified, and wanted the government to intervene more on behalf of the workers.

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[33] The Young Czech activity in the Reichsrat in relation to economic issues will be discussed in greater detail in chapter three.

[34] "Valná schůze voličstva všech měst pražských," Národní listy, Příloha, 1 March 1891.

Political meetings and the publication of the speeches of Young Czech deputies and candidates had a great influence on Czech public life.[36] For the first time all the major political issues were openly discussed in public; for the first time Czechs received an opportunity to participate intensively in politics. Until 1890, the National Party, as the leading Czech political force, had acted primarily as a parliamentary group and had failed to initiate broader participation in politics. It considered negotiations with the Viennese government and with other political groups in the Reichsrat the most important aspect of its activity, and probably rightly so. For decades, the educational and political level had not allowed for any meaningful communication between political parties and the population. Consequently, the cultural and political development of the Czech nation was dependent primarily on the activity of its political elite. However, by the 1880s the Czech population was capable of political judgement as well as participation, and the National Party had not incorporated this substantial political change into its work.

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[35] Karel Kramář, Poznámky k české politice (Prague: Bursík a Kohout, 1906), p. 10.

[36] There were 102 Czech political newspapers and journals available in Bohemia in 1891. Most of them had been in opposition to the government since the March election. The Bohemian Germans had sixty-three political papers. František Roubík, Bibliografie českého časapisectva z let 1863-1895 (Prague: Česká akademie věd , 1936), p. 267. Czech historians claimed that the quality of Czech newspapers did not lag behind, and probably surpassed the quality of German newspapers in Bohemia. Ibid., p. xiii. In 1891, thirty-two Czech deputies (out of forty-two) were regularly contributing to the Czech newspapers. Josef Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách v letech 1878-1918, 2 vols. (Prague: Český čtenář, 1930-31), 1: 11

Moreover, its lack of responsiveness to the economic needs of farmers, artisans and workers left the Liberal Party with another source of popular support. The Young Czechs focussed mainly on gaining the well-to-do farmers, with voting privileges, for cooperation. Farmers were seriously affected by the prolonged agricultural crisis,[37] and in the 1880s attempted to form their own organizations to defend their economic interests. But being only partly successful, they responded positively to the Liberal Party's endeavour at cooperation. From early 1888 the Liberals gained the support of some of the agrarian organizations, including the most significant Farmers' Union (Selská jednota) founded in May 1889 in Prague at the farmers' congress which was attended by fifteen hundred farmers and a number of prominent Young Czechs.[38] The Liberal Party activity among the workers only partially influenced their organizations because an increasing number of workers was being attracted by social democratic parties.[39] The Liberals' activity among workers had no visible impact upon the election results mainly because the bulk of workers had no voting rights until 1896.

The Young Czechs, maintaining intensive communication with the population, gained deserved results in the elections to the Bohemian Diet in 1889. But the results of the elections to the *Reichsrat* in March 1891 were even more remarkable, and exceeded all expectations. The electoral outcome was a result of the exasperation of the Czech electorate with the policies of the National Party combined with the Young Czechs' dynamic electoral campaign. The intensive and optimistic activity of the Czech population, which started during the election campaign of 1891, continued thereafter for almost three years, contributing to the formation of a politically educated and responsible Czech citizenry; it educated citizens in the spirit of democracy and concern for Czech national progress, economic advancement and social justice.[40] This intensified political activity, however, also had undesirable side-effects, caused mainly by the Liberal Party's policy of "consistent" opposition to the Viennese government, which began in the summer of 1891. Even some Young Czechs observed with some apprehension the radicalism of Czech politics,[41] because it tended to nourish, among Czechs, unrealistic political expectations.

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[37] The economic and political situation of peasantry in the Bohemian Kingdom in the 1880s and 1890s is analysed by Jan Havránek in "Die ökonomische und politische Lage der Bauernschaft in den böhmischen Ländern in den letzten Jahrzehnten des 19. Jahrhunderts," Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftgeschichte pt. 2 (Berlin, 1966), pp. 96-136.

[38] Vojtěch, "Organizačni vývoj," p. 571.

[39] Ibid., p. 573.

The National Party inadvertently facilitated the victory of the

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[40] Josef Penížek, a Czech historian and activist in the Liberal Party, described the intensity of Czech political life in this period as greater than during the First Czechoslovak Republic. Penížek, *Česká aktivita*, 1: 116. Kamil Krofta, a Czech historian and a Minister of Foreign Affairs during the last years of the First Czechoslovak Republic, wrote in 1930 in an article about Kramář that older Czech generations, linked to the National Party, considered the Young Czechs' goal of involving the Czech population in the political participation unrealizable before it took place. Krofta viewed the Young Czechs' success in "bringing politics to the people" as their greatest achievement, and the major reason that contrary to other Central European countries after the break up of the monarchy, the development of the First Czechoslovak Republic was successfully democratic. Krofta, "Největší životní dílo dr. Kramáře," *Sborník dra. Karla Kramáře k jeho 70. narozeninám* (Prague: Akciová tiskárna, 1930), pp. 254-55.

[41] Kramář, *Poznámky o české politice*, p. 12; Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách*, 1: 179.

Liberal Party in the elections by its limited activity during the electoral campaign. Since many Old Czechs themselves were deserting the Party over its stand on the settlement with the Germans, the Old Czechs' appeals to the unity of the nation did not rally the Czech electorate. On the whole, they were out of touch with the voters,[42] and did almost nothing to intensify communication with the common people to try to win them over. Their political speeches only superficially discussed the serious political issues, including the "settlement"; they barely touched upon the socio-economic problems that were so important to most of the population. They also held far fewer electoral meetings than the Young Czechs, probably because they believed that the urban population, politically "more mature", would continue to support them. Times, however, had changed. No longer could a Czech political party limit its activity to the representative bodies and communication with the government. No party could ignore, without serious consequences for itself, that the Czech society had advanced economically, culturally and politically to such a degree that it wanted to participate actively in politics. At the beginning of the 1890s the Liberal Party was the only one to recognize the paramount importance of intensive interaction between politicians and the masses. They realized that a political party now had to be also concerned with issues of people's everyday life, interests and socio-economic problems. Because of this recognition by the Liberals, and its obvious success, the pattern of Czech political life became greatly altered from the 1890s onwards.

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[42] The candidates of the National Party, for example talked with disrespect about the Czech farmers, describing their "immaturity" as responsible for their support of the Young Czechs. "Jednota občanů pražských." Hlas národa, 3 March, 1891.

The results of the Bohemian elections to the Reichsrat in March 1891 surprised everyone. The Young Czechs were victorious by a landslide in seventeen of eighteen urban Czech districts. In the seventeen rural Czech districts the Young Czechs won every seat. Moreover, they obtained three seats by the elections of the Chamber of Commerce, while the Old Czechs obtained only one. On the whole they received the support of 58.5 per cent of voters, who represented less than 10 per cent of the Czech adult male population.[43] The Liberal Party's deputies in the Reichsrat constituted "The Club of Independent Czech Deputies in the Reichsrat." Eighteen members of the Bohemian historical nobility joined Hohenwart's Catholic Club, and two Old Czech deputies from Bohemia joined their colleagues from Moravia in a separate Club.[44] Moravia did not change its voting pattern significantly from previous elections. Despite a two-thirds Czech majority in the population, Moravia elected twenty-five Germans and only eleven Czechs, all members of the National Party.[45]

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[43] Garver, The Young Czech Party, p. 153.

[44] S. B. Winter, "The Hegemony of the Young Czech Party," p. 292.

[45] The most frequent explanation of this unusual situation was the national and political immaturity of the Czech population in Moravia, which on the whole was much less interested in politics than the population of Bohemia. Národní listy, 19 March, 1891.

Division of seats of Bohemian and Moravian deputies in the Reichsrat after the election in 1891

Bohemia

	Great Landowners		Chambers of Commerce	Districts		Total
	Conservative	Centralists		Urban	Rural	
Czechs			4	18	17	39
Germans		6	3	15	12	36
Independent					1	1
Without national specification	17					17
Total	17	6	7	33	30	93
Young Czechs			3	17	17	37
Old Czechs			1	1		2

Moravia[46]

	Great Landowners	Chambers of Commerce	Districts		Total
			Urban	Rural	
Czechs		-	10	1	11
Germans			13	12	25
Without national specification	9	3			12
	9	3	23	13	48

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[46] More accurate division of votes is not available.

The level of participation in the indirect elections in rural districts was far from spectacular.[47] In Bohemia and Moravia only about 50 per cent of the voters came to the polls. This was, however, still a few percentage points higher than average participation in the monarchy as a whole, excluding Hungary, which was 46.9 per cent.[48] In some cases this unimpressive participation was explained as a result of the political "immaturity" of the voters;[49] however some of the press argued that the system of indirect voting itself was responsible for voters' indifference in electoral participation, because the voters felt their vote mattered little.[50] Participation of urban voters was somewhat higher.No data is available specifically for Bohemia and Moravia, but average overall participation came about 63 per cent in urban districts. The participation of rural voters elected in the indirect elections to participate in the direct elections was rather impressive. Ninety-six per cent of them came to polls.[51] Due to the fact that their voting power

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[47] To obtain a seat in the Reichsrat, a simple majority of votes cast was required. Attaining such a majority was sometimes difficult, when several popular candidates of different parties competed for the same seat. In several instances run-off elections took place between the two most successful candidates.

[48] "Volby na řišskou radu r. 1873 až 1891." Atheneum, December 1891, p. 69.

[49] Národní listy, 19 March, 1891.

[50] "Volby na řišskou radu r. 1873 až 1891," Atheneum, December 1891 p. 68.

[51] Ibid.

represented an important segment of the rural population, they probably felt considerable responsibility for the outcome of direct elections.

Only fifty Czech deputies from the lands of the Czech Crown were elected to the Reichsrat, a number that reflected neither their numerical nor economic strength (as expressed in tax revenues). The existing structure of the electoral laws enabled the Czechs to gain only fourteen per cent of the Reichsrat's seats, though they constituted twenty-four per cent of the total Austrian population. In contrast, the eight million Germans formed less than forty per cent of the total population, yet German representatives numbered 177 out of 353 -- a full half of the Reichsrat's members. The Czechs felt they should have eighty-four representatives in the Reichsrat,[52] and the Czech representatives included an electoral reform as one of their most important political objectives.

Since the Young Czechs held thirty-seven of the forty-nine Czech mandates, they might appear to have been a relatively powerful group in the Reichsrat. But, because of the system of parliamentary clubs and because the Young Czechs, unlike the Old Czechs, would not join Hohenwart's Catholic Club of sixty deputies,[53] they were too weak to influence legislation directly. It was, however, their industriousness, the zealous spirit and the manner in which they contributed to parliamentary debates, which had a lasting impact upon the Czech population.

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[52] Národní listy, 24 March, 1891.

[53] Immediately after the elections, Hohenwart's Club consisted of 60 members (later its structure changed slightly): 14 Slovenes, 8 Croats, 29 German Conservatives, 5 Romanians, and 4 Italians. The strongest Club was that of the German United Left with 110 deputies. The Club of German Nationalists had 20 deputies, Poles 57, Ruthenians 8, the Club of the Left Center 10, Antisemites10, and others had 6 deputies. Národní listy, 23 March, 1891.

As the National Party's cooperation with the government had resulted in only minimal political, cultural or national advancement for Czechs during the second half of the 1880s, the only alternative left to the Liberal Party was to stand in opposition to the government. They were to maintain this stance for close to seven years, enjoying the support of the majority of the Czech population. Only the press associated with the National Party considered the Liberal Party's opposition hazardous, on the grounds that it blocked the possibility of cooperation with other parliamentary clubs and also allowed the government to treat the Czech delegation with indifference.[54] But the number of political papers supporting the National Party was half the number of those supporting the Liberal Party. Eleven Czech deputies from Moravia did not join in opposition those from Bohemia. Two Moravian Czech deputies, J. Fanderlík and J. Žáček, who were considered close to the Liberal Party, neither joined its Club nor became members of Hohenwart's Catholic Club.[55] Their ambiguous position irritated voters of their constitutencies, who expected them to cooperate closely with the Young Czechs; however, the voters' repeated calls for a change in their position met with no result.[56]

The Liberal Party continued its tradition of intensive communication with the Czech population after its electoral victory in

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[54] "Nebezpečná situace," Hlas národa, 13 March 1891.

[55] Vojtěch, "Organizační vývoj," p. 576.

[56] Národní listy, 24 March and 12 May, 1891.

March 1891. This communication proved to be very significant for the political development of the Czech nation. The organizational structure of the Liberal Party provided a basis for effective communication with the public. The Party never established the tradition of having one leader because of fear that his influence could become gradually too strong, in a similar fashion to what had happened in the National Party. Consequently, the Liberals enjoyed considerable freedom of personal initiative. The Party's highest authority was the convention, which met every six years. The Party's deputies, members of the executive committee, local trustees, members of local governments and journalists composed the main body of each convention. Since conventions of several thousand participants were too large for policy making, the main course of the Liberal Party's activity was usually clarified and defined at the Congress of the Liberal Party's board of trustees,[57] which met regularly each year. In practice, however, the policy of the Party was usually designed by the body of the Party's deputies, which met each month. All actions of the Party were organized by the executive committee of thirty-two members, of whom thirteen consisted a permanent core of the committee. The executive committee also had at its service five specialized committees,[58] of which the central voting committee took care of nominating most of the party's candidates for elections.[59]

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[57] Organizations of district trustees began to be formed from the middle of the 1870s. Each unit on the local level consisted of several prominent Young Czechs, who met regularly, cooperated with voting committees, and gradually established close contacts with local governments. See more on the political role of local governments in Garver, The Young Czech Party, pp. 89-98.

[58] Most information about the organization of the Liberal Party is taken from Škarda, Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program, pp. 16-18.

[59] Vojtěch, "Organizační vývoj." p. 575.

The organization of the Liberal Party remained stable from its beginning through the 1890s. The only substantial changes were the increase in the number of the Party's trustees from several hundred to several thousand, and in the number of the Executive Committee from thirteen to thirty-two.

Before the Liberal Party's electoral victory in 1891, the organizational structure of the Party assisted in the Party's growth, because it allowed easy access to and communication with the public. After the Party became the leading Czech political force, its structure and its established communication with the public served mainly to promote a rapid increase in the political participation of Czechs, and facilitated their political education.

Although the impact of the Liberal Party's activity on the Czech public seems to be the most significant practical result of the Party's endeavours, the parliamentary activity of its representatives in the *Reichsrat* was far from negligible. The Young Czechs brought into it new inquisitive spirit and concern for issues which were barely touched previously by the *Reichsrat*'s members.

CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL ACTIVITY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY FROM 1891 TO 1893

The period from the Young Czechs' victory in the *Reichsrat* elections to the declaration of martial law in Prague and environs in September 1893 was above all an era of political growth for the bulk of the Czech nation. It was characterized by an unprecedented degree of political participation and by the wide-spread belief that a solution for existing national problems was within reach if proper and consistent methods of political struggle were used.

Such unjustified expectations, however, soon led to disillusionment and to increased political tensions, particularly between the Czech deputies and the Viennese government. The government of Count Taaffe hesitated to take the "odd company" of the Young Czechs in the *Reichsrat* seriously.[1] Since the government insisted on the implementation of the Czech-German settlement of 1890, the Czech deputies in the *Reichsrat* intensified their policy of opposition, passing into so-called radical, or "consistent" opposition in the middle of 1891.[2] In reality, however, this policy was combined with a pragmatic stance vis-a-vis the government, cooperating with it on occasions which seemed advantageous to the majority of the Czech population, and opposing it in other cases. The idea of radical opposition was enthusiastically supported by most

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[1] Zdeněk Tobolka, *Politické dějiny Československého národa*. Vol. 3, Pt. 2: 24-25.

[2] Karel Kramář, "Dějiny české politiky nové doby," in Tobolka, ed., *Česká Politika*, 3: 534.

Czechs, whose "sentiment was galvanized along radical and nationalistic lines" since the publication of the Czech-German settlement of 1890.[3] However, since it soon became apparent that the radicalism of the Liberal Party in the Reichsrat was not to be a successful means for achieving the party's major aims, the Liberal Party's performances in the Reichsrat soon became less radical than speeches in meetings with voters. The radicalism of the Liberal Party's representatives in the Reichsrat between 1891-1893 was still greater than suggested in the party's program of 1891, which had been drafted for constructive work at home as well as in Vienna.[4] After 1893, however, the Liberal Party gradually abandoned the radical opposition and even dealt drastically with the most radical elements within the party.

Although the basic assumption of the Liberal Party's political activity after 1891 remained the same as in the previous decade, the establishment of a federal system in Austria as a whole[5] was its ultimate goal, its deputies focused much of their efforts on achieving implementation of the Bohemian Staatsrecht. They also used the Bohemian Staatsrecht as a legal basis for preserving the unity of the Bohemian Kingdom against German attempts to divide it along national lines. Since the Czech Staatsrecht was in theory bound to the political privileges and the leadership of the historical nobility, it was opposed by a part of the Czech peasants,[6] and the Young Czechs were aware that the prospective clarification and re-evaluation of the whole concept was necessary.

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[3] Winters, "Kramář, Kaizl, and the Hegemony of the Young Czech Party, 1891-1901," p. 287.

[4] Kramář, Poznámky k české politice, p. 10.

[5] Tobolka, Politické dějiny Československého národa, 3: 4.

The Young Czech deputies gradually gained the respect of their colleagues in the Reichsrat by their responsible approach towards parliamentary work and existing political problems,[7] as well as by the high standard of most of their speeches.[8] This does not mean that the party's political views were unified and that the party was free from internal problems. Controversies between moderates and radicals, and differences between the Young Czechs' relatively moderate performances in the Reichsrat and their more radical stances in Bohemia were detrimental to the party's efficiency. A discrepancy between the limited scope of possibilities of the Liberal Party's practical policies and the expectations of the Czech population, who judged the Czech deputies mainly on the basis of the party's program, electoral promises, and proclaimed goals, also contributed to internal tensions.

From the Young Czechs' point of view, the inequitable political system combined with the serious limitations of the representative bodies' powers were the most serious obstacles to efficient political work. The Reichsrat, having very limited powers, was to a great extent manipulated by the government, which had no true constitutional responsibility towards this body of popular representatives. The government itself was traditionally in the hands of aristocrats, mostly of German origin, and showed little understanding of the national and political strivings of the empire's various nationalities. The Upper House was composed of members of the nobility selected by the Emperor, and this unrepresentative body did not have a tradition of making problems for the government. Moreover, the majority of German deputies had no sympathy for the political and national demands of other nationalities, including those of the Czechs, who aimed primarily at decentralization of the empire and complete equality of the Czechs and Germans in Bohemia.

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[6] Národní listy, 8 September 1893.

[7] Jan Herben, T.G. Masaryk, 5th ed., (Prague: Sfinx, 1947) p. 67.

[8] Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách, 2: 123.

The Young Czechs believed that the monarchy's existence would be endangered in the long run if all its nationalities did not receive equal opportunities for development. They hoped that their industriousness and detailed analyses of the monarchy's major internal problems would help to form a new outlook on the empire's internal situation, and would help to inspire the interest of the representatives in the Reichsrat in solving these problems. Although the Young Czechs gradually realized that their limited strength in the Reichsrat as well as their opposition to the government was not a reliable means for achieving their aims, they maintained this position for more than half a decade. The government soon viewed Czech public political activity as one of the major causes of political unrest in the empire. The Young Czechs fully concurred, and gave a warning to the government that there would be no peace in the monarchy as long as the "Czech question" was not solved.[9]

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[9] Národní listy, 4 September 1893.

The issue of the "Czech question" thus reappeared with new strength after the electoral victory of the Young Czechs in 1891. This victory also definitively ended the political leadership of the National Party and the Bohemian historical nobility. Their conservative political approach was replaced by the more liberal, democratic persuasions of the Young Czechs, who preserved their leadership in the struggle for Czech national interests until 1914.[10] Their position in the Reichsrat as well as in the nation was, however, drastically weakened after the introduction of universal suffrage in 1907, when the economic stratification of the Czech population became more truly reflected in the political system.

Even the Young Czechs realized that their landslide victory in the elections of 1891 had been too great and rapid.[11] Julius Grégr confessed in private that less victory would have been better for the Liberal Party.[12] The Young Czechs were aware of all the responsibility which a victory brought upon them; however, for several years they tried to avoid the inevitable conclusion that there were no adequate means for a successful political struggle available to Czech parties. It seems that they worked on the assumption that labourious analyses of existing political, national and economic problems in the monarchy would eventually influence the political attitudes of the majority of the popular representatives in the Reichsrat, and would win them over to the cause of substantial reforms of the monarchy's political system. This "idealism" of the Liberal Party was not fated to succeed, and from the beginning it was shadowed by the party's reluctant awareness of its limited sphere of action.

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[10] Winters, "The Young Czech Party (1874-1914)," p. 426.

[11] Kramář, Poznámky o české politice, p. 9.

[12] Karel Tůma, "Padesát let boje a práce." Půl století Národních listů 1860-1910. Almanach. (Prague: Akciová tiskárna, 1911), p. 25.

Severe criticism of the Liberal Party's political methods in newspapers close to the National Party revealed a great deal of insecurity among the Young Czechs. The latter frequently responded in Národní listy with irritated attacks on the National Party, despite its negligible popular support. For several years disputes and reproaches between these two parties continued to be a significant part of Czech political life. The conservative newspapers interpreted the isolation of the Czech delegation in the Reichsrat as humiliating and dangerous, not only for the delegation but for the Czech nation as a whole.[13] It could only result, they claimed, in a less favourable attitude of the government towards the political and national ambitions of the Czech nation.[14] They still desired cooperation between the Czech deputies and the historical nobility, who were the only "power able to defend the progress of the country and the Czechs against the aggressiveness of the Germans."[15] The Old Czechs deprecated the policy of open opposition to the government, because they believed that collaboration with the majority in the *Reichsrat* was a more efficient means to achieve progress for the Czech nation, particularly if the *Reichsrat* majority was united in its opposition to the German Liberals.[16] The opinions of the Old Czechs reflected some significant aspects of the Liberal Party's troubled situation; however, they failed to understand that in the 1890s politics could no longer be limited solely to parliamentary work. Cooperation between the Liberal Party and the Czech nation would have been hardly possible under the situation promoted by the Old Czechs.

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[13] "Nebezpečná cesta." Hlas národa, 31 March 1891.

[14] For example, Count Taaffe, after responding more or less diplomatically to the Old Czechs on their demand for Czech as the inner language of administration in the Czech regions, rejected the same demand of the Young Czechs with unusual hardness. "Prohlášení hr. Taaffa." Hlas národa, 29 May 1891.

[15] "Prohlášení poslanců strany národní." Hlas národa, 16 February 1892.

This does not mean that all Young Czechs were against cooperation with the government under certain conditions. Some moderate Young Czechs, who viewed the Czech parliamentary opposition as directed purely against the "centralizing" and "germanizing" government, believed that the parliamentary Right, supporting the government, could eventually be won to the idea of federalism and the equality of nations in the empire.[17] The optimism of some Young Czechs went even further at the beginning of their parliamentary activity. They saw the "Czech question" as a kind of misunderstanding between Germans and Czechs which would be resolved as soon as the Germans understood that the major Czech political aims did not go beyond the equality of the Czechs and Germans in the Bohemian Kingdom. They also believed that, as soon as the Bohemian Germans realized the advantage of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* for themselves, they would adopt it readily as their own political aim,[18] because it would give them considerable economic benefits.

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[16] "Jak chcete provést státni právo české." *Hlas národa*, 4 September 1892.

[17] Speech of K. Kramář to the voters. *Národní listy*, 1 September 1891.

The National Party welcomed publicly the intention of some Young Czechs to work for a better understanding of Czech political aims among the Germans.[19] But such rare manifestations of the National Party's support for the Liberal Party's activity did not result in cooperation between the parties. The Czech-German settlement of 1890 remained the most painful cause of controversy between the Young and the Old Czechs for more than a year. The struggle of the Young Czechs against the settlement was carried out intensively on the floor of the Reichsrat[20] as well as in the Diet. The Liberal Party took over the struggle for Czech as the inner administrative language in Czech regions from the National Party, trying to prove that the use of German led to less efficiency, not more, as argued by the government and the Germans.[21]

For more than a year the Old Czechs insisted on implementation of the settlement as "originally negotiated" by all parties. In February

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[18] "Posl. prof. T.G. Masaryk před voliči." Národní listy, 24 September 1891. Already in April 1892, however, Masaryk expressed a different, more pessimistic, view regarding the prospect of an eventual involvement of the Germans in decentralization. He accused them of being in favour of centralism only because it secured their privileged position in the monarchy. "Sněm království českého." Národní listy, 8 April 1892. Masaryk's shift in his view seems to have been influenced by opinions about the Bohemian Staatsrecht expressed by some German politicians. For example, Ernst Plener believed that realization of the Bohemian Staatsrecht would destroy Austria. "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 24 October 1891.

[19] "Mladočeský obhájce opportunní politiky." Hlas národa, 25 September 1891.

[20] "Říšská Rada." Speech of Josef Kaizl. Národní listy, 2 May 1891.

[21] For example, "Říšská Rada. Řeč poslance dr. Bed. Pacáka." Národní listy, 25 July 1891.

1892, however, they ceased to support its implementation, because there was no progress in obtaining improved status for the Czech language in state administration in Czech regions, while the government did not abandon its intention to carry out some part of the settlement through administrative decrees.[22] Since the National Party's change of attitude toward the settlement was not immediately accompanied by a public statement, and the Party did not abandon its pro-government stance, its basic political position became rather confused. Some Czech politicians voiced the opinion that the National Party should be pressed to resign completely from the political scene.[23]

František Rieger, then seventy-four years old, wished to retire completely from political activity, which at the end of his long career had brought him mainly hatred from the public.[24] But his sense of responsibility did not allow him to demoralize the National Party by his withdrawal from its leadership. To improve the situation of the National Party, he decided in May 1892 to clarify the National Party's attitude to the problems which evolved in relation to the settlement. In a letter to the President of the Supreme Court in Bohemia he expressed his disagreement with the German interpretation of the settlement and methods of its implementation.[25]

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[22] "Pohřeb vídeňských punktací." Plzeňské listy, 16 February 1892.

[23] "Ve vážné chvíli." Čas, 30 April 1892.

[24] "Rieger Pražákovi." 28 January 1892. Kameníček, ed., Paměti a listář Dr. Aloise Pražáka, 2: p. 352.

[25] "Riegrův dopis." Hlas národa, 15 May 1892.

Rieger mainly opposed the formation of "closed German territory," which took into account only the national aspects of the settlement and ignored considerations related to transportation, commercial and financial conditions, which were also important components of the original agreement. According to Rieger, the indirect implicit exclusion of the Czech language from this territory was also unjustified in terms of the settlement's text. One of the reasons why Rieger freed himself from the liabilities of the agreement was that it did not become a source of stability in Bohemia as originally expected, but rather a source of deep conflicts. He retained his deputy's seat in the Reichsrat, as did other National Party deputies,[26] but the main reason was for prestige, so as "not to look as if they were subordinating themselves to the policies of the Liberal Party."[27] In reality Rieger and other Old Czechs were probably influenced by the Liberal Party's Manifesto to the Czech population, published on April 26, 1892, in which sixty Czech deputies from the Reichsrat and the Diet rejected the settlement, calling it a means for strengthening the centralist system.[28] They held the National Party's indecisiveness responsible for the government's action in carrying out some of the provisions of the settlement through administrative measures. They wanted to prosecute the Minister of Justice, F. Schönborn, who was responsible for this action, because he ignored the Diet's jurisdiction.[29] The Manifesto invited the Czech population to stand in strong opposition to the government.[30]

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[26] Karel Mattuš was an exception, he resigned his seat in May 1893.

[27] Mattuš, Paměti, p. 150.

[28] Národní listy, 26 April 1892.

Although the issue of the settlement was an important part of the Liberal Party's public activity other important political, economic and social issues received equal attention. The Young Czechs organized hundreds of public political meetings, discussing issues of public interest as well as giving detailed reports on their work in the *Reichsrat* and Diet. Besides this, they attempted to increase the political interest and participation of the Moravian Czechs, who remained even after 1891 under the leadership of the National Party. Public political meetings organized by the Club of the Liberal Party's deputies were attended by a population enthusiastic about the political methods of the Young Czechs. Some of these deputies, like Eduard Grégr, even advocated the so-called "total opposition," which involved the stoppage of tax-payments.[31] But Grégr's idea of "total opposition" was not shared by most of the Czech deputies, who viewed it as unrealistic under the present conditions in the Bohemian Kingdom. The government on the whole deliberately ignored Czech dissatisfaction with the Czech-German settlement of 1890, which was expressed most often at public meetings, in newspapers and in the form of petitions.[32] To end these outbursts of public dissatisfaction, the government started to suppress more frequently any newspapers writing against the settlement.[33]

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[29] The full text of the proposal for prosecution against Schönborn is in Srb, *Politické dějiny národa českého*, p. 859. The *Reichsrat* voted 238 to 41 against prosecution. Ibid., p. 861.

[30] In the *Reichsrat* the Manifesto was rejected by 238 votes against 41. Kramář, Dějiny české politiky nové doby," in Tobolka, ed., *Česká Politika*, 3: 534.

[31] Enthusiastic support for Grégr's suggestion expressed by two thousand people participating at the meeting in Německý Brod caused the dissolution of the meeting by a government representative. "Rozpuštěná schůze Dr. Edurda Grégra v Německém Brodě." *Národní listy*, 13 June 1892.

Eventually, Czech obstruction in the Bohemian Diet succeeded in preventing further attempts to implement the settlement. The immediate cause for the obstruction was an attempt by the government to establish a new German judicial district in Trutnov (Trautenau). Since the government had followed a rather unusual procedure -- submitting its proposal directly to a committee of the Diet -- the Young Czechs wanted to prevent any discussion of the proposal in the spring session of 1893. They declared that they had gained the promise of the speaker, Prince Lobkowic, to keep the commission report off the agenda until the deliberation on the budget was ended. However, Lobkowic put the report on the agenda on May 17, one day before the spring session was going to end.[34] The Czech deputies responded with obstruction, which prevented the discussion of the proposal as well as of the budget, since the Speaker closed the session the same day.[35]

The obstruction was accepted with enthusiasm by the Czech population -- at last a means was found which worked, and prevented the government from carrying out the feared settlement. It became apparent only gradually that the action of the Czech deputies played an important role in the government's decision to take repressive measures against Czech political activity several months later. Moreover, the unparliamentary method by which the Young Czechs prevented deliberation about some parts of the settlement was several years later used against the Czech liberals, when the German deputies in the Reichsrat used the same means to prevent measures favourable to the Czech language.

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[32] In 1890 alone, 1600 such petitions were sent to the Presidium of the Bohemian Diet. Tůma, "Padesát let boje a práce." p. 23.

[33] For example, only during June 1892 the censor suppressed 281 issues of Czech oppositional papers. Srb, Politické dějiny, 2: 873.

[34] Srb in Politické dějiny národa českého, 3: 882-83, states that Lobkowic did not make such a promise, but by putting the report on the agenda he violated the tradition of the Diet's procedure, since he interrupted discussion about another business.

[35] "Zemský sněm." Národní listy, 19 May 1893.

The settlement of 1890 was the only significant issue over which the Liberal Party was able to maintain an admirable unity in its public performances as well as its inner cohesion. As long as the issue of the settlement and the future position of the Czech language in Bohemia were not settled, internal differences in the party tended to be shelved.

Aside from this major issue, however, between 1891-1893 there were significant differences in opinions within the Liberal Party, particularly related to the Party's basic strategy: a handful of Young Czechs believed that obstruction in the Reichsrat would speed the introduction of federalism; some were convinced that passive resistance would work more efficiently for the interests of the nation; and several Young Czech deputies did not favour the opposition to the government, and waited only for a convenient moment to join the governmental majority in return for some substantial concessions. But there was also a lack of agreement as to what constituted a "substantial concession"; for some it meant nothing less than the establishment of federalism, while some did not go beyond a relatively modest demand for Czech as the inner administrative language in Czech regions.[36] There was also a significant division of opinions among the Young Czechs regarding the monarchy's foreign policy. Austria's subordination to German foreign policy within the framework of the two empires' 1879 treaty was resisted by all Young Czechs. Some of them opposed the existence of any military treaty with Germany at all; some viewed it as acceptable in case it would serve to preserve peace. The terms of such acceptability were, however, far from clear. Besides these groups, there was even a weak but very vocal pro-Russian trend, represented by Jan Vašatý.[37]

In view of these divergent opinions, and since the Liberal Party never established a tradition of having an official leader, its relative homogeneity in the Reichsrat was admirable. It was greatly helped by the chairman of the Czech Club of deputies Bedřich Engel, whose diplomatic skills managed to achieve unanimity within the party at least for its important public performances.[38]

But it was more difficult to prevent deputies from manifesting their different opinions at public meetings. Moderate views, harmonizing with those expressed in the Reichsrat, were not accepted as enthusiastically by the Czech public as the more radical ones, which reflected more readily the mood of the population. Národní listy, frequently unwilling to subordinate its writing to views prevailing in the Czech Club, encouraged both the unrealistic expectations and the radicalism of the voters, particularly in rural areas. The Czech rural areas had no substantial German minorities, and thus the rural population had no opportunity to balance its theoretical knowledge of Czech-German problems by direct experience.[39]

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[36] Josef Kaizl, Z mého života, Vol. I, Introduction by Z. Tobolka, p. 36.

[37] Ibid., p. 36.

[38] Kramář, "Dějiny české politiky," 3: 528.

However, the Czech delegation's policy of opposition in the Reichsrat, though attacked by the Czech public for being too moderate, contributed to the Czechs' isolation and impeded the attainment of minor cultural and political concessions.[40] This "infertile" policy gradually pushed the Young Czechs into a more pragmatic stand in the Reichsrat. This combination of opposition and pragmatism, maintained during 1891-1897, was to achieve more national concessions than the cooperation with the government practiced after 1897.[41]

The already difficult position of the Czech delegation in the Reichsrat was further aggravated by the fact that the majority of the Reichsrat accepted the suggestion of the Crown Speech of April 11, 1891, to adopt a "non-political policy," which basically meant an exclusion of all discussions about national, constitutional and denominational matters.[42] Although this kind of procrastinating policy only delayed attempts to solve the monarchy's serious internal problems, the practice survived for several years. In agreement with the Reichsrat's "non-political policy" the Young Czechs were not allowed to deliver speeches on topics of the Bohemian Staatsrecht and federalism; however, they used every possible occasion to remind the Reichsrat of their opinions on these issues.

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[39] Kramář, Poznámky o české politice, p. 13-14.

[40] Kramář, "Dějiny české politiky," 3: 531.

[41] Tobolka, Politické dějiny Československého národa, 3, Pt. 2: 10.

[42] "Otázka česká v nové radě říšské." Národní listy, 29 March 1891.

The speeches of the Czech deputies were mostly in German, since speeches in that language were reported verbatim by stenographers, and then allowed to be published. Also speeches in German would be understood by all members of the Reichsrat, while those in the other languages would not, as there were no provisions for translating the non-German speeches. Non-German speeches were not legally equal with German ones, and a newspaper that published a speech delivered in a language other than German was in danger of confiscation.[43] In these speeches, the Young Czechs frequently used the floor of the Reichsrat for analyzing and criticizing the inadequacy and inefficiency of government policies.[44] There were several major issues which particularly occupied the Czech deputies: foreign policy, electoral reform, education, and economic and social problems.

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[43] Non-German speeches began to be reported verbatim only during the First World War. Penížek, Česká aktivita, 2: 4. Newspapers which published Czech speeches before 1914 were frequently suppressed, because it was not possible to prove that they were identical with those in the Reichsrat. The Bohemian Supreme Court frequently overruled these suppressions, because it was also impossible to prove in court that the published speech was not identical with that delivered in the Reichsrat. Ibid., p. 251. Such decisions by the courts, however, usually had no practical effect because it was rather difficult to distribute newspapers several days old.

[44] During the first month of the budget debate alone, 29 Young Czechs delivered 40 speeches in the Reichsrat. "Zpráva posl. Gustava Eima." Národní listy, 30 August 1891. To-the-point and comprehensive speeches during the first three years of the Young Czechs parliamentary activity were still highly admired by Czech historians forty years later. For example, Penížek, Česká aktivita, 2: 127.

Foreign Policy

The most significant feature of the Young Czech deputies' approach to Austrian foreign policy was their emphasis on the interaction between foreign and internal policy.[45] They understood that the internal policy of the monarchy was significantly influenced by Austria's weakened international position after its defeat by Prussia at Sadowa in 1866 and still more after the Prussian victory over France in 1870-71. They considered the Austro-German Treaty of 1879 as a turning point in Austria's foreign policy, for it subordinated that policy to German interests, and was a major obstacle against implementation of substantial political and national reforms inside the empire. The Liberal Party's politicians in the Reichsrat tried to prove that Germany needed Austria for its ambitions abroad, and not vice versa as it was claimed by the government and the Austrian Germans.[46] The basic thesis of the Liberals' position on foreign policy maintained that the best Austrian interest lay in concentrating on purely "Central European politics" with an emphasis on domestic economic, political and cultural development. At all costs, Austria had to avoid being drawn into "world politics."[47]

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[45] The interaction of Austrian foreign and internal policy after 1867 has most recently been analyzed in English by Solomon Wank in "Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in Austria Hungary, 1867-1914," AHY, 3 Vols., 3: 37-56, and by Hans Kohn in "Was the Collapse Inevitable?" pp. 250-266. Both authors see Austrian foreign and internal policy interlocked; however, they have different perceptions of this dependency. Wank's major thesis is that Austrian foreign policy after 1867 had to adapt to the realities of Dualism. Kohn's thesis is that Austrian domestic policy became subordinated to the foreign policy and this situation was mainly responsible for the breakup of the monarchy.

[46] Kamil Krofta, Politická postava Karla Kramáře (Prague: Z. Chytil, 1930), p. 28.

[47] Ibid.

They made many attempts to persuade the government and the German representatives in the *Reichsrat* that the dependency of Austrian foreign policy on Germany would eventually lead to an Austrian disaster, and most probably to its destruction.

They particularly opposed Austria's Balkan policy, arguing that the monarchy was not strong and cohesive enough for any kind of expansion, and that increased tensions with Russia were harmful for Austria. The Liberal Party deputies advocated intensive economic relations with the Balkan nations as much more beneficial than any expansionist tendencies. If the government wanted to follow the German suit, the Young Czechs thought, it should follow the German example in the intensity of developing economic relations with the Balkans rather than in developing expansionist aspirations.[48]

Their specific plans concerning Austria's orientation in general European affairs were somewhat less unified, ranging from those politicians who wished a cooperation with Russia to those who did not view the Austro-German alliance as necessarily a hazard for Austria, if substantial changes in the nature of Austro-German relationships were made.

In 1891, the Young Czech deputies could only express their views on Austrian foreign policy on the floor of the *Reichsrat* and in public political meetings. They lacked the timidity of the National Party, and their frequent public performances presented a new problem for the authorities to deal with. Their open disagreement with the course of foreign policy was often a cause for dissolution of meetings[49] or for suppression of parts of published speeches analyzing foreign policy.[50] The government was particularly sensitive to the Liberal Party's criticism of the Austro-German alliance of 1879, (reluctantly joined by Italy in 1882), since the Young Czechs frequently questioned the peaceful purpose of the Triple Alliance. They held the existence of the Alliance responsible for deteriorating relations between Russia and Germany and between Russia and Austria, and questioned the officially held defensive character of the Alliance. On the whole the Young Czechs were increasingly sceptical of the Triple Alliance's capability for preserving peace.

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[48] The following are the most detailed articles about the Liberal Party's ideas on Austrian foreign policy in 1891: "Veřejná schůze politického spolku." Speech of Josef Herold, *Národní listy*, August 11; "Rozpuštěná schůze." Speech of Josef Purghart, *Národní listy*, August 31; "Řeč posl. Gustava Eima," *Národní listy*, September 2; "Naše zahraniční politika." Detailed extract of K. Kramař's speech from August 30 (which was partially suppressed when published in *Národní listy*, September 1), *Čas*, September 5. Austrian Balkan policy was analyzed by T.G. Masaryk in the *Reichsrat* in September 1892. *Národní listy*, September 21 and 22, 1892.

A significant group of Czech Liberals doubted the monarchy's need for military alliances at all. They considered peace and concentration on solving the country's serious internal problems as the most reliable means to ensure the monarchy's existence. Some of the prominent Young Czechs believed that an alliance with France and Russia would be more natural for Austria, not because she would be better off in this alliance than in that with Germany, but because it would avoid Russian hostility towards the empire, and perhaps avert a conflict with this power. Only a small group of the Young Czechs deputies, led by Jan Vašatý, idealized Russia and claimed that an alliance with that country would bring freedom and all desired rights to the Slavic nations in Austria-Hungary. The Russophile persuasions of the group combined with their lack of realism was soon to isolate it in the Liberal Party. Vašatý was asked as early as the middle of 1891 to disclaim before his speeches in the Reichsrat that he was speaking on behalf of the party, and to state that he was merely expressing his personal views.[51]

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[49] For example, "Rozpuštěná schůze." Národní listy, 31 August 1891. "Řeč posl. G. Eima." Národní listy, 2 September 1891.

[50] For example, parts of Karel Kramář's public speech at the end of August 1891 were not allowed to be published. "Veřejná schůze v Jičíně." Národní listy, 1 September 1891.

Although Austro-Hungarian foreign policy was predominantly in the hands of the Viennese government, the floor of the Delegations -- the only common Austro-Hungarian representative institution -- allowed some latitude to its 120 members for the expression of their opinions on the course of the monarchy's foreign policy. In 1891 the Young Czech deputies missed this opportunity because of their exorbitant pride. To protest that one of the four Czech seats in the Delegations was given to a member of the National Party, they resigned the remaining three assigned to them. The next year the Young Czechs were careful not to make the same mistake.

In 1892 the Young Czechs received all four positions in the Delegations, and they became its most active members. Their numerous speeches were regularly published in Národní listy without any interference from the censor. The Young Czechs' views on Austrian foreign policy remained similar to those expressed in previous years. The Austro-German alliance remained at the centre of their criticism, accompanied with a call for the decrease of Austrian military expenditures.[52] The Czech members of the Delegations, Gustav Eim, Josef Herold, Tomáš Masaryk and Bedřich Pacák, delivered several extensive speeches during the fall session of 1892.[53] They focused on analyses of the Austro-German alliance from the standpoint of potential sources of future international conflict, pointing out deteriorating relations with Russia as the most dangerous for peace.[54] Pacák, in his speech, did not demand an alliance between Austria and Russia, but an agreement between these two powers in relation to the "Eastern Question," which in his view would improve their relations and allow Austria to decrease its military expenditures.[55] Eim doubted that Italy would remain a permanent member of the Alliance, and suggested that Russia replace Italy.[56]

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[51] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 25 June 1891. In 1896 Vašatý was excluded from the Liberal Party.

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[52] In 1893 the military expenditures of the monarchy made up 17.6 per cent of all public expenditures. "Památná schůze cislajtánské delegace." *Národní listy*, 15 June 1893. Adam Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch in *Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918*, 2 Vols. (Vienna: Oesterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1973), 1: 91, gives data for 1870 and 1910: in 1870 military expenditures were 80.20 million gulden, or 24.1 per cent of all public expenditures; in 1910 they were 227.5 million crowns, or 15.7 per cent of all public expenditures.

[53] "Rozpočtový výbor delegační." Speech of Gustav Eim. *Národní listy*, 4 October 1892. "Řeč del. G. Eima o zahraniční politice." *Národní listy*, 18 October 1892. "Řeč posl. Eima o vojenském rozpočtu." *Národní listy*, 17 October 1892. "Řeč. posl. Pacáka o zahraniční politice." *Národní listy*, 19 October 1892. "Řeč del. Dr. B. Pacáka o vojenských poměrech." *Národní listy*, 19 October 1892.

[54] The desire of the Young Czechs for improving relations with Russia at the beginning of the 1890's was not in fact so isolated. For example, Baron Alois Aehrenthal, ambassador in St. Petersburg in 1888-94, urged the Austrian government in 1890 to reconcile itself with Russia, because it was apparent that Russia was not economically strong enough for any adventures in Europe. Its situation became even more difficult in 1891-92, when famine spread through the country. Moreover, at this time Russia started to orient its expansionist ambitions towards Asia and not Europe. F.R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo. The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914* (London and Boston: Routledge & Keagan Paul, 1972), p. 191-92.

The Young Czechs also opposed the alliance from an economic point of view, disagreeing with the practice of the Austrian government of giving priority to political over economic considerations when negotiating commercial treaties. In their view the Austro-German economic ties were formed mainly for the purpose of reinforcing the political and military alliance, and were far from being economically advantageous for the empire.[57]

Economic considerations thus formed a significant part of the Young Czechs' attitude to the Austro-German alliance. As its economic benefits for Austria were questionable,[58] and military expenditures became much greater than were feasible for the state of the monarchy's economy, the alliance was indirectly contributing to the heightening of the empire's internal tensions. Since the Young Czechs had grave doubts about the peaceful purposes of the Alliance, they were afraid that in the case of a serious international conflict the combination of the empire's economic weakness, internal tensions and military involvement[59] might threaten the monarchy's very existence.

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[55] "Řeč del. Dr. B. Pacáka o vojenských poměrech." Národní listy, 19 October 1892.

[56] "Řec del. G. Eima o zahraniční politice." Národní listy, 18 October 1892.

[57] In the light of recent historical literature the arguments of the Young Czechs accurately reflected the existing situation. For example, Bridge describes the policy of German Chancellor Count Leo Caprivi in 1891 as designed partly "to reinforce" the Austro-German "alliance by economic ties, with the ultimate objective of a central European customs union under German leadership." Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 190.

[58] Economic disadvantages of the Austro-German Alliance are described by Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 190-91.

The Young Czechs also continued to oppose the occupation of Bosnia and Hercegovina by Austria.[60] In the light of considerable hostility of the native population to the occupation, the Young Czechs expected that it would become a source of serious problems for the empire. Though there were slight improvements in the economy of the two provinces, no significant improvements were made in cultural, linguistic and social matters[61] under the Austrian administration. T.G. Masaryk personally visited Bosnia and Herzegovina and collected great amounts of information about the grave conditions in the provinces.[62] On the basis of this knowledge, the Young Czechs in the Delegations vigorously demanded autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Young Czech representatives in the Delegations further concerned themselves with the internal situation of the Austrian army. Pacák collected information on various injustices practiced in the army, particularly cruel and undignified treatment of soldiers by officers, and discriminatory treatment of any Czech army officers who claimed Czech as their language of communication.[63] The fact that military bands in Bohemia were prohibited from playing Czech compositions and songs was beyond any justification.

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[59] In 1892-93, the military role of Austria in the German war plans was to bear all military responsibility for the conflict with Russia. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 193. It is, however, possible that the Young Czechs did not know these details.

[60] Gustav Eim stated in his speech in the Delegations' session that the Liberal Party had maintained opposition to the occupation in 1878. "Delegace." Národní listy, 14 October 1892.

[61] For example, "robota" was still in existence in both provinces.

[62] Masaryk delivered in the Delegations on October 19, 1892 a very extensive speech about the overall situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Národní listy, 21 and 22 October 1892.

Although the Young Czechs endeavoured to the utmost to influence other members of the Delegations, their efforts had very little practical results. The Delegations did not have a tradition of attempting to change the basic orientation of Austrian foreign policy, which was determined by the government. There was very little response in the Delegations to the Young Czechs' elaborate speeches. On the occasion of Eim's speech on October 3, 1892, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kalnoky described arguments of the Czech deputies as incompatible with the view of the Viennese government. He emphasized that individual parliamentary groups had no right to judge the empire's foreign policy through narrow interests of individual nationalities, since such attitudes disregard the interests of the empire as a whole.[64]

The Young Czechs' position on Austrian foreign policy as expressed in their speeches in the Delegations in 1892 was favourably accepted by most of the Czech press. Only the National Party expressed reservations over the Young Czechs' peremptory negative attitude to the Austro-

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[63] These officers were usually sent to remote garrisons, despite the many Czech regiments who had a majority of officers who did not know Czech. "Rec del. G. Eima o zahranicni politice." Narodni listy, 18 October 1892. "Rec del. Dr. B. Pacaka o vojenskych pomerech." Narodni listy, 19 October 1892.

[64] Srb, Politicke dejiny naroda ceskeho, 2: 870.

German Alliance. Karel Mattuš, one of that party's most prominent personalities, reiterated the view of the National Party on foreign policy in January 1893 in Hlas národa.[65] He considered the Austro-German Alliance acceptable if it served long-lasting peace. He, however, emphasized that the alliance must never become a source of diminished sovereignty for Austria-Hungary. By this he was specifically referring to the efforts of the German Nationalists in Austria to include the treaty with Germany in the monarchy's constitution. He searched for a middle ground between what he considered the extreme position of the Liberal Party -- expressed mainly in its opposition to the government and its total rejection of the Austro-German Alliance -- and the tendencies among the Reichsrat's German deputies to create even closer ties with Germany. In the tradition of the National Party, he regarded the parliamentary majority of the Right as the best available safeguard against the formation of any firmer ties between Austria and Germany because such parliamentary composition excluded the German Liberals from the majority. For that reason he advised the Liberal Party to abandon its negative attitude to the Alliance, and strengthen its parliamentary position by entering the Reichsrat's majority. An even stronger motivation for such a change was the fear that the German Liberals might enter the parliamentary majority. In this case the government's policies towards the Czech nation would become even less favourable, and the Young Czechs' failure to join in the majority would be held responsible for this development.

The National Party's well-meant advice remained without any influence on the political attitudes of the Liberal Party, despite deterioration of its position in the Delegations in 1893. Specifically, the Young Czech deputies were excluded from the Delegations' committees. The initiative for the exclusion came from E. Plener, the leader of the German Liberals. This was in part motivated by "revenge" for Czech obstruction in the Bohemian Diet, which prevented the formation of a new German judicial district in Trutnov,[66] and was partly a response to Eduard Grégr's speech in the Upper House on February 24, 1893, in which he condemned the dependence of Austria-Hungary on Germany.[67] All efforts of the Czech deputies to reverse this unconstitutional decision were in vain, and the Czech representatives soon recognized that it was an attempt to silence dissident Czech opinions on the monarchy's foreign policy.[68] Though Delegations committees provided more freedom for expression of opinions for their members than the plenary sessions, the Czech deputies made hard efforts to express their views in the plenary sessions of the Delegations. They also tried to justify their plan to vote against the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for 1894.

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[65] "O politické situaci." Hlas národa, 9 January 1893.

All four Czech representatives again concentrated on showing the incompatibility of the Austro-German military alliance with the "true" interests of the monarchy. Masaryk presented statistics showing that

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[66] "Delegace." Národní listy, 25 May 1893. "Nové násilí." Plzeňské listy, 27 May 1893.

[67] Penížek, Česká aktivita, 2: p. 226-27.

[68] "Památná schůze cislajtánské delegace." Národní listy, 15 June 1893.

Austrian taxpayers were considerably more burdened with taxes than taxpayers in Germany, despite lower Austrian military expenditures per individual taxpayer.[69] He felt that Germany had no right to expect armament at the same speed from Austria, because this would lead to the monarchy's greater economic weakness, which would indirectly lead to further weakening of its international position. He made relations between armaments, a weak economy and the growing socialist movement. He pointed out the workers' desperate economic situation which, combined with their exclusion from the basic rights of political participation, were particularly dangerous for the empire's internal development.

In his speech on June 14, 1893, the Young Czech deputy, Bedřich Pacák, elaborated on the increasing estrangement between the Austrian Germans and Slavs. On a more general level, he identified the assumption of the government and the Germans that "what is Slavic is automatically anti-Austrian" as the root of many problems. However, he was more concerned with the situation that had developed after the conclusion of the Austro-German Alliance in 1879. He explained the lack of sympathy for the alliance on the part of the Slavic nationalities by its economic and military disadvantages for the monarchy, combined with the obvious strengthening of the German position and ambitions in Austria. Pacák considered this situation as dangerously contributing to the internal weakness of the monarchy and jeopardizing its future existence. When he started to use the Czech nation as an illustration of this unfortunate development, the chairman of the session, after several warnings, prohibited the continuation of his speech.

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[69] According to the official statistics Austria's military expenditures in 1892 were 17.6 per cent of the total public expenditures, and the German ones were 17.8 per cent.

Deputy Karel Adåmek looked at the Austrian international situation from a broader perspective. To prove that armaments were not contributing to the strengthening of European countries, he compared the military expenditures of some of them with the expenditures of the USA, which were very low and allowed concentration on economic build up. In Adåmek's not entirely unrealistic prediction, American economic strength would soon make this nation increasingly more influential in European and world affairs. He believed that the improvement of relations between the Triple Alliance and Russia would be the first step toward a real strengthening of Europe, because it would permit each country to concentrate more on its economic development. He concluded his speech by presenting detailed data on the unpleasant economic situation of the monarchy and on the heavy tax burdens of its nations and individuals.

Deputy Josef Herold in turn attacked the government's basic concept of foreign policy, which separated the interests of the empire as a whole from the interests of its individual nations.[70] He reminded the members of the Delegations that the major mission of Austria-Hungary had been to provide security for the small nations of Central Europe and favourable conditions for their development. He argued that peace maintained by armaments which so strained the monarchy's budget would not fulfill this aim. Moreover, the Austro-German military Alliance was created to serve German, not Austrian, needs.

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[70] In the Delegations speakers were prohibited from discussing domestic affairs and making links between foreign and internal policies.

All four Czech deputies based their arguments on two major assumptions. The German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 made war between Germany and France a realistic possibility. The war between Austria and Russia, however, was preventable, particularly in light of their balanced influence in the Balkans, and the Russian reorientation to Asia. All of them considered concentration of the monarchy on solving internal problems and promoting economic growth as the most important way for the country to become stronger and more stable, and thus able to preserve its existence in the future.[71]

The arguments of the Czech representatives in the Delegations continued in the same spirit after 1893. Their major arguments held the Austro-German Alliance largely responsible for the increase of militarism in Europe as well as for the unhealthy state of the empire's economy. The Alliance provided the "need" for feverish speed in the stockpiling of armaments and subordinated Austria's international economic relations to political considerations. The Young Czechs saw the monarchy's pre-1879 neutrality as more beneficial to the empire than the alliance with Germany. They also linked the Alliance with the increased tendency of the monarchy's Germans and Magyars to repress other nationalities. They tried endlessly but unsuccessfully to persuade Germans that this course was shortsighted and tragic for the empire's future.[72]

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[71] Speeches of all four Czech deputies were published in full in Národní listy, 15 June 1893.

[72] "Delegace." Speech of B. Pacák and J. Kaftan. Národni listy, 2 October 1894.

But the Liberal Party's recommendations on foreign policy were incompatible with the intentions of the Viennese government and the Germans. The Young Czechs not only did not think that the Alliance increased the international security of the monarchy, but moreover, they insisted that this course of foreign policy was unwisely enforced at the cost of internal economic and political advancement. Apparently, "since 1866, or at least since 1871, it had been axiomatic in the Ballhausplatz that the chief threat to the vital interests of Austria-Hungary was that posed to its territorial integrity by irrendentism, whether of a south Slav, Roumanian, or Italian variety."[73] Believing this, the Viennese government had to welcome the Alliance as strengthening the German and Magyar elements of the empire, which seemed to be its strongest integrating and "state building" forces. The Germans and Magyars did not oppose the empire's involvement in "world politics," although the lack of any clear ideas and concepts about the monarchy's foreign policy made this involvement very problematic.

It does not seem that the Liberal Party ever considered the distrust of the government and the Germans in the loyalty of the non-German nationalities to the monarchy as something axiomatic and unchangeable. In their view there was no reason for small nations in Central Europe to wish the destruction of the monarchy; it was within the empire's capacity to provide sufficient space for the economic, cultural and political development of its nations. However, certain changes in its political and social structure were overdue. The Young Czechs accused the Germans many times of being interested in the preservation of the monarchy only under the condition of preservation of their political privileges, but at the beginning of the 1890's they still believed that presentation of all relevant information, combined with the logic of their arguments, would eventually influence those involved in policy making. It was evident that the empire's increased military expenditures left insufficient resources for solving even the most grave economic problems, and that the commercial ties with Germany had serious political implications and were not advantageous to the monarchy. It seemed natural to the Young Czechs that the economic weakness and internal political tensions made Austria-Hungary unsuitable for involvement in "world politics," and that its first priority should be the creation of internal strength. Even if they had observed that in history it is not unusual for nations to attempt to solve accumulated internal problems by expansion or war, in the 1890's they would still have refused to believe that this was going to be the fate of the empire in 1914.

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[73] Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 382.

Electoral Reform

Czech dissatisfaction with the existing electoral laws in the monarchy went back to 1861, when the February Patent was issued and the centralistic principle written into the constitution. This principle was strengthened in 1873 when direct elections to the Reichsrat were introduced by the government, which unconstitutionally abolished the Diets' powers to elect representatives to the Reichsrat. The principle of "interest representation" was adopted in the February Patent of 1861, with the formation of four curiae, each having a certain number of representatives within each crown land.[74] The system secured a privileged political position for the Germans and the great landed proprietors. Since no substantial changes were made in the centralistic system and the dominant position of Germans until the break-up of the monarchy, Czech objections to the existing political system continued until that time. Even in 1907, when the introduction of universal suffrage democratized the whole political system in Austria, the Young Czechs and others who expected this reform would lead to the federal reorganization of Austria were disappointed.[75] The expectations of the government that national problems would automatically diminish as a consequence of such a reform also remained unfulfilled.

In contrast to the National Party, the Liberal Party had always supported universal manhood suffrage. The Young Czech deputies consistently promoted the idea until the beginning of 1897, and did not cease to support it even when they realized that newer political parties would benefit from its introduction more than the Liberal Party.[76] They expected this reform to provide the immediate benefits of increased political strength for the Slavic element in Austria[77] and diminished dominance of the Germans. They also hoped that a more democratic system would create more favourable conditions for the economic and cultural growth of the Czech nation.[78]

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[74] William A. Jenks, *The Austrian Electoral Reform* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 15.

[75] The hope that universal suffrage would assist federalist reorganization in Austria was expressed frequently. The issue is dealt with, for example, in "Všeobecné hlasovací právo." *Národní listy*, 5 March 1893.

[76] As early as October 1893, Josef Kaizl proclaimed in his vigorous speech in defense of direct universal manhood suffrage in the *Reichsrat* that the Liberal Party would certainly lose by its introduction. "Řeč Dr. Jos. Kaizla v poslanecké sněmovně." Josef Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3 vols. (Prague: J.R. Vilímek, 1909-14), 3: 272.

When the Young Czechs entered the Reichsrat in 1891, they realized that its atmosphere was not favourable to the acceptance of universal manhood suffrage. Therefore, although they retained universal suffrage as an ultimate goal, in practice they were inclined to support any electoral reform which would make the electoral law more democratic and which had a chance for success.[79] The first occasion on which the Liberal Party's deputies had an opportunity to participate in efforts for a change in the electoral law was in April 1891, when the Young Czechs, German Liberals, German Radicals, and Christian Socialists submitted to the Reichsrat a motion "providing for the abolition of indirect elections in the rural areas."[80]

The Young Czech deputies maintained that indirect elections deprived the rural inhabitants not only of political participation -- for which they were mature enough -- but also of the opportunity to gain more political education and experience.[81] Each rural elector, who participated in direct elections for the Diet as well as the Reichsrat, represented five hundred citizens voting indirectly.[82] Thus the great majority of rural voters were excluded from direct elections and responsibility for their results. Some held the indirect elections responsible for considerable political indifference among the rural population.[83]

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[77] Krofta, Politická postava Karla Kramáře, p. 24.

[78] Ibid., p. 23.

[79] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 29 April 1891.

[80] Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907, p. 19.

[81] Peníżek, Česká Aktivita, 2: 121. Peníżek mentions that the fact that eight years compulsory education was in existence in Austria since 1867 was the basis of arguments in favour of direct elections in rural areas.

The motion for abolition of indirect elections was read in the Reichsrat by a Czech deputy, Professor František Tilšer. In subsequent sessions the Young Czechs broadened the discussion of changes in the electoral law in an attempt to promote the idea of universal suffrage. Their efforts continued for several years, but they did not gain sufficient support, and the government remained unresponsive.[84] Tilšer emphasized that the principle of indirect elections was inequitable towards the rural population and, moreover, had a demoralizing effect on their political participation. Occasional corruption among the relatively few electors further contributed to this undesirable development. Tilšer also pointed out that oral elections in Moravia and Silesia were part of a system which encouraged manipulation of the voters, and he demanded its abolition. The existing system of rural electoral districts, which in many Czech regions included towns, was also criticized.[85]

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[82] Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907, p. 16.

[83] Bedřich Linhart, "Volby na radu říšskou r. 1873 až 1891." Atheneum 9 (December 1891), p. 68.

[84] Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907, p. 20-21.

[85] For example, Vinohrady with 34,500 inhabitants and Žižkov with 40,000 inhabitants formed, with six other districts, only one rural electoral district, while Liberec (Reicheberg) with 30,000 inhabitants, mostly German, formed an entire urban electoral district.

In 1893 the Liberal Party's deputies in the *Reichsrat* continued their agitation for universal suffrage. On March 17, they presented Slavík's proposal for direct, equal, universal manhood suffrage.[86] The parliamentary debate initiated by this proposal spurred a movement by the working class organizations for equal voting rights.[87] Czech deputies delivered a number of speeches in which they elaborated on existing political conditions in Cisleithania and on Austrian electoral law. The most detailed speeches were those of Bedřich Pacák and T.G. Masaryk.[88] Both politicians held centralism responsible for economic inefficiency of Cisleithania and the German Liberals' opposition to greater equality of all the monarchy's nationalities for national tensions. They particularly emphasized the German demand for German as the official language of the monarchy as unacceptable to the Czechs. Both accused the German politicians that they were in favour of centralism not because they really believed in its benefits for the monarchy as a whole, but because centralism secured them political privileges. Pacák particularly opposed the opinion of Ernst Plener, the leader of the German Liberals, who claimed that non-German nationalities lived by their narrow national interests and were not willing to put the empire's interests in the forefront of their endeavours. Pacák, like other Czech politicians, saw no discrepancy in decentralization of the empire and its power. He especially rejected the major assumption of German Liberals that the Slav nations would soon be assimilated by the Austrian Germans, because of the German numerical strength and expansionist spirit and thus capacity to speed up this process. These views were, for instance, expressed by a moderate German Liberal, Viktor Russ,[89] who did not consider the Czechs equal to the Germans in important areas of development and thus thought they had no right to national and political equality with the Germans. Pacák and Masaryk, however, emphasized that Czechs would settle for nothing less than equality with the Germans. Masaryk also attacked the Viennese government for the lack of impartial dealing with nationalities and for exploiting and manipulating national tensions. Both deputies described particularly the existing electoral law as a means for German domination. They claimed that the Czech-German settlement of 1890 would have meant no real difference for the political position of the Czechs, since it was offering them only thirteen more seats in the Bohemian Diet although in the light of numerical and tax (direct) criteria the Czechs should have received thirty-nine more seats (fifteen from urban and twenty-four from rural areas).

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[86] "Říšská Rada." *Národní Listy*, 29 April 1891. "Návrh neodvislých poslancův českých na všeobecné právo hlasovací." *Národní listy*, 18 March 1893.

[87] Richard Charmatz, *Oesterreichs innere Geschichte von 1848 bis 1907*. 2 vols. (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1911-12), 2: 79.

[88] "Říšská Rada." Speech of B. Pacák. *Národní listy*, 18 March 1893. "Říšská Rada." Speech of T.G. Masaryk. *Národní listy*, 21 March 1893.

Narodní listy contributed to the discussion about universal suffrage. It concentrated especially on its potential as a means for decentralization, since universal suffrage would result in a Slavic majority in the

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[89] Viktor W. Russ, Der Sprachenstreit in Oesterreich (Vienna: S. Konegen, 1884).

Reichsrat, which in turn would favour a federal reorganization of the empire. The newspaper compared the existing number of deputies with the number which individual nationalities would receive if universal suffrage was introduced.

Nationality	Number of representatives under existing system	Number of representatives if there were universal suffrage
Germans	177	127
Czechs	49	82
Poles	58	55
Ukrainians	8	46
Slovenes	15	17
Croats & Serbs	8	11
All Slavs	137	211

Not all Czechs, however, supported the struggle of their deputies for universal equal manhood suffrage. In rural areas, well-to-do farmers did not feel that small farmers and landless rural workers should enjoy equal political rights. The Young Czechs attempted to overcome this opposition at public political meetings.[91] The National Party had also certain reservations about universal suffrage. Its leader, F.L. Rieger, believed that universal suffrage stood in opposition to the basic principles of the Bohemian Staatsrecht[92] because it would substantially weaken the historical nobility. Since Rieger considered any development which would exclude the historical nobility from its powerful political position dangerous to the existence of the Czech nation, he especially opposed the principle of equality as a part of universal

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[90] "Ve znamení volební reformy." Národní listy, 18 February 1896.

[91] Such a typical meeting took place, for example, in Chrudimi. "Posl. Dr. Herold v Chrudimi." Národní listy, 17 July 1893.

[92] Srb, Politické dějiny národa českého. 2: 911.

suffrage. The nobility, he felt, was still a very influential factor in politics, respected by the emperor as well as the government.[93] Newspapers close to the National Party usually supported the idea of universal suffrage for the Bohemian Diet, but not for the *Reichsrat*. They wanted the reestablishment of the principle of indirect elections for the *Reichsrat* through the Diets to strengthen the political position of these bodies and of the historical nobility.[94]

A new opportunity for the Young Czechs to deliver speeches in favour of universal suffrage came when Taaffe introduced his proposal for universal suffrage in late 1893.[95] The Czech deputies supported his proposal, but demanded that the suffrage be direct and equal as well. Major Czech speakers were Jan Slavík, who delivered his speech on October 23, 1893, and Josef Kaizl, who spoke three days later. They both linked direct universal manhood suffrage to human progress. Kaizl attempted to prove to the German Liberals, who opposed the proposal, that their liberalism no longer represented a progressive force in Austria when compared to liberalism in some West European countries. He rejected the major argument of the German Liberals -- that great cultural differences between individual crown lands in Austria prohibited the introduction of universal suffrage -- stating that similar differences existed in other countries, such as Germany. Kaizl also did not agree with those who saw limited suffrage as a means to prevent the spread of socialist "internationalism." In his view, practice showed sufficiently that the "internationalism" of Social Democrats was limited mostly to the economic sphere and, on the whole, the Social Democrats frequently manifested their national feelings and loyalty to the state.[96]

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[93] Heidler, *Přispěvky k listáři Dr. Frant. Lad. Riegra*. 2: 505.

[94] "Všeobecné hlasovací právo." *Plzeňské listy*, 5 August 1893.

[95] The major reason for Taaffe's proposal is usually described in terms of his wish to diminish the position of the German Liberals. For example, Jenks, *The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907*, p. 21; Penížek, *Česká Aktivita*, 2: 173-74. But Kann in *A History of the Habsburg Empire*, p. 425, says that "Taaffe's main motivation for the reform was the belief that the extension of the franchise would diminish the acuteness of the national conflict." The most extensive work in Czech, analyzing the struggle for universal suffrage in 1893, particularly its aspects related to the endeavour of the Czech working class is that of Jan Havránek, *Boj za všeobecné přímé a rovné hlasovací právo r. 1893* (Prague: Československá akademie věd, 1964).

Slavík's analyses were based on the assumption that exposing the unfairness, inconsistencies, and backwardness of the existing electoral law would gain support among the deputies for substantial electoral reform. He employed several criteria to show that the electoral system did not conform to the social and political development of Austrian citizens. Above all he condemned the division of the population into four curiae, which still reflected a feudal social structure, an anachronism in Austria at the end of the 19th century. He showed the existing situation in Bohemia in 1893 through statistics relating political to economic power:

Number of voters in curiae	Number of deputies	Number of voters per deputy
452 large estates	23	16
186 directors of chambers of commerce	7	27
92,841 urban voters	32	2,900
236,460 rural voters	30	8,790
1,200,000 non-voters	0	0

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[96] Kaizl's speech is published in full in his memoirs: Kaizl, Z mého života, 3: 269-76.

A comparison of the tax burden with political representatives produced similarly inequitable results:

Curiae	Direct taxes in million of gulden	Number of deputies	Amount of taxes paid per elected deputy
Large estates	4,2	23	182,000
Urban inhabitants	10,6	32	322,000
Rural inhabitants	12,7	30	410,000
Total	27,5	85	

Slavík did not limit his examination to Bohemia, but analyzed the situation in other crown lands as well, comparing them and finding an unequal distribution of power. The next target for his criticism was the existing system of electoral districts. He showed statistically that extremely inconsistent criteria were employed in determining urban electoral districts, often leaving out large towns in the Czech regions. For example, Czech Bohemia had only 14 urban districts, despite the existence of more than 14 towns with over 2,000 inhabitants. German regions in Bohemia had 15 urban electoral districts, which included many towns with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. Moreover, there were great disparities in the number of inhabitants in individual urban districts; some in Czech regions had twice as many inhabitants as the largest German one. Slavik also named twelve towns with a Czech majority, having between 950 and 1,700 inhabitants, which were included in German electoral districts. The result of this system of electoral districts was that German deputies were being elected by fewer voters than were Czech deputies.

Political Party	Number of deputies	Number of voters who elected those deputies	Number of deputies who would fairly reflect the number of voters
United German Left	112	270,000	112
Czech Liberal Party	39	230,000	99

In his argument for universal suffrage, Slavík opposed the exclusion of indirect taxes as a part of the criteria in deciding for voting rights. He pointed out that indirect taxes were usually a source of higher revenue for the government than direct taxes. For example, indirect taxes in Bohemia in 1893 were 286,411,511 as compared to direct - 107,764,000. Since indirect taxes were paid mainly by the lower income population, which in this way made a contribution to the maintenance of the state, Slavík concluded that its exclusion from voting rights was immoral.[97]

In three years of continuous effort the Young Czechs failed to gain the support of the Reichsrat for any substantial electoral reform. Taaffe's attempt to create four million more voters cost him his ministerial seat, because the German Liberals, the Polish Club and the Clerical Conservatives formed a block against his proposal.[98] The need for substantial reform of the electoral system was, however, so obvious that only a few years later changes began to take place. But, even then they always lagged behind prevailing popular demands and failed to solve problems which could have been alleviated to a certain degree had the measures been introduced earlier. But no electoral reform was radical enough to threaten the German dominance in Austria, and no reform gave a sufficient number of representatives to individual nationalities to truly correspond to their strength in the monarchy.

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[97] "Řeč poslance Slavíka." Národní listy, 25 October 1893. In 1891 the lower classes still had no representatives in the Reichsrat. There were 50 lawyers, 40 professors, 12 physicians, 9 writers and journalists, 8 architects and engineers, 29 civil servants, 30 merchants and manufacturers, 20 priests, 146 landowners and 6 gentlemen of leisure. May, The Habsburg Monarchy, 225. In 1893 the structure of the Reichsrat was similar.

[98] Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring 1879-1893, p. 302.

Education

Schooling in Bohemia was traditionally one of the most important areas of concern to Czech political parties. The Young Czechs continued the National Party's struggle for improvement of Czech schooling on all levels. They were particularly concerned with awakening the national consciousness of those Czechs who, for various reasons, were sending their children to German schools.

Most expenditures for educational purposes were handled centrally from Vienna, on the basis of estimates and requirements submitted by the Land Diets. But each crown land usually received much less money than it demanded. Bohemia usually obtained less than half of the money requested by the Diet to maintain and slightly improve the system of elementary and secondary schools.[99]

Each year the budgetary debate of the Ministry of Education became an occasion for the Czech deputies to examine the educational system in the Bohemian Kingdom. A comparison between the Czech and German system was their favorite method of demonstrating the needs of Czech schools. At the same time, they made efforts to decrease as much as possible any scope for further Germanization of Czech children. One example of such an effort was their attempt to enforce a rule that elementary schools would accept children only on the basis of the language which they actually spoke, and not on the basis of "parental right," a rule advocated by the Germans and currently applied.[100] The Czech deputies argued that, in German regions with Czech minorities, Czech parents were frequently forced by their employers to send their children to German elementary schools.[101]

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[99] For the 1891 fiscal year the Bohemian Diet asked for 6,475,552 gulden. "Zemský sněm." Národní listy, 27 January 1891. However, it received only 3,441,440 gulden. Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch (Vienna, 1892), p. 266-67. This sum also included expenditures for both universities in Prague, which were around 700,000 gulden.

The practices of a private organization, the Schulverein, in charge of a part of the German schools in Bohemia, were attacked as unethical; the Schulverein registered Czech children in its schools, but an equivalent Czech organization, the "Matice česká," did not accept German children.[102] Czech deputies demanded that schools should not be established with regard to the wealth of the population but on the basis of the population's needs and number.[103]

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[100] "Řeč. J. Herolda." Národní listy, 10 February 1893.

[101] The most outrageous example of such a situation appeared in Dolní Sekyřany, where in 1890-91 a new Czech school lost 99 pupils because Czech miners were threatened by their employers with loss of work if they did not transfer their children into a German school. This case, as well as others, were brought before the Bohemian Diet in January 1891. "Český sněm." Národní listy, 27 January 1891.

The speeches of Czech deputies on the state of the school system in the Bohemian Kingdom were often based on statistical data, which in many cases can be compared with the official Austrian statistics. In some case these data were a result of independent investigation of local conditions by Czech deputies.[104] They were often assisted by statistical information published by Národní listy, usually taken from the official Austrian statistics. The newspaper was very concerned with the state of both elementary and secondary Czech schooling. The following table shows the state of elementary Czech and German schools in

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[102] In 1887 representatives of the "Schulverein" proclaimed publicly at the congress of their organization that 17 to 20 per cent of the pupils in the "Schulverein" schools were Czechs. "Řeč poslance Adámka." Národní listy, 31 January 1891. Adámek did not find this percentage alarming, but what he considered intolerable was that in some cases the Czech children formed the majority of pupils in these schools. For example, in Teplice Czechs made up 74 per cent of the enrollment, in Svárov 58 per cent, and in Budějovice 86 per cent. Adámek was afraid that the "Schulverein" functioned as a political organization, working with the help of generous governmental subsidies toward Germanization of Czech children, particularly poor ones, who were attracted by certain advantages, such as remission of tuition and provision with free clothing.

[103] "Řeč poslance K. Adámka." Národní listy, 8 July 1891.

[104] The most active Young Czechs in the deliberation of the Ministry of Education budget between 1891-1893 were K. Adámek, J. Herold, J. Kaizl and T.G. Masaryk.

Bohemia in 1893:[105]

National-ity in Bohemia	% of pop.	No. of dist.	No. of schools	No. of classes	Average no. of children/ school	Average no. of children/ class	Total no. of children
Czechs	63	58	2,746	8,424	201	67	564,250
Germans	37	47	2,169	5,625	149	57	323,652

Czech secondary schools began to develop only from the middle of the 19th century. Until 1849 all secondary schools were Latin or German. In 1848 the first Czech secondary school was founded, and up to 1893 the Czechs had only forty-two "gymnasia" and "realgymnasia;" while the Germans in Bohemia had thirty-two.[106] Not all of these schools were founded by the government. Some were attached to the Catholic Church, some were supported by the Land Diet, and some by private organizations.[107]

The Young Czechs pressured vigorously for an increase in the number of Czech secondary schools. They argued that demand in enrollment in these schools was much higher than the facilities available, and that the Czech secondary schools had a considerably higher number of students per class than the German schools. Special emphasis was put on the demand for more gymnasia - the most advanced kind of academic school, which provided the major supply of students for universities.[108] The insufficient number of such Czech gymnasia was held responsible for the proportionally smaller number of Czech students at universities. The number of Czech and German gymnasia in Bohemia in 1891 was as follows:[109]

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[105] "K poměru českých a německých škol obecných v Čechách." Národní listy, 18 August 1893.

[106] Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch (Vienna, 1894), p. 69.

[107] For example, Matice česká (Czech Matice), which from its foundation in 1831 took care of Czech schooling as much as its limited finances allowed, reported in 1892 that in the previous twelve years it had founded two gymnasia, of which one had already passed into governmental care. "Osmý dar Svatováclavský." Národní listy, 12 August 1892. The Matice's annual income, solely from private contributions, was approximately 150,000 gulden; expenses always exceeded income. Gradually, Matice's activity concentrated more on Moravia, where national initiative by Czechs lagged much behind their counterparts in Bohemia, and Czech schooling was in a much worse state. "Valná hromada Ústřední Matice školské." Národní listy, 20 March 1892.

Nationality	% of pop.	No. of gymn.	No. of gymnasia supported by govt.	Total no. of students in gymn.	Average no. of students per school	No. of private gymn.
Czechs	63	31	21*	8,085*	385	
Germans	37	22	16*	4.042*	252	
Total		53	37			16

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[108] Since 1887 the government was disinclined to open more new Czech secondary schools, and some were even closed by the Minister of Education Gautsch, because there was no employment for a number of graduates from these schools as well as from the university. In January 1891 deputy Brdlík tried to prove that Czech schools were not responsible for this situation. He argued that the Germans in Austria formed 36.73 per cent, Czechs 23.77 per cent and Jews 4.54 per cent of secondary school graduates (they usually spoke German). In the winter session of 1887 enrollment at Austrian universities was as follows: Germans 46.2 per cent, Czechs 20.0 per cent and Jews 17.8 per cent. "Řeč posl. Brdlíka." Národní listy, 27 January 1891. In 1890 only twenty-six per cent of the Jews in Prague were listed as Czechs, but this number grew rapidly. Havránek, "Czech nationalism," p. 226.

[109] Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch (Vienna, 1892), p. 73. Realgymnasia (i.e. technically oriented secondary schools), are not included in the table; their number for Czechs and Germans in Bohemia was approximately the same. Marked numbers in the table are taken from the speech of J. Herold: "Řišská Rada," Národní listy, 23 May 1891, because the division along the national line is not made in the official Austrian statistics. Czech deputies complained in the Reichsrat budget committee that official Austrian statistics were without sufficient reference to nationalities. "Řišská Rada." Národní listy, 22 May 1891. They demanded the establishment of a statistical bureau for the Bohemian Kingdom on several occasions. Speech of K. Adámek. Národní listy, 2 May 1892. "Sněm království českého." Národní listy, 21 January 1894.

The situation in Moravia was much worse: the Czechs had only eight gymnasia and the Germans thirteen.[110] Czech deputies felt bitter about the government's reluctance to permit the foundation of one more Czech secondary school in Moravia. Moravian deputy Tuček estimated that there was only one governmental secondary school (gymnasium or real-gymnasium) in Moravia for every 176,000 Czech inhabitants, and one such German school for 53,300 inhabitants, despite the fact that 71 per cent of the population in Moravia were Czechs.[111]

Since it was extremely expensive for the Land Diets, communities, or private corporations to maintain schools with insufficient financial support from the state, the Czech deputies worked hard to obtain the transfer of as many schools as possible to government supervision. Still, private and Land sources founded a considerable number of Czech schools, and maintained these for some years before the government took responsibility for them.[112]

The government's treatment of the Czech University appeared similarly inequitable. The total enrollment in Prague at the Czech University in the 1891-92 winter session was 2,670 students, and at the

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[110] Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch (Vienna, 1892), p. 73.

[111] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 5 February 1893.

[112] The Czech communities themselves were able to raise twenty-two million gulden from 1864 to 1891 to build and maintain some of the Czech schools. "Sjezd samosprávných úředníků." Národní listy, 15 August 1891. Considering that the local self government had almost no share in money collected as taxes, it is admirable how much money was raised among the Czech population for support of their schools.

German University 1,460 students.[113] For 1892 the Ministry of Education allocated 786,300 gulden for both universities. The Czech University received 366,367 gulden and the German 408,785 gulden, in spite of its smaller enrollment and better equipment.[114] The focal point of the Czech deputies' efforts was the support of a Czech school in Vienna for the 200,000 Czechs living there. The Ministry of Education refused to give any subsidy, though the school was chronically in need of money. The government also rejected Czech demands for support of Czech schooling in Silesia, though it was giving annually 400,000 gulden to German schools there.[115]

The Czech representatives in the Reichsrat believed that the improvement of Czech education was one of the most important means for raising the cultural, intellectual and economic level of the whole nation. The struggle for more secondary schools was in the center of their activity, but they did not underestimate more practical education, and often focused their speeches on defending the need for more agricultural, trade and business schools. Special attention was also given to the unsatisfactory state of education for young women, who obtained higher education only with great difficulties. The number of schools for women was very small and they were constantly overfilled.[116] The major problem was that education for women on the secondary level was maintained solely by communities, which lacked the resources necessary for a proper system of such schools. The Congress of Czech teachers in August 1891 demanded that education for women be organized by the government in the same way as education for men.[117] A number of Czech deputies involved themselves in the Reichsrat in the struggle for the right of women to study at universities. Medicine and arts were usually presented as the most suitable fields for women.[118] Národní listy and other Czech newspapers strongly supported the idea of better education for women.

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[113] Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch (Vienna, 1894), p. 50.

[114] "Ze zprávy dr. rady Beera." Národní listy, 5 November 1891.

[115] These data are summarized, for example, in a speech of K. Adámek: "Poslanec Karel Adámek ve Vysokém Mýtě." Národní listy, 6 August 1894.

[116] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 14 November 1891.

Other aspects of Austrian schools were examined in detail. The Young Czechs particularly criticized the method of instruction, which was too dependent on memorizing. They demanded more emphasis on independent thinking and judgement, and the establishment of good school and public libraries as the first step towards this objective.[119]

For three years the Liberal Party's deputies struggled for improvement in the quantity as well as quality of Czech schools with only modest results. One of their major demands -- foundation of a Czech university in Moravia -- was never achieved. The major arguments by Czechs for a second university was that nine million Germans had five universities, and six million Czechs only one, and that the Czech University in Prague was overcrowded.[120]

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[117] "Valný sjezd učitelstva Československého." Národní listy, 7 August 1891.

[118] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 6 November 1891.

[119] "O úkolech české politiky školské." Národní listy, 21 July 1891. Speech of T.G. Masaryk.

The number of other Czech schools increased only slowly. The Young Czechs were involved in numerous difficult problems and their energies were often squandered in struggles to prevent changes that would indirectly harm the progress of Czech schooling. Attempts of the Catholic Church to increase its influence over schools was a source of constant concern for most Czech deputies.[121] They also opposed the division of the School Council in Bohemia along national lines, because it would have left Czech schooling in regions with German majorities dependent on decisions of German local governments, and would increase the already serious difficulties of Czech minorities in the German regions of Bohemia.

As was the case in many of their other pursuits, the Young Czechs at the beginning of the 1890s cherished the idea that federal reform was the only solution to the problem of Czech schools, since greater Bohemian economic independence would more readily provide the necessary financial means for such changes.[122] Although often accused of neglecting Czech cultural development by the National Party, the Liberal Party's efforts for improvement of Czech schools were certainly not negligible. Considering good education for all as a necessary condition for the sound development of both the nation and individuals, they strove hard against the unfavourable attitude of the government and the Germans for improvements in the educational system.

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[120] "Řišská Rada." Národni listy, 8 September 1891. Speech of deputy Sichert. The foundation of the second Czech university was permitted by the Reichsrat in the middle of 1896, but the implementation of this decision never took place because of the opposition of German deputies at the Moravian Diet.

[121] "Řišská Rada." Národni listy, 7 February 1893. Speech of T.G. Masaryk.

[122] "Řišská Rada." Národni listy, 8 September 1891. Speech of deputy Sichert. Národni listy, 22 May 1891. Speech of deputy Kaizl.

The economy and the "social question"

During the second half of the 19th century the Lands of the Czech Crown became the major industrial center of the monarchy. The three crown lands comprised three-fifths of the Austrian industrial establishment.[123] By the end of this period, Bohemia alone supplied a quarter of Austrian revenues.[124] Traditionally, industrial production had been in the hands of the Germans, but the food industry gradually became dominated by the Czechs, and in 1880 the food industry represented 33 per cent of the total value of industrial production in Bohemia.[125] The economic status enjoyed by the Czechs during the second half of the

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[123] Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1974), p. 464. The most recent book on the economy of central Europe is the work of Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Economic Development in East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

[124] May, The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914, p. 202.

[125] The sugar industry became the main source for the accumulation of Czech capital; around 1880 the sugar industry in Bohemia amounted to one quarter of that of all Europe. Jan Havránek, "The Development of Czech Nationalism," 228-30. By the 1890s Bohemia was producing one fifth of the world supply of sugar. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 191.

19th century became comparable to that held by the Bohemian Germans,[126] a fact which exercised a great influence on the political ambitions of the Czechs. At the beginning of the 1890s Czech self confidence increased due to the magnificent jubilee exhibition in Prague from May until October 1891, which showed the high level of their economic and cultural development.[127]

Underneath this Czech rapid economic growth, however, lay grave problems and difficulties, some of which the Liberal Party linked to the existence of the centralistic system, its inflexibility and lack of impartiality. The idea of exploitation of the Czech Lands by the Viennese government was not new at the beginning of the 1890s, but it received much greater public attention than in the past. In December 1891, while justifying the Young Czechs' opposition to the 1892 governmental budget, Eduard Grégr lamented a system under which two-thirds of the money collected as taxes in the Bohemian Kingdom remained in Vienna for governmental use as "the most ruthless exploitation." In his Reichsrat speech he warned the government that this situation would eventually lead to the break-up of the monarchy if a federal reform was not carried out.[128] The Young Czechs never relinquished their belief in the federal idea as the best solution to the economic and political problems in both the Bohemian Kingdom and Austria. Aware, however, of the poor political climate for the implementation of such radical reform, much of their parliamentary work aimed at achieving partial concessions.

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[126] Havránek even states that "during the second half of the 19th century the Germans were actually surpassed in wealth by the Czechs." Havránek, "The Development of Czech Nationalism." p. 245.

[127] The Germans of Bohemia refused to participate at the exhibition, and made endless attempts to ruin its success and significance. They also tried unsuccessfully, in cooperation with Kalnoky, to prevent the emperor from visiting the exhibition. These aspects of the exhibition are described, for example, in Tobolka, Politické dějiny Československého národa,3, Pt. 2: 43-47.

[128] "Řeč Dr. Eduarda Grégra na říšské radě." Národní listy, 17 December 1891.

Agriculture traditionally played a dominant role in the Czech economy. Although it had never experienced great prosperity, in the 1890s the situation became even worse, primarily as a result of foreign competition and a drop in cereal prices at the end of the 1880s.[129] The government's help was traditionally negligible; 3 per cent of the money collected as land tax in Bohemia, given back to her for the improvement of agriculture, had no practical result.[130] The Czech representatives made considerable efforts in the parliament to improve the situation of farmers, whose electoral support had helped the Liberal Party to its victory. They blamed the agricultural difficulties mainly on inefficient farming, caused by several basic problems, none of which was being remedied by the government. Among these were the distribution of land, the inequitable system of taxation, insolvency of farmers, insufficient education of farmers, and the government's agricultural policy.

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[129] Jenks, Austria Under the Iron Ring, 1879-1893, p. 7. Havránek, "The Development of Czech Nationalism." p. 230.

[130] "Sněm království českého." Národni listy, 6 April 1892. Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch (Vienna, 1895), p. 274, gives for 1893 the amount of land taxes collected in Bohemia as 10,671,552. However, it does not show how much money went back to Bohemia for agricultural purposes. Three per cent would be about 320,000.

The first of these problems was the distribution of arable land. Large amounts of farm land belonged to a few big landowners. In Bohemia, out of 5,027,306 ha. of arable land, 33.7 per cent (1,699,241 ha.) was owned by five hundred great landowners, and 66.29 per cent (3,328,241 ha.) by smaller farmers totalling approximately 866,800 combined landholders,[131] and their families.[132] Production on small farms was not competitive with cheap cereals from Hungary and overseas. Low grain prices meant not only personal hardship for small farmers and agricultural workers, but also a lack of money for investments in new equipment which could improve efficiency.

The existing system of taxation was the second problem seen by the Young Czechs as contributing to agricultural inefficiency. Land taxes were assessed since 1880 on the basis of grain prices. Although prices of grain declined by almost a half by the end of the decade,[133] no adjustments were made in the level of taxes. Whereas the land tax represented 21 per cent of cereal production in 1880, by 1893 this percentage was much higher, because of the decrease in cereal prices. In addition, the same amount was collected in additional taxes by the Diet, districts and communities.[134] The Czech deputies tried vigorously to gain support in the *Reichsrat* for a decrease in the land tax, and for a more equitable method of assessing taxes. They wanted to apply a method which would take into account not only changed conditions in the price structure but also exceptional conditions, such as natural disasters.

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[131] Garver, *The Young Czech Party*, p. 333.

[132] "Úpadek našeho rolnictva a naše šlechta," *Národní listy*, 19 September 1891.

[133] "Řeč D. J. Dvořáka," *Národní listy*, 16 July 1891. "Řeč poslance R. Treybala," *Národní listy*, 15 April 1892.

[134] "Řeč poslance Jindřicha ve schůzi sněmu království českého 5. května," *Národní listy*, Příloha, 9 May 1893.

The high land taxes, as well as insufficient protection of farmers against foreign competition, were held responsible for the great insolvency of the farmers, the third problem of Czech agriculture. This insolvency led, in turn, to the decrease of rural population and to emigration. Each year in the 1890s, over one thousand farms were expropriated for default on taxes.[135] Official estimation of the arable land in Bohemia placed it at the value of 747,466,650 gulden; however, the indebtedness on this farm land as a whole reached 854,544,438 gulden at the beginning of the 1890s and was still growing because the interest rate was too high to allow any real repayments on the principal of debts.[136] The major demands of the Czech deputies in the Reichsrat were related to the introduction of obligatory insurance for farmers, lower transportation tariffs, reduction of land tax, introduction of a graduated income tax, establishment of a greater number of agricultural schools,[137] and farmers' bank, which would charge no interest for certain kinds of loans.

Since the government was mainly responsible for policies applied to the monarchy's agriculture, the Czech deputies criticized it harshly, describing the government at times as incompetent and uneconomical, unable to fulfill its obligation to rule for the benefit of the monarchy's population. By bringing to light the unpleasant facts related to agriculture in the Czech lands, the Czech deputies wanted to press the government to take a different course in its agricultural policies. As there was no sign that the government would do so, the speeches of the Young Czechs in the *Reichsrat* emphasized federalism as the only real solution to the economic problems of the Bohemian Kingdom. The federal reorganization of the monarchy would increase enormously the amount of money which would remain in the Kingdom, and the Diets would receive proper political powers to take care of the Kingdom's administration and economy.[138]

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[135] "Řeč poslance R. Treybala," Národní listy, 15 April 1892. He points out that only Belgium, the Netherlands and France had higher land taxes than Bohemia.

[136] Ibid.

[137] In 1892 there were approximately forty agricultural schools below university level in Bohemia. This number was viewed as insufficient, considering the number of people engaged in agriculture. "Schůze v Přešticích," Národní listy, 10 October 1892.

As a result of the Young Czechs' inability to achieve any immediate substantial concessions for the Czech farmers, Czech deputies were soon being accused of insufficient efforts on behalf of farmers,[139] in the economic as well as political sphere. For example, the Farmers Association felt that the efforts of the Liberal Party to gain equal political rights for farmers were far from satisfactory. Its members were afraid that the Liberal Party's ulterior concern for the historical nobility was contributing to its "moderate" standpoint in the *Reichsrat*.[140]

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[138] The Young Czechs were not the only ones looking for the complex causes of the difficult economic situation in Bohemia. For example, *Radikální listy*, a paper of the Progressives, occupied itself with the issue as well; its opinions did not differ very much from those of the Liberal Party. One of its best articles analyzing the economic situation was published in 1894. "Naše hospodářské nedostatky." *Radikální listy*, 1 December 1894.

[139] "Sjezd rolnictva českého z Čech, Moravy z Slezska." *Národní listy*, 29 September 1891.

[140] "Výroční valná hromada zemské Selské Jednoty." *Národní listy*, 17 May 1892.

Soon the dissatisfaction of farmers led to attempts to form a new agrarian political party. The Young Czechs used all means to prevent a further split of the Czech political movement, and for a few years they succeeded, probably owing to their increased radicalism.[141]

The Young Czechs deputies felt confident that they were advocating the interests of the Czech peasants to the best of their ability in the *Reichsrat*.[142] Growing public complaints about their "inconsistent opposition" and "restraints" seemed to the Czech Club mostly a result of the public overestimation of the powers which the *Reichsrat* and the Diet had for making substantial changes in any area, including agriculture. The press close to the Liberal Party, meanwhile, was encouraging other channels through which economic improvements could be carried out. *Čas* investigated the limited economic initiative of the Czechs, particularly in farming, and suggested an increase in professional education as one way to improve agricultural efficiency.[143] The liberal press appreciated the awakening initiative of the farmers in their attempts to solve some of their problems through their cooperation and their own means. At the same time, it advised them to form their own, non-political, self-help organizations, to free themselves from dependence on government assistance.[144]

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[141] Attempts to found a new agrarian party were made by Alfons Šťastný, who was at the foundation of the Liberal Party in 1874. The Young Czechs made considerable efforts at public political meetings to discourage farmers from founding a new party. For example, "Schůze voličská ve Strašecí." *Národní listy*, 11 September 1893.

[142] "Sněm království českého." *Národní listy*, 14 May 1893.

[143] "Naše nepodnikavost." *Čas*, 6 May 1893.

Between 1891-93 there were several key issues discussed in the Reichsrat relevant to the situation of the peasants. In the fall of 1891 the leader of the German Liberals, Ernst Plener, introduced a proposal for removal of the extraordinary military tax from the poorest taxpayers. Such a reform could be more easily enforced than a planned complex tax reform, and would alleviate the tax burden of six hundred thousand citizens;[145] however, since these lowest taxpayers were in danger of losing their voting rights, and it was not possible to achieve a change of the related electoral law, the Young Czech deputies faced a dilemma. They decided to apply rather peculiar voting tactics. Half of them voted for the proposal deputy Freser who demanded parliamentary debate on voting rights and relevant matters, while the other half voted with the minority of the House for immediate acceptance of the Plener's proposal.[146]

Another issue related to agriculture was the government proposal for a commercial treaty with Germany. The treaty, which was enthusiastically accepted by the German press in Austria, was severely criticized by Czech deputies on political as well as economic grounds. But since they were the only group in the Reichsrat voting against its acceptance,[147] their stand had no practical consequences.

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[144] "Sjezd českého rolnictva." Národní listy, 29 September 1891.

[145] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 25 November 1891.

[146] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 29 November 1891.

[147] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 20 January 1892.

Their major argument against the treaty was that Austria was a more industrialized country than the treaty reflected. The exports of Austrian agricultural products and raw materials (61 per cent of all exports) to Germany did not necessarily guarantee any long run benefit for Austria, because the treaty did not take into account possible changes in exchange rates which could occur during its terms of twelve years.[148] It was implicitly recognized that the export of agricultural products from the monarchy was beneficial to Austrian farmers, but many believed that Germany needed to import these products anyway, and would have to buy them even if Austria did not bind herself to buy German industrial products (which comprised 67 per cent of all German exports to Austria).[149] The Czech deputies also tried hard to show that importation of German industrial products would be, in the long run, harmful to the development of Austrian industry.[150]

The Young Czechs also criticized German economic competition in the Balkans, where Germany was replacing Austria in the sale of industrial products. In 1885-86 Austrian exports to Roumania had declined from around 53 to 26 million florins, while German exports to the same country had risen from 18 to 90 million florins.[151] The Young Czechs believed that the areas south and east of the Austrian border could become the main target for Austrian economic interests if this German competition could be overcome.[152]

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[148] Ibid.

[149] "Říšská Rada." Speech of J. Vašatý. Národní listy, 15 January 1892.

[150] "Říšská Rada." Speech of K. Adámek. Národní listy, 14 January 1892. The frequent complaints of Czech deputies were partially justified in light of the Austrian international trade balance, which in 1894 was negative. "Veřejná schůze lidu v Mnichově Hradišti." Národní listy, 23 July 1894.

[151] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 14 January 1892.

Underneath this Liberal Party criticism of the Austro-German commercial treaty lay the fear that this treaty would strengthen the ties between the two countries which had been established by military treaty in 1879. This apprehension was nourished by Germany's lack of sympathy for any treaty between Austria and Russia.[153] The tensions caused by the Austro-German commercial treaty between the Czech delegation and the government partially relaxed in the spring of 1894. At that time Austria concluded a commercial treaty with Russia, which improved relations between these two countries for approximately ten years.[154] But this improvement was overshadowed by poor crops in 1893 and other economic difficulties.[155]

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[152] Kann states that more intensive trade with the Balkans could not be developed mainly because of the Hungarian opposition towards imports of cheap agricultural products from the Balkans. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire 1526-1918, p. 463.

[153] In December 1893 Germany even warned Austria not to make any treaty with Russia behind Germany's back. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 199.

[154] Ibid., pp. 200 and 210.

[155] The Czech deputies worked out a proposal on how to ease the situation of the peasants. Its basis was that the Bohemian Diet would raise the fund of 1,000,000 gulden of which 400,000 would be given to peasants in need and 600,000 would be paid back in 6 years. This proposal was read by Václav Janda in the Bohemian Diet. Janda, at the end of his speech, complained about the lack of concern on the part of the Viennese government which was aware that the Bohemian Diet had no means for providing necessary help for farmers. Národní listy, which published the speech, was marked to be suppressed. "Sněm království českého." Národní listy, 24 January 1894. The system of taxes, in the light of its disadvantages for the Bohemian Kingdom, was analyzed by J. Herold. His major demand was that the land tax and taxes from printed matters should stay in the Kingdom. "Sněm království českého." Národní listy, 21 January 1894.

The rapid growth of large-scale production in Austria during the last two decades of the 19th century was accompanied by problems confronting the working class which were no less significant than those facing the peasants. By 1902, enterprises, with over one hundred workers, made up 23 per cent of all Austrian enterprises, and employed two thirds of all workers.[156] The workers' standard of living was low, but their overall situation was probably not much worse than that of artisans or of workers employed in small enterprises. Austrian law forbade the employ of children under fourteen. The working days were long; eleven or twelve-hour working days were usual only in bigger establishments; small businesses and artisans had unlimited working hours.[157] Problems related to the working class were particularly relevant to Bohemia, where industrial workers constituted a significant percentage of all working people.[158] Economic liberalism still prevailed as the way of thinking among the politically influential. The Viennese government, composed mostly of members of the nobility, had very little understanding for problems of the lower classes, and was disinclined to introduce effective measures to improve their economic situation. The *Reichsrat*, divided mainly by divergent national interests, was unable to exert sufficient pressures upon the government to take a substantially different stance towards the lower classes. There were no workers representatives in the Reichsrat, to speak forcefully on behalf of working class interests.

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[156] František Červinka, *Přehled dějin Československa v epoše kapitalismu* (Prague: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství, 1958), p. 117.

[157] May gives the incorrect impression that eleven or twelve hour working days was the maximum number of working hours for Austrian workers. May, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1867-1914*, p. 202. Going through the press of the 1890s one finds a good deal of evidence that working hours in small businesses were much longer, and people frequently worked even on Sunday mornings.

[158] In 1910 industrial workers made up thirty-one per cent of all working Czechs. Havránek, "The Development of Czech Nationalism," p. 232. (However, this percentage must have been lower in the 1890s).

At the end of the 19th century political and economic problems related to the working class found their expression in the so-called "social question." Many Young Czech deputies stood in the forefront of those who were deeply interested in the "social question" and who opposed the government's hostility towards workers' demands and their efforts to organize themselves effectively. The only organization of the workers, the Austrian Social Democratic Party, had no visible influence upon policy making yet; moreover it was split in its approach on the issue of internationalism. Although the Young Czechs disliked the idea of internationalism avowed by the majority of the Social Democrats, they usually showed an understanding for their economic demands and even sympathy for some of their ideas for social reforms.

The Czech Club did not limit its work for workers to agitation for universal suffrage and equal political rights. The Club also brought to light dismal economic and working conditions, especially among artisans and civil servants.[159] They often reminded the government that it had the same obligation towards the working class as towards other classes. Regulations concerning working conditions, hours of work, safety and insurance were often presented as the first necessary step towards protection of the workers. Other major demands of the Czech deputies included the eight hour working day for factory workers, an increase in wages, and public control of cartels, which were viewed as one of the major sources of hardship for artisans and workers.[160] They continued to criticize the tax system, since the amendments accepted by the *Reichsrat* in 1894 made no attempt to transfer a part of the tax burden from the heavily taxed lower classes to the shoulders of the more affluent. The reform putting the empire's currency on a gold standard, the Young Czechs asserted, was also going to be most disadvantageous to lower classes, including the farmers.[161]

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[159] Peníżek in Česká aktivita v Čechách, Vol. II, p. 207, states that the Young Czechs were the first in the Reichsrat to have an understanding of and concern for the needs of the working class and other lower classes.

The "social question" came especially under the scrutiny of T.G. Masaryk, who elaborated in detail on its political and economic as well as its moral dimension.[162] He participated in the Young Czechs' struggle for equal political rights of the workers, and in the *Reichsrat* strongly attacked the laws recently issued by the government to prevent political activity of the workers.[163] He predicted that the government's disregard for workers' demands, its failure to work out a social program, and its repressive attitude towards the working class would bring serious problems in the future.[164] Masaryk considered good educational opportunities for the working people, coupled with freedom of the press, as basic steps towards improvement of conditions and eventual incorporation of the workers into society as responsible citizens. He frequently appealed to the consciences of the Viennese government and the employers, and contrasted their lack of concern for the "social question" with their counterparts in West European countries, where the political and economic status of the workers far exceeded the position of workers in the monarchy.

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[160] "Říšská Rada." Speech of K. Kramář. *Národní listy*, 28 February 1892. "Řeč poslance Jindřicha ve schůzi sněmu království českého 5. května." *Národní listy*, Příloha, 9 May 1893.

[161] "Veřejná schůze lidu v Mnichově Hradišti." *Národní listy*, 23 July 1894. Although the Young Czechs were not against putting the Austro-Hungarian currency on a gold basis, they had serious objections to the way it was carried out. The Young Czech view is expressed in "Řeč posl. Gustava Eima o valutních předlohách." *Národní listy*, 12 July 1892.

[162] In 1898 he published his views on "social question" in a study. *Otázka sociální* (Prague: 1898). A brief summary of his views in English are in T.G. Masaryk, *The Meaning of Czech History*, (The University of California Press, Chapel Hill, 1974), pp. 143-45.

[163] "Nový socialistický zákon." *Národní listy*, 4 June 1891.

Masaryk's concern with the "social question" did not mean that he agreed with the ideology of the Social Democrats. He particularly disliked the incompatibility of the narrow materialistic approach of socialism with humanism and spiritual progress. But he understood why materialism was gaining so much sympathy among the working class, and considered fulfillment of workers' economic and political demands as the only way to prevent their growing alienation. Masaryk, as well as other Young Czechs, were aware that the workers constituted a sizable part of the Czech nation and realized that their incorporation into the policy was necessary for the progress of the whole nation.[165] They tried hard to persuade the majority of the Reichsrat to get interested in the

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[164] "Říšská Rada. O sociální otázce." Národní listy, 10 July 1891. "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 27 July 1891.

[165] K. Kramář. "Mladá generace." Čas, 10 September 1892, p. 583.

"social question," and to get involved in projects which would improve the economic and political status of the working class.[166]

Národní listy was also active in increasing public awareness of the economic conditions and social problems of the working class. Statistics on wages and living conditions of various groups of employees were frequently printed, along with comparisons of conditions in West European countries. The paper printed almost daily reports of meetings organized by workers and artisans. It also welcomed all proposals, including those of German deputies, presented in the Reichsrat for the improvement of conditions of the lower classes. For example, Baernreiter's proposal to investigate working conditions in individual industrial branches met with great sympathy. Similarly lauded was his appeal to the government to limit its oppressive measures against workers and allow them more freedom to associate and educate themselves.[167]

Although the main objectives of the Liberal Party's parliamentary struggle fell primarily into the political and national spheres, its involvement on behalf of the interests of the lower classes, including the working class, was considerable. The overall political conditions in the monarchy, however, thwarted the Party's efforts, and the Young Czechs were frequently criticized at public political meetings for inefficiency and insufficient concern for the interests of the workers.[168]

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[166] "Říšská Rada." From speeches of T.G. Masaryk and J. Kaizl. Národní listy, 9 July 1892.

[167] "Říšská Rada." Národní listy, 2 December 1892.

[168] "Veřejná schůze dělnická v Praze." Národní listy, 19 April 1892. "Dr. Kramář před svými voliči." Národní listy, 15 January 1893. "Tábor dělnictva brněnského." Národní listy, 26 July 1893.

But it was rather unrealistic of the workers to expect greater involvement of the Liberal Party to champion their cause because the party represented more middle classes than any other group. Moreover, its major commitment until 1897 was to the struggle for federalism and other substantial political reforms, and not to the struggle for economic interests of individual groups.

Despite the lack of appreciation with which the Liberal Party's work was received by the workers, its deputies frequently attended the workers' meetings and tried to explain the problems of their work. The number of political meetings organized by workers in this period remained large, despite the increasing difficulties involved in obtaining official permission to organize such gatherings. Several thousands often attended a meeting. Národní listy regularly reproduced detailed summaries of the speeches made by the Young Czechs and frequently of those delivered by workers' spokesmen as well. The most common demands formulated at workers' meetings were those calling for the eight hour working day, greater freedom of the press, abolition of the press deposit and press fines, universal manhood suffrage, representation of workers in the Reichsrat and Land Diets, and higher wages.[169]

The cooperation between the Czech workers and the Liberal Party was rather difficult because of incompatibility of their goals. The national section of the Czech Social Democrats, established in 1890 under the name "Czechoslavic Political Party of the Workers,"

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[169] "Veřejná schůze dělnická v Praze." Národní listy, 19 April 1892. "Tábor Národní strany dělnické na Žofíně. Národní listy, 2 May 1892. "Tábor dělnický ve Velkých Benátkách." Národní listy, 2 May 1892.

(Československá politická strana dělnická) organized a minority of the Czech workers. The majority, called international section of the Czech Social Democrats, remained subordinated to the leadership of the Austrian Social Democratic movement, and consequently was not willing to support the Liberal Party's struggle for national equality and federalism. Nevertheless, numerous Young Czech deputies took part in meetings of the Social Democrats. For years they sincerely supported the workers' economic and political demands while trying to inspire and strengthen their national loyalty and civic responsibility.[170]

The discussion of the "social question" would be incomplete if the so-called "woman's question" of this period were not mentioned. As industrialization and urbanization, and the general level of education, as well, progressed in the monarchy, women were now becoming wage earners in professions previously closed to them. More women were becoming teachers,[171] post office clerks, secretaries, and qualified nurses. The major prerequisite for these and similar careers was specialized education beyond the eight years of basic schooling. There were never enough such schools for females in Bohemia.[172] In some respects the possibilities for Czech women were still better than for their counterparts in other European countries. For example, the Czech gymnasium for girls Minerva in Prague, founded at the beginning of the 1890s, was a unique phenomenon in the whole of Central Europe. The relatively advanced schooling for Czech females developed through the initiative and efforts of private organizations, such as "Matice česká" and the Women's Trade Association, as well as through the initiative of Czech representatives in the Bohemian Diet. Only gradually did these schools receive the government's financial assistance. The Young Czechs supported all efforts for the establishment of more female schools. In the Reichsrat they also promoted the idea of opening some existing institutions of higher education, particularly gymnasia and the faculties of arts and medicine at universities, to women.[173] At public meetings the Young Czechs were encouraging public sympathy for equal education and economic rights for women.[174]

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[170] "Dr. Eduard Grégr v Roudnici." Národní listy, 23 May 1892. Two thousand people participated in the meeting in Roudnice. Since the internationalists' alleged insufficient loyalty to the Czech nation was under attack from the broad public, the workers' spokesmen began to stress that the primary loyalty of the Czech workers, including the internationalist section of the Social Democrats, was to the Czech nation. "Tábor dělnický na Ostrově Střeleckém." Národní listy, 2 May 1892. "Veřejná schůze lidu v Pečkách." Národní listy, 22 July 1893.

[171] In Bohemia alone there were 459 Czech female teachers in 1893 (out of 1,614). Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch (Vienna, 1895), p. 75.

The situation of working women, particularly their extremely difficult working conditions, received special attention from the Liberal Party's deputies. Women's claims for equal wages, pensions and limitations on working hours were among those being most forcefully supported by the Young Czechs.[175]

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[172] In 1890 there were seven such schools in Bohemia. "Říšská Rada." Speech of K. Adámek. Národní listy, 4 July 1891.

[173] "Říšská sněmovna." Speech of Gabriel Blažek. Národní listy, 1 July 1891.

[174] "Mladá generace." Speech of K. Kramář. Čas, 10 November 1892.

As women gradually became more involved in political activity, they began to articulate their demands in the form of resolutions and petitions to the representative bodies. For example, in April 1892 a political meeting in Prague was specially organized for working women. Besides seven hundred women, three hundred men came to the gathering. The women's attempt to formulate their usual demands for equal political rights, shortening of working hours, the right to form their associations and to publish papers was, however, thwarted. The governmental representative dissolved the meeting before the resolution could be completed.[176]

The greater involvement of women in politics also resulted in more criticism of the Czech deputies' work in the Reichsrat. Their efforts on behalf of women were not considered sufficient, and their failure to include women in their demand for universal suffrage caused bitterness on the part of many women.[177] Working women did achieve some better working conditions as a result of the gradual improvement of the economic situation of the whole working class. But, their conditions in the economic as well as the political sphere lagged far behind those of men, and one of their major political aims -- female suffrage -- was never achieved in the framework of the monarchy.

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[175] "Ku otázce ženské." Speech of K. Kramář. Národní listy, 18 January 1893.

[176] "Veřejná schůze dělnických žen a dívek." Národní listy, 17 April 1892.

[177] "Reportáž z 1. Máje na Střeleckém ostrově." Národní listy, 2 May 1893.

After 1894 the Liberal Party's deputies became less radical in the Reichsrat and, to a certain extent, less concerned with the "social question." This change in their attitude was partly caused by the fact that Masaryk, one of the Young Czechs most concerned with the "social question," parted from the Liberal Party at the end of 1893. The other, probably more important reason was, that after the proclamation of martial law over Prague and surroundings in September 1893, the Liberal Party had to become less radical, and concentrated more on parliamentary work. Unlike the Socialists, the Liberal Party never placed social and economic demands in the center of its program, and would not entertain any unparliamentary means for achieving these aims. Since Czech deputies realized that chances of getting the Reichsrat's support for their more radical aims were less than slight regardless of the cogency, eloquence or number of their speeches,[178] the idea of cooperation with the majority of the House under certain conditions began to gain more support among prominent members of the Party.

Although the Liberal Party was devoted to parliamentarism, the Reichsrat's inefficiency and disorder gradually contributed to the Young Czechs' scepticism and loss of enthusiasm.[179] Their basic political attitudes and aims changed little between 1891 and 1893. In theory the national aims, particularly the Bohemian Staatsrecht, equality of both nationalities in the Bohemian Kingdom, and democratization of the political system, remained its major aims. They supposed that if these goals were realized, the political, economic and social betterment of all classes in the Bohemian Kingdom would inevitably follow. Although the struggles for partial concessions was considered subordinated to the larger national aims, in practice, the struggle for partial political, cultural, linguistic and economic concessions became primary. The Young Czechs gradually realized that a program of opposition to the government was not the most suitable means of obtaining partial concessions. Their open criticism of the government as well as their elaborate speeches, using statistics and complex information, was a new phenomenon in the Reichsrat.[180] Although a novel approach, appealing to the reason and consciences of the Reichsrat's members, it was considerably less successful than the Young Czechs had hoped. Later, in 1897, tired and frustrated by their fruitless opposition, they wished to cooperate with the Reichsrat majority, and began to seek concessions, which the Czech public did not consider adequate. The public disapproval was eventually justified, because renewed cooperation between the Liberal Party and the government failed to bring permanent significant concession, but it would not be fair to evaluate the Party only by the degree of its success in attaining its officially proclaimed aims. The lasting significance of its activity rested on its work with the Czech population.

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[178] Kaizl, Z mého života, Vol. III, Introduction by Z. Tobolka, p. 51.

[179] The Czech politicians and press had become concerned with the problem of "declining parliamentarism" in Austria as early as the beginning of the 1890s, when the limited powers of the Reichsrat were further weakened by Taaffe's ability to manipulate individual parliamentary groups. "Úpadek parliamentarismu v Rakousku." Plzeňské listy, 11 November 1892.

Widespread communication between the Liberal Party and the Czech public greatly contributed to Czech political education, which a quarter of a century later enabled the relatively smooth functioning of the democratic system of the First Czechoslovak Republic. From 1891 on the Czech population received political information through parliamentary speeches and political discussions in public meetings and newspapers, particularly *Národni listy*. Through these channels it became widely involved in politics, and political attitudes and opinions crystallized quickly. Although in the initial stage of this development, the importance of this contact did not seem too apparent, the Viennese government was quick to judge the consequences of Czech political activity as dangerous for the political *status quo*. Repression became frequent and the most usual method of dealing with this activity. During the second half of 1893 the number of government interrupted speeches at political meetings, as well as the number of political meetings dissolved by government representatives, increased greatly. Most meetings or speeches were suppressed as a result of controversial topics, such as "universal manhood suffrage," "the woman question," criticism of the government, the "settlement," and the *Staatsrecht*.[181] Newspapers which printed detailed reports from public political meetings were also often suppressed.

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[180] Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách, 2: 123.

After anti-dynastic manifestations escalated on the occasion of the emperor's birthday in August 1893, it became apparent that the government was looking for an occasion to impose more drastic restrictions on Czech political activity. Anti-government and anti-dynastic performances of the young peoples' movement called the "Omladina" (Youngsters), and the murder of one of its members, (who was a police informer) became the official reason for imposing martial law on Prague and environs on September 12, 1893. The leaders of the Liberal Party were unable to prevent these measures and did not achieve their abolition for more than two years. At the beginning the Young Czechs were inclined to believe that the extremism of "Omladina" was the only reason for the government's oppressive policy. Although they maintained close relations with "Omladina," the Party's leadership quickly took steps to publicly separate the Party from the youth movement, to prevent suppression of Národni listy and to avert any oppressive measures against the Liberal Party.

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[181] "Poslanci Karel Adámek a Fr. Hovorka v České Třebové." *Národni listy*, 1 July 1893. "Rozpuštěná schůze Novoměstského klubu." *Národni listy*, 1 July 1893. "Tábor dvakrát rozpuštěný." *Národni listy*, 26 June 1893.

This rapid and unfavourable development at the end of 1893 had serious implications, the most serious of which was a partial political demoralization of the Liberal Party and the Czech public and the increased radicalism of the Czech nation. Furthermore, the policies of the Viennese government in the years following the proclamation of martial law only increased this political alienation of the Czech nation from the monarchy. Since it was not possible to advocate policies which would lead to substantial reforms in the empire, frustrations and tensions inside the monarchy grew rapidly. Most Czech politicians did not lose hope for the eventual solution of the many grave problems existing. But at the same time, they were often unable to find a clear orientation in the midst of this difficult situation and, at times, they were at a loss as to what course of policy to take.

The Young Czechs were a strong party, if measured by election results, but as a parliamentary, isolated group they would have preferred the cooperation and support of the National Party and even the historical nobility, whose social status still gave them great strength in the Reichsrat. Between 1891-97 the Liberal Party made several attempts to cooperate with other political groups in an effort to make the best of a very difficult situation.

Difficulties of alliances

After the initial hope that persuasion would win them sufficient support in the Reichsrat and the Diet, the Young Czechs recognized the lasting nature and difficulties of their isolation. Although they did not believe in the renewal of a unified Czech political movement, to which the Old Czechs were inclined,[182] they did not entirely exclude the possibility of cooperation with the Old Czechs and the nobility. Since all of them had some political aims in common, it was generally recognized that such cooperation would bring benefits to the Czech nation. On every occasion, however, when representatives of these groups attempted to work out a common political course, the differences in their outlook became an obstacle impossible to overcome. The Liberal Party, supported by the majority of the Czech nation, felt that its tactics and aims should be accepted by the others in the political struggle. The National Party, which counted on the importance of the nobles in the political system, viewed cooperation with them as fundamental to the realization of basic national aims. Meanwhile, the traditions and the social status of the nobility did not allow them to adopt a more democratic approach towards politics, one which would have made closer relations with the Liberal Party possible.

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[182] "Řeč poslance Dr. Karla Kramáře." Národní listy, 23 August 1892.

The first occasion on which the Young Czech deputies attempted to gain support of the other representatives was their Address to the emperor in September 1892. Since 1879, when the Czechs had ended their passive resistance, an Address was read at the beginning of the Reichsrat's and the Diet's sessions. Its purpose was to proclaim the insistence of the Czech nation on its Staatsrecht and its determination to struggle for its realization. In most cases, the whole act was formal, but in 1892 the Liberal Party wanted to use the occasion for criticism of the centralistic constitution and the government, particularly the government's involvement in the implementation of the "settlement."[183]

At a joint meeting of the Liberal, National and Conservative Landowners, the Young Czechs emphasized the moral value the Address would have for the Czech nation if it were signed by all Czech deputies. They also hoped that the emperor would have to take it seriously if all the Czech representatives adhered to it.[184] The Old Czechs refused to sign the Address on the grounds that it could bring no positive results. Instead, they suggested making proposals for changes in the basic laws of Austria as a course which would have a better chance for success.[185] Count Karel Schwarzenberg, a spokesman for the nobility, wanted the concept of Staatsrecht properly clarified before the nobles signed the

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[183] "Návrh adresy k Jeho Veličenstvu." Národní listy, 28 September 1892.

[184] "Zpráva o společné poradě zástupců klubu poslaneckých." Národní listy, 22 September 1892.

[185] Ibid.

Address.[186] The disappointed Young Czechs interpreted this cautious attitude of the National Party and the nobles as proof of their unwillingness to abandon the "settlement" completely, in the futile hope that the government would eventually reward their moderate stand.[187] Although the National Party rejected this interpretation,[188] it did not join the Liberal Party in signing the Address. The Address, signed only by 51 deputies, was submitted to the Bohemian Diet on September 27, 1892.[189] Next year the Liberal Party's deputies submitted a similar Address, without making any attempt to gain support from the other parties. Julius Grégr, in his speech in the Diet, described the Address as a protest against the December Constitution of 1867, the centralistic system and violations of the rights of the "Czech Kingdom."[190]

Differences between the Czech political parties came out even more clearly when their trustees met on November 1, 1892 at the conference called by the Moravian Club. The meeting was called to clarify and unify the tactics to be employed by the Czech deputies against the increased activity and strengthened position of the German Left in the

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[186] "Společná porada klubu poslaneckých na českém sněmu." Hlas národa, 22 September 1892.

[187] "Ve vážné chvíli národa." Národní listy, September 22, 1892.

[188] "Výsledek mladočeského návrhu o součinnosti stran." Hlas národa, 24 September 1892.

[189] "Návrh Adresy k Jeho Veličenstvu." Národní listy, 28 September 1892.

[190] "Řec zem. poslance Dr. Julia Grégra." Národní listy, 6 May 1893.

Reichsrat. Baron Pražak's resignation from his ministerial chair because of Taaffe's secret request,[191] as well as the resignation of Minister Dunajewski, were generally interpreted and feared to be moves resulting from a new understanding between Taaffe and the German Left.[192] Such a combination posed a major threat to the position of the Czech political parties.

Thirty-one representatives from seven political parties from Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia realized that the disunity of the Czech political movement detracted greatly from its strength. There were no disagreements over the major political aims of Staatsrecht, an equitable number of Czech deputies in the Reichsrat, a fair electoral law, or equal rights for both nationalities in the lands of the Czech Crown.[193] As usual, however, the discrepancies in their views on the means to be used for achieving these aims proved too great for successful reconciliation.

The main point in their dispute was the policy of opposition to the government employed by the Liberal Party, which urged the other deputies to adopt it. The Old Czechs, particularly F.L. Rieger, were in favour of replacing a "consistent opposition" with a less rigid, fluid opposition, which would allow more flexibility in the *Reichsrat* and would not endanger the existence of Taaffe's cabinet. The aristocrats disagreed with any opposition, on the grounds that it was unrealistic, overestimating the strength of the Czech nation and based on the implicit hope that some foreign conflict would help to achieve the desired aims. They believed that the restoration of the government's and Crown's trust towards the Czech nation and their representatives would be the most reliable way to success.[194]

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[191] Taaffe asked Pražák in a letter from July 23, 1892, to resign on the grounds of personal reasons. Kameníček, ed., Paměti a listář Dr. Aloise Pražáka. Introduction by F. Kameníček, 2: LXXXIV.

[192] Čas, 5 November 1892, p. 705.

[193] "Společná porada poslanců českých." Národní listy, 2 November 1892. "Společná schůze důvěrníku českých stran v Praze." Hlas národa, 2 November 1892. Čas, 5 November 1892, pp. 705-708. The participating parties were: the Czech Liberal Party, the Czech National Party, the Czech Conservative Landowners, the Moravian Popular Party, the Moravian National Party, the Moravian Conservative Landowners, and Škarda Association. There were also two representatives from Silesia.

Josef Herold, a spokesman for the Young Czechs, explained that the policy of opposition to the government was a consequence of the government's long lasting inequitable policies toward the Czech nation. Such negative experience, he continued, did not leave room for any optimism that the Liberal Party's cooperation with the government would reverse the government's political attitudes. While the major parties argued these issues, representatives of other political groups expressed no definite opinions on political tactics, and were prepared to accept a decision of the majority. Despite the failure to reach a concrete agreement on tactics in the *Reichsrat*, the fact that all Czech parties were able to meet and discuss their political attitudes peacefully and with openness, and to adopt a joint resolution, was described by the Czech press as a considerable success.

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[194] A summary of opinions on the significance of the conference was published in 1892: *Rozhovor o významu konference delegatů poslanců ze zemi koruny české*. (Prague: E. Beaufort, 1892).

The interest of the Liberal Party in establishing closer political contacts with the nobles continued after the conference. Czech opposition to the division of Bohemia on national lines prompted the historical conservative nobility to make a move which apparently opened the way to a rapprochement with the Liberals. In March 1893, the nobility in the Reichsrat proclaimed their opposition to all negotiations about the settlement and demanded their suspension.[195] For a while the hopes of the Young Czechs of gaining the cooperation of the historical nobility were high, since the latter now at least had discussed the issue publicly.[196] This optimism was also nourished by the nobility's proclaimed insistence on the Bohemian Staatsrecht and the indivisibility of the Bohemian Kingdom as expressed in the address to the Diet by Karel Schwarzenberg in October 1892.[197] But, most of the influential members of the nobility's parliamentary clubs had no true understanding for the Czech nation and no broader understanding of its political struggle.[198] In April 1893 ten nobles sympathetic to the Czech national cause issued a proclamation criticizing the majority of their political representatives in the Diet because of their increasing inclination to side with German deputies against the Czechs in the settlement controversy.[199] Disagreement in the nobility's club went so far that in January 1894 seventy Bohemian nobles announced their separation from the group led by Karel Schwarzenberg. They emphasized their insistence on the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* and an equitable solution of national and linguistic problems in the Bohemian Kingdom.[200] They founded the National Landowners' Party, and incorporated into their program some social and democratic aspects, unlike the Conservative Landowners' Party, which based its political attitudes primarily on Catholic persuasions and monarchical loyalty.[201]

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[195] "Historická šlechta promluvila." Národní listy, 8 March 1892. "Konec všem pochybnostem." Hlas národa, 8 March 1892.

[196] "Sněm království českého." Speech of T.G. Masaryk. Národní listy, 8 April 1892. "Poslanec Dr. Kramář před voliči v Jičine." Národní Listy, 11 April 1892.

[197] "Řeč prince Karla ze Schwarzenbergu." Národní listy, 10 October 1892.

[198] "Shoda se šlechtou?" Plzeňské listy, 2 June 1892.

The conciliatory moves of the Liberal Party toward the nobility were received with little sympathy by the Czech public. It was obvious that close cooperation between the Liberal Party and the nobles would be very difficult as a result of the latter group's conservative outlook on social and economic problems. The nobles had alienated the public through their lack of concern for the problems of the lower classes. Furthermore, they were charged with insufficient understanding of social issues, civic freedoms, true parliamentarism and the need for more Czech schools.[202] The Czech public was afraid that closer relations between the Young Czechs and the nobles would be maintained at the cost of the Liberal Party's departure from its basic democratic political stance.

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[199] The names of these nobles were: F. Dolanský, J. Friedlaender, V. Kounic, C. Lang, E. Macenauer, F. Mareš, F. Noltsch, J. Novotný, J. Tetřev, and Julie Z Rumerhirchu. *Národní listy*, 29 April 1893. The whole text of the proclamation with thirty-two signatures was published in *Národní listy*, 14 May 1893: "Prohlášení českých šlechticů."

[200] "Prohlášení české šlechty." *Národní listy*, 14 January 1894.

[201] "Prohlášení konservativních velkostatkářů." *Hlas národa*, 3 February 1894.

[202] "Říšská Rada." *Národni listy*, 23 November 1892.

A meeting of representatives from the Liberal Party, National Party and the historical nobility in April 1893 confirmed the scepticism of many over the possibility of cooperation between the nobles and the Czech nation. Schwarzenberg pointed out in the discussion that the Liberal Party's struggle for universal suffrage, and its sympathy for some aspects of the Social Democratic movement, were the major obstacles to their cooperation.[203] Following this, the Liberal Party resumed an even more critical attitude toward the historical nobility,[204] and no further serious attempts were made to gain its cooperation. The prevailing feeling among Czechs became that of antagonism against the nobility.[205]

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[203] "Společná konference zástupců českých stran s velkostatkáři." Národní listy, 23 April 1893. "Společná schůze zástupců státoprávních stran." Hlas národa, 25 April 1893.

[204] "Poslanec Dr. Julius Grégr o situaci politické." Národní listy, 12 June 1893. On the basis of this speech, which criticized the nobility and centralism, Julius Grégr was prosecuted.

[205] The view that the historical nobility betrayed the Czech nation still underlay the work of Josef Holeček, Česká šlechta, published in Prague in 1918. Seven years later Jaroslav Prokeš published Základní problémy českých dějin in which he opposed Holeček's views on the grounds that individual members of the historical nobility, particularly in the 18th century, had worked for the benefit of the Czech nation, and some had even developed strong patriotic feelings. He viewed it as natural that most of the nobles turned away from the Czech nation in 1848 when the Czech political representatives promoted democratic political attitudes. Ibid., p. 291.

The failure of the attempts to create a united front of all Czech political parties did not mean that the Liberal Party gave up all efforts to strengthen its position. It soon realized that the liberal forces in Moravia were becoming stronger and more influential. Traditionally, the prevailing clerical influence had left very little room for political activity in Moravia. But the situation began to change when the Liberal Party strengthened its position after the elections to the Bohemian Diet in 1889. Its political concepts and opinions began to have influence in Moravia. Several liberal newspapers were founded, the most significant being Moravské listy, published from 1889.[206] It maintained close cooperation with the Liberal Party and Národní listy. The Liberal press in Bohemia began to examine the political situation in the province, particularly the causes of the political passivity and "national immaturity" of the Moravian Czechs. At the same time it encouraged anticlericalism and political participation.

Liberal forces in Moravia, in opposition to clericalism and the National Party, were loosely united in the so-called Popular Party (Lidová strana). The Party, however, lacked a firm organizational basis and leadership. In 1892, with the help of some Young Czech deputies from Bohemia, particularly T.G. Masaryk, the Popular Party was reorganized. Its convention in June elected a new leader, deputy Josef Tuček, and a forty member committee. The program of the party included the Bohemian Staatsrecht, certain social and economic aims as well as increased political involvement with the population.[207]

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[206] The activity of Moravské listy and all Moravian political parties was analyzed in an extensive article "Strany na Moravě." Časopis českého studentstva, 16 July 1892.

Political activity in Moravia did increase, therefore, probably due as much to the participation of Bohemian deputies at political meetings in Moravia as to the efforts of Moravian deputies. Attendance at such meetings was high, sometimes close to several thousand people, demonstrating a burgeoning political consciousness in Moravia.[208] Besides sharing major political aims with the Liberal Party, the Popular Party was concerned about the Germanization of Moravia, particulary its towns and schools. The majority of post-elementary schools had an almost exclusively German appearance, despite the large numbers of Czechs. The demand for "Czechization" of schools and the foundation of a Czech university in Moravia became the most important demands made of the government, which was slow and inconsistent in its response.[209] The struggle for the Czech university in Moravia was won only in theory. Although the government permitted its foundation in 1896 the vigorous opposition of the German deputies in the Moravian Diet made the opening of the university impossible.

On the whole, the cooperation between the Liberal Party and the

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[207] "Sjezd lidové strany na Moravě." Národní listy, 10 June 1892. "Lidová strana moravská." Čas, 11 June 1892.

[208] "Úkoly lidové strany na Moravě." Speech of T. G. Masaryk, Čas, 18 March 1893. "Slavný den lidové strany na Moravě." Národní listy, 13 March 1893.

[209] Between 1890 and 1894 the number of German and Czech higher secondary schools in Moravia remained the same: Eleven Czech schools and twenty-five German schools. The total number of Czech students in these schools slightly exceeded that of German students. This information was calculated on the basis of statistics given in Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch, 1891-1894 (Vienna, 1892-1895).

Popular Party brought more results on the public level, where there was an increase in political awareness and education of the Moravian Czechs. The increased cooperation between the liberal political parties in Bohemia and Moravia did not, however, result in corresponding cooperation between the deputies in the *Reichsrat*.[210] The Moravian deputies maintained their own club and did not actually contribute to the strengthening of the Liberal Party's position in the *Reichsrat*.

Moreover, the Liberal Party began to be weakened by its own internal dissensions. The major source of discord within the party became disagreements between the Realists on the one hand, and *Národní listy* and a few Russophil radicals, represented by Jan Vašatý and Karel Tůma, on the other.

Masaryk formulated the basic political views of his group in September 1891, at a meeting with his voters in Strakonice[211] where he elaborated on several important issues related to the Liberal Party's political attitudes and work. He openly expressed disagreement with the growing radicalism of the party, considering the original party programme as radical enough. He rejected the idea of "passive resistance" as irresponsible because the Liberal Party, representing the majority of the nation, could not adopt strategy which could slow down the economic and political growth of the Czech nation. Masaryk's major assumption was that Germans would soon understand that the equality of both nationalities in Bohemia was the only way to ensure the continued existence of the monarchy. He also believed that the Bohemian Germans would eventually accept the Bohemian *Staatsrecht*, because of its great economic and political advantages for both nationalities. In relation to the Empire's foreign policy, he opposed the lack of realism of those who thought that a military alliance with Russia could be advantageous to the monarchy and the Czech nation. He felt particularly irritated by the fact that this "radicalism" was based on the idealization of Russia's harsh realities and on ignorance of the Russian political system and economy.[212]

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[210] Moravian deputies, being more conservative than the Young Czechs, preferred to remain in their own Moravian Club in the *Reichsrat* and felt closer to Hohenwart's Catholic Club than to the anti-clerical Czech Club.

[211] "Poslanec prof. T. G. Masaryk před voliči." Strakonice, 22 September. *Národní listy*, 24 September 1891. This issue of *Národní listy*, which published Masaryk's speech, was suppressed. *Plzeňské listy* reported the content of the speech in detail on 24 September, 1891.

Masaryk's speech was also critical of *Národní listy*, which gave too much space for the expression of extreme views, representing only a tiny minority of the party. He proposed the establishment of a new political newspaper, which would be in greater harmony with the prevailing opinions and practices of the Liberal Party.

The opinions voiced by Masaryk were more favourably received by newspapers close to the National Party than by the liberal press.[213] Although *Národní listy* had published Masaryk's speech in full, the newspaper subsequently became hostile to him. Julius Grégr allowed Vašatý -- with whose opinions he otherwise mostly disagreed -- to attack the Realists frequently and rudely. *Čas* responded with increased criticism of *Národni listy*, and a kind of "war" between the two newspapers started.[214] Masaryk's "opportunistic" approach towards politics, his belief that the Bohemian Germans would eventually come to favour the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* and his personal preference for the ethnic principle over the territorial one, were the main targets of attacks on the Realists.[215] Most of the party's prominent members were far from sharing opinions with the most radical elements in the party, such as Vašatý, and were persuaded that J. Grégr, as an editor of *Národni listy*, should work to attain greater harmony among dissenting opinions.[216]

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[212] Masaryk explained his views on this aspect of the Party's radicalism in greater detail in *Čas*, 17 October 1891, pp. 666-670.

[213] "Řeč posl. prof. Masaryka ve schůzi lidu v Strakonicích." *Plzeňské listy*, 24 September 1891. "Mladočeský obhájce opportunní politiky." *Hlas národa*, 25 November 1891.

Disputes between Masaryk and *Národni listy* intensified during 1892-93, despite the Liberal Party's concessions to the Realists, such as accepting their views on the monarchy's foreign policy.[217] Masaryk, on the other hand, because of his parliamentary experience, became more sceptical of winning Germans to the idea of the equality of both nationalities in Bohemia, and of the possibility of universal suffrage.

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[214] Kaizl, *Z mého života*, Introduction by Z. Tobolka, 3: 42.

[215] "Veřejná schůze Sladkovského." *Národní listy*, 10 October 1891. "Nové směry." *Národni listy*, 8 March 1893.

[216] Kaizl, *Z mého života*. A letter of Kaizl to J. Grégr, 3 August 1891, 3: 86-87. See also Kaizl's Diary: 5 April 1892, Ibid., p. 154. It does not appear that the disharmony between the Liberal Party and its official organ *Národní listy* was very significant up to the end of 1893. From then on it is described by contemporaries as serious. Kramář, *Poznámky o české politice*, p. 13.

[217] *Čas* elaborated on disputes between *Národní listy* and Masaryk in an article "Orgán nebo desorganizátor strany?" *Cas*, 18 February 1893.

Moreover, he began to speak more favourably about "consistent opposition" to the government.[218] The Realists also occasionally tried to clarify their method of work and clear themselves of unfair accusations by Narodni listy,[219] which on some occasions described the Realists' critical approach to current political issues as nihilistic, destructive and unpatriotic. However, the gap between Čas and Narodni listy became unbridgeable, mainly because many existing political controversies assumed the form of a personal quarrel, a tendency which had intensified by the end of 1893.[220] For that reason, a split between the Realists and the Liberal Party could not be prevented in October 1893. Masaryk had resigned his seat in both the Reichsrat and the Diet on 25 September, despite apparent support from his constituents.[221] Other politically prominent Realists, Josef Kaizl and Karel Kramář, did not follow Masaryk's example. They preferred to remain members of the Liberal Party to be able to continue their parliamentary work. They partially adjusted their work to conform to prevailing political views in the party, and discontinued their cooperation with Čas.

The Liberal Party, besides three years' cooperation with the Realists, maintained close ties with the so-called "Progressive movement," which by 1893 exerted some influence upon students and workers.[222] Its spokesmen were young intellectuals, Alois Rašin (1867-1923), Antonin Hajn (1868-1953) and Karel S. Sokol (1867-1922), who had grown up under Masaryk's indirect leadership but parted from him after his "opportunistic" speech in Strakonice in 1891.[223] Although the Progressive movement was loosely associated with the Liberal Party, it was more radical and more concerned with the "social question." The movement promoted the "spirit of an independent Czech state," and would accept nothing less than a personal union of the Bohemian Kingdom with the monarchy. For this interpretation of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* they hoped to gain large support from the Czech workers.[224] But by 1893 the Progressive Movement was neither well organized nor possessed of a clearly-formulated programme.[225] Its members had united first in the "Readers' Club" in Prague, and when this was dissolved by the government in 1889, in the association "Slavie" which numbered twelve hundred members.[226] Broader membership was concentrated around three political papers: Neodvislost, Pokrokové listy and Nové proudy.

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[218] "Řišská Rada," Narodni listy, 21 March 1893. Masaryk's more favourable attitude to "consistent opposition" could have been a result of the voters' stormy disagreement with Kramář's suggestion in the Reichsrat on 16 December, 1892 to form a new parliamentary "Right" and to cooperate with the government. Plzeňské listy, 10 January 1893.

[219] "Radicalism a realism," Čas, 1 January 1893.

[220] The whole petty quarrel between Masaryk and J. Grégr is described, for example, in Narodni listy, 21 July 1893, and in Čas, 15 July 1893.

[221] "Z Pisku," Čas, 27 September 1893.

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[222] "Omladina" was a part of the Progressive Movement, and the name, meaning the "Young People" referred originally to the paper published by young workers.

[223] Karel Hoch, *Alois Rašín* (Prague: Orbis, 1934), p. 24.

[224] Karel Hoch, *České novinářstvi od roku 1860 do doby současné*. (Prague: Sfinx, 1935), p. 486.

[225] Jan Heidler, *České politické strany v Čechách, na Moravě a ve Slezsku* (Prague: J. Vilímek, 1914), p. 13.

[226] Ibid., p. 11-12. The most detailed review of the Progressive Movement as well as of the political activity of Czech students in the 1890s is in František Červinka, *Boje a směry českého studentstva na sklonku minulého a na počátku našeho století* (Prague: Universita Karlova, 1962).

Spokesmen of the movement were also active at political meetings. On 17 August 1893, on the eve of the Emperor's birthday, there were riots in which members of the Progressive movement, particularly Rašín, delivered inflammatory speeches which were not only anti-centralistic and anti-government, but also anti-dynastic.[227] The government had been observing the development of the Progressives for some time. Sensing a cause for limiting the political activity of the Czechs, it used the activity of the movement, particularly "Omladina," as the ostensible reason for the imposition of martial law on Prague and surroundings on 12 September 1893. Approved in the Reichsrat by 185 to 75 votes, the declaration came on the day when many meetings to celebrate the Emperor's rescript of 1871, promising autonomy for Bohemia, had been planned.[228] All political meetings were prohibited, liberal political clubs were dissolved; other political clubs, which had mushroomed since 1891, were in danger of being dissolved for trifling reasons. All radical newspapers were suppressed.[229] Members of the "Omladina" were accused of maintaining a "secret subversive association," and later of having been involved in the murder of Rudolf Mrva, their active member, who had been a police informer. Seventy-six young people were arrested and tried in January 1894. Out of these, sixty received sentences ranging from several months to five years of hard labour.[230] Sentences were handed down by special courts, because the government could not rely upon the current juries to follow its instructions.[231]

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[227] Hoch, Alois Rašín, p. 25. In his speech in Říčany, Rašín predicted the end of the empire in a not too distant future. Národní listy, which printed the content of his speech, was suppressed. The reporter responsible for its publication was imprisoned and freed only after the amnesty of 1895. Ibid., p. 25.

[228] Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách, 2: 209.

[229] Národní listy, 14 September 1893.

The first reaction of the Liberal Party and *Národní listy* was great caution.[232] Since Governor Count Thun believed that there were close connections between *Národní listy* and the sentenced young people,[233] the Young Czechs around the paper felt intimidated by the new situation and became more moderate in their writings. Although the party officially dissociated itself from the Progressive Movement to save *Národní listy*, it struggled courageously for the abolition of martial law.

In the middle of October, 1893, the party issued a Manifesto protesting martial law on the grounds that no existing law justified it. The Manifesto emphasized that the stated reasons for martial law made no sense, because the whole Czech nation was against centralism, which was suppressing the legitimate status of the Bohemian Kingdom, and against Germanization, because it blocked the natural rights of the nation's development. Since the Manifesto was not allowed to be published in Austria, it was first published in Hungary.[234] In the following years, the Young Czechs used every occasion in the *Reichsrat* to speak in favour of revocation of martial law in and around Prague. Their struggle succeeded, however, only when political conditions in the monarchy changed at the end of 1895.

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[230] Hoch, *Alois Rašin*, p. 33. Some of those young people died soon after being released from prison as a consequence of inhumane conditions in jail.

[231] Václav Škarda, *Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program* (Prague: E. Beaufort, 1897), p. 98.

[232] *Čas* described the sudden cautiousness of *Národní listy* as cowardice which most of the Czechs did not expect and did not understand. "Prvý týden výjimečného stavu," *Čas*, 23 September 1893, pp. 600-605. *Hlas národa* shared this opinion as well as the view of *Čas* that the radicalism of *Národní listy* was mainly responsible for the current situation in Bohemia. "Úkol poctivých Čechů." *Hlas národa*, 24 September 1893.

[233] Karel Tůma, "Padesát let boje a práce," p. 26.

For some months the Liberal Party had not changed its basic political stance. The consistent opposition to the government remained in practice, though some members, such as Josef Kaizl and Karel Kramář, were in favour of "pragmatic opposition" and moderate political attitudes.[235] The existence of martial law and the consequent demoralization in Czech political life gradually forced the Young Czechs to reconsider their political attitudes and position. It was soon apparent that blaming the Realists for martial law in Bohemia, because of their initial influence upon the Progressive Movement, was out of place. This did not prevent some historians, even several decades later, considering the proclamation of martial law a result of the political activity of young people, who were under the influence of the irresponsible agitation of a "seducer," Rudolf Mrva, the police agent.[236] Most Czech politicians, however, soon realized the broader connection between increased political activity of the Czech nation as a whole and the repression imposed on it by martial law.

Almost three years of the Liberal Party's parliamentary and public activity had kept the "Czech question" in the forefront of all parliamentary discussions,[237] and involved the Czech nation in political participation which aimed at substantial changes of the existing political system. Federal reform, universal manhood suffrage, and political and linguistic equality of both nationalities in the Bohemian Kingdom, were the issues pressed most strongly. The unexpected rapidity of the Czech nation's involvement in politics was hardly welcome to the ruling strata of the monarchy, whose major interest was to preserve the status quo, because it best protected their political, social and national privileges.

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[234] *Manifest poslanců o výminečném stavu z r. 1893* (Budapest, 1893). When the *Manifesto* was published in Bohemia more than three years later in V. Škarda, *Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program*, it was incomplete, because the censor deleted its six most important sections.

[235] Kaizl, *Z mého života*, Introduction by Z. Tobolka, 3: 41.

[236] Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách*, 2: 171-72.

It is apparently not a coincidence that the major aims of the Czech political struggle harmonized with measures which, in retrospect, seem to be the only ones which could have saved the monarchy's existence. The Germans of the empire probably believed sincerely that their interest in the preservation of the monarchy was much greater than that of other nationalities,[238] and their privileges, centralism and limited democracy necessary for its continual existence. Most of the Czech politicians believed that the Czech nation had at least an equal interest in the preservation of the monarchy, since it had nowhere to go if the empire broke up. They argued, however, that the political privileges of some, plus centralism, contributed to the weakening of the empire, not to its strength. Their argument does not seem to be without a sound core; in a multinational empire one nation, even if numerically stronger than the others, cannot maintain a privileged position at the cost of others without grave consequences for the internal development of that state. Only a state which is flexible enough to incorporate gradual changes in national, political, cultural and economic development into its political structure can hope to maintain itself. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was an example of a state which failed to develop such flexibility, and whatever political reforms were made lagged far behind real needs.[239]

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[237] The Czech deputies took pride in the fact that they were able to keep the "Czech question" so alive in the Reichsrat under the conditions of so-called "non-political" policy, which supposed avoidance of discussions about national problems, the Bohemian Staatsrecht and the Constitution of 1867. "Posl. p. Ervin Špindler před svými voliči," Národní listy, 28 October 1892. "Řec poslance prof. dr. T. G. Masaryka při rozpočtové debatě na řišské radě dne 18. listopadu," Národní listy, 23 November 1892.

[238] Wank, "Foreign Policy and the Nationality Problem in Austria Hungary." Bridge even maintains that since 1866, or at least since 1871, the Austrian government believed that the territorial integrity of the monarchy was most threatened by irredentism. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo, p. 382.

The issue of centrifugal and centripetal forces has not to date been definitely solved in relation to the monarchy's non-German nationalities, including the Czechs. Many historians are inclined to consider the centrifugal tendencies of these nationalities as stronger than their loyalty to the monarchy;[240] however, it can be said that until the beginning of the war most of the non-German nationalities strived for substantial reforms in the political and social system rather than for complete separation from the monarchy.

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[239] The author of this thesis, however, does not share the view of S. D. Kertesz (in his "Comments" to Wank's article) that between 1815 and 1914 realistic possibilities for radical reorganization of the Danubian empire hardly existed. AHY, 3, Pt. 3: 57. More will be said about this problem in the conclusion of this thesis. Neither does she share Wank's view (Ibid., p. 52) that political and economic reforms which were implemented after 1900 were made only for the purpose of distracting public attention from grave national problems.

It seems that the Czechs, since "they had nowhere to go," and were as afraid of Russian as of German expansionism, were more interested in the preservation of the monarchy than some of the monarchy's other nationalities. At all times, however, they persisted in their efforts to reorganize the political and social system along federalist and democratic lines. That was their major objective since 1848. Although they were not unaware of complex causes for the failure of all attempts to implement such reforms, it was only at the beginning of the 1890s that even the most moderate and loyal Czech representatives in the Reichsrat began to accuse the Germans of supporting centralism and the December Constitution only for selfish reasons, namely preservation of their political and national privileges. Moreover, the Young Czechs began to point out neglect and lack of knowledge of Slavic culture and realities as being at the root of German prejudices to Slavic nations, and contributing to Germans' anxiety for greater centralism and germanization.[241]

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[240] The national problem in Austria, from the point of its integrating and disintegrating role, was elaborated on at an international conference on "The Nationality Problem in the Nineteenth Century Habsburg Monarchy: A Critical Reappraisal," at Indiana University in 1966. The papers were published in AHY, Vol. III, Pt. 1-3, Rice University,1967. Prevailing opinions viewed non-German nationalities more as a disintegrating force. The strongest voice opposing this view was Hans Kohn, "Was the Collapse Inevitable?" AHY, Vol. III, Pt. 3, pp. 25-63. His disagreement with arguments supporting the idea that the major aim of the monarchy's non-ruling nationalities was their independence was shared by Z. A. B. Zeman in his "Comments," Ibid., Pt. 2: 328-331. Ivo J. Lederer in "Comments," Ibid., pp. 189-99, even suggests that using the term "integrative" and "disintegrative," or "centrifugal" and "centripetal" to describe the roles of individual nationalities is more confusing than illuminating, given the complexity of the problems related to the monarchy's existence and disintegration.

Between 1891 and 1893, the less the government and the Germans were willing to consider a substantial reform of the system, the more the Young Czechs insisted on the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* as the most important aim of their struggle for improvement of overall conditions.[242] The demand for the equality of both languages in Bohemia as the first step on the road to this goal,[243] was, however, the major obstacle for any Czech-German negotiations. The policy of opposition to the government remained in 1893 the means for achieving Czech aims.[244] The Young Czechs only gradually realized complex difficulties involved in their struggle.[245] The topic of federalism and the Bohemian Staatsrecht also remained one of the favorite topics at public political meetings, despite the government's increasing irritation at these themes and the frequent dissolutions and prohibitions of these meetings.[246]

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[241] All these charges were expressed in a speech of T. G. Masaryk in the *Reichsrat* in November 1892. "Řeč poslance prof. dr. T. G. Masaryka pri rozpočtové debatě na říšské radě dne 18. listopadu," *Národní listy*, 23 November 1892. The contents of Masaryk's speech, which caused a great commotion in the *Reichsrat*, were also published in *Čas*, 26 November 1892, pp. 753-54. Because of this speech and Masaryk's reference to the Bohemian *Staatsrecht*, Masaryk was proclaimed a traitor to the monarchy by a German deputy, Menger. Despite the Germans' loudly expressed sympathy for his statement, Menger was censured by the majority of the House. Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách*, 2: 161-62.

[242] Due to public pressures, an increasing number of the Young Czechs realized that substantial adjustments in the *Staatsrecht* programme would be necessary to ensure that its benefits would apply to all social strata of the Kingdom's population, including the peasants. "Veřejná schůze ve Střenicích." *Národní listy*, 8 September 1893.

[243] "Mladočesko - německé smíření," *Hlas národa*, 9 March 1893.

[244] This policy was reaffirmed at the meeting of the Liberal Party's Club in January 1893. "Valná hromada národní strany svobodomyslné," *Národní listy*, 30 January 1893.

The martial law and isolation in the Reichsrat forced the Young Czechs after 1893 to reevaluate their parliamentary position and attitude to the government and to consider modifying their political tactics. It still took several months before these changes began to be discussed inside the party and more than three years before the opposition to the government was replaced by cooperation. It became apparent only later that these changes facilitated neither the strengthening of the Liberal Party's position nor the realization of its major political objectives.

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[245] For example, in February 1893, Count Taaffe proclaimed explicitly that the monarchy's internal policies had to be in harmony with its foreign policy. "Vídeňské nadělení." Plzeňské listy, 7 February 1893.

[246] On September 11, 1893 Národni listy printed news about ten prohibited meetings planned for the next day. These meetings were intended to celegrate the thirty-second anniversary of the "royal rescript," in which Franz Joseph had promised greater autonomy for the Czech Kingdom. Sometimes it happened that people managed to meet despite official prohibition. For example, a meeting of five hundred people in Lužice on September 3, 1893, was dissolved twice by a governmental representative and six policemen. But the meeting still continued as a private banquet at the garden of the local restaurant "U Slupků." Národní listy, 4 September 1893.

CHAPTER FOUR

SEARCH FOR CLARIFICATION OF POLITICAL CONCEPTS

The proclamation of martial law in September 1893 seriously disrupted the principles of Czech politics. Since 1891 it had been based mainly on two assumptions. The first was intensive communication between Czech political leaders and the public, and the second was founded on the belief that exposing the weaknesses, injustices and shortcomings of the existing political and social system in public and in the *Reichsrat* would speed up implementation of badly needed reforms. Both these assumptions lost much of their validity, because the governmental measures were aimed precisely at frustrating the Liberal Party's chances of applying them in practice. Soon the need arose to analyse the existing situation and its causes, and to re-formulate the major aims of the political and national struggle.

The need to analyse the existing situation led to discussions in the press at the end of 1894 about the meaning of Czech history. They lasted for several decades, but they gradually became more concerned with the truth of historical facts and less related to practical politics.[1]

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[1] The entire discussion on the scholarly level was started by Josef Goll and Josef Pekař in 1898 in *Český časopis historický* (Czech Historical Journal) and continued until the end of the 1930s. It involved historians such as J. Vančura, Z. Nejedlý, F. M. Bartoš, E. Rádl, J. Jareš, J. Werdstadt, Mendl, Borovička and J. Slavík. The dispute resulted in the production of dozens of books and articles.

For the purpose of this study, however, only the early debates have relevance, because they grew directly out of the need to clarify political problems of the 1890s. The importance of these debates are in the fact that they have had a permanent influence upon the thinking of Czech intellectuals and were instrumental in the crystalization of Czech national values. Since the substance of these discussions is inseparable from the political context of the mid-1890s, the salient features of the political milieu need to be briefly retraced.

The political enthusiasm of the Czech public in 1891 - 1893 was gradually replaced by lethargy when political activity seemed only to bring more repression rather than positive results. Petty wrangling over the causes of this situation, which for a short time occupied the parties as well as prominent individuals, contributed to the scepticism of the Czech public. It was realized that the political activity and struggle of the preceding years had not been an adequate means for achieving those national aims, considered by the Czechs to be legitimate and fair. The revived hope that the political status of the Czech nation would soon be considerably improved was seriously shattered. Further, the expectation that the political development of the Czech nation would soon approach that of the most advanced countries of Europe was undermined. It became clear that the government, supported by the nobility and a majority among the Germans, was willing to use unlawful means to restrict political activity in order to maintain the existing political organization of the empire and the status quo in Bohemia and Moravia. After 1893, there was little hope left that the political situation of the empire would permit a gravitation toward a more genuine parliamentary and democratic system. The Germans of the empire were not only disinterested in such a change but seemed to dread it. They acted as if they really believed that their cultural and economic development was still higher than that of the Czechs, and that this provided sufficient justification for their ruling position.

In the nineteenth century the peoples of central Europe took great pride in the achievements of their forefathers. Feelings of historical continuity played an important part in their thinking. At the end of the last century it was still more acceptable in Austria to justify policies by using arguments which had their roots in historical tradition rather than in modern concepts. The notion of "progress", however, became irresistibly attractive to an increasing number of people who wanted not only to share its benefits but also to contribute consciously to its development. This applied particularly to those nations which lacked independent statehood. Such groups wished to accelerate social, economic and political changes, and put them to work for their benefit. The Czechs at the beginning of the 1890s availed themselves with enthusiasm of the opportunity of more increased political activity, accompanied by better information and intensive communications with their political representatives. Martial law and restriction of political life from September 1893 on deprived the Czechs of those newly acquired features of their lives, and contributed to the spread of defeatism. Only in the framework of these events and with this atmosphere in mind can one understand the disputes over the Czech past and the future national course.

It was Masaryk's *Česká otázka* (The Czech Question),[2] published at the end of 1894, which initiated the discussion, even though the book was mostly a summary and an expansion of articles previously published in *Čas* and *Naše doba*.[3] The first response to this study was Antonín Hajn's series of articles in *Rozhledy*.[4] Josef Kaizl's *České myšlenky*[5] (Czech Thoughts), which was published at the end of 1895, was a response to Masaryk's *Česká otázka* as well as to his study *Naše nynější krize*[6] (Our Present Crisis), which came out in the middle of the same year.

In *Česká otázka* Masaryk attempted to formulate concepts whose application would enable the Czech nation to progress rapidly in the cultural, political and economic spheres under the existing political conditions. When formulating his philosophy, Masaryk took into consideration Czech geographic, ethnographic and historical conditions; however, the justification of his programme lay mainly in the historical context. He argued that humanistic ideals had played a substantial role in modern Czech history, and whenever these ideals became a driving force behind the nation's actions, the nation had experienced its greatest advance. He believed that the Czech nation revival of the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, having humanistic ideals as a foundation of its striving, drew inspiration mainly from the Czech Reformation of the fifteenth century. He tried to persuade his contemporaries of the pre-eminent value of humanistic ideals, which were suited to become the focus of the Czech national endeavour. The means by which humanity was to be cultivated was slow, everyday, painstaking work in the cultural, economic, political and ethical spheres. By such work the Czech nation would not only secure its future, but it would also contribute to the progress of mankind as a whole.[7]

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[2] T. G. Masaryk, *Česká otázka* (Prague: Čas, 1895). Actually the book came out in December 1894. *Česká otázka* was published in English under the title *The Meaning of Czech History*, ed. Rene Wellek, trans. Peter Kussi (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974). However that edition is not a *verbatim* translation; particularly parts related to the contemporary political situation were left out. For that reason the study uses the first Czech editions and the fourth edition published together with *Naše nynější krise* (Prague: Čin, 1936).

[3] Most important articles are "Časové směry a tužby," *Naše doba*, vol. 1, no. 1,2 and 3 (1894) and "Nové osvícení - pryč s humanitou," *Čas*, 1 December 1894, pp. 753-55.

[4] Antonín Hajn, *Rozhledy*, no. 4 - 7 (1895).

[5] Josef Kaizl, *České myšlenky* (Prague: E. Beaufort, 1895).

[6] T. G. Masaryk, *Naše nynější krise* (Prague: Čas, 1895).

It is not easy to give a simple interpretation of Masaryk's humanistic ideal clearly. Renè Wellek probably grasps its complex meaning better than any other historian: "Democracy is another name for this ideal . . . Democracy meant to him the belief that every man should be able to strive for perfection, that no outward constraint, no social barrier, no economic or national oppression should bar his way to the realization of his humanity. When Masaryk stresses the natural right of man, he does so out of reverence for the immortal soul of every single man."[8] Masaryk's humanistic ideals also "implied that all nations had equal rights to strive for their specific values as groups of mankind."[9] Masaryk seems to accept an assumption of Herder and most of the Czech national awakeners that, unlike the centralized multinational states, the national have potential to realize humanistic ideals.[10] Masaryk himself viewed the humanistic ideals as an ultimate goal of Christian civilization. Striving for progress was broad, combining political ideas of the Great French Revolution with economic and technological advancement.[11]

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[7] T.G. Masaryk, Česká otázka. Naše nynější krise, 4th ed. (Prague: Čin, 1936), p. 241-42.

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[8] T. G. Masaryk, The Meaning of Czech History, ed. and with an Introduction by René Wellek, p. xvii. Wellek explains Masaryk's term "humanity" in still greater detail: "... humanity is an ambiguous term and Masaryk has often been grievously misunderstood. Humanism never meant to him sentimental humanitarianism, nor is a secular humanism ever set in opposition to a belief in God, as the term is frequently used in the United States. Nor does Masaryk share the view of the neo-humanism of Irving Babbit and Paul Elmer More, which emphasizes man's opposition to nature, his duality. Rather, humanism is for Masaryk the perfection of man conceived as a religious, moral and responsible being." Ibid., p. xvii.

[9] T. G. Masaryk, Humanistic Ideals, trans. and Preface by W. Preston Warren, with a Foreward by Hubert H. Humphrey (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1971), p. 64.

[10] T. G. Masaryk, Česká otázka (Prague: Čin, 1936), pp. 26, 103, 112, 118. It is not clear if Masaryk considered decentralized multinational states capable of realizing humanistic ideals in the same degree as national states. The opinion that multinational states cannot provide the same degree of liberty to their individual members as the national states can, found a more recent adherent in L. B. Namier, "Nationality and Liberty," in European Political History 1815-1870, ed. by Eugene C. Black (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 154.

Masaryk's attempt to trace the continuity of the modern humanistic ideals in Czech history as far back as the late middle ages has met with objections of many Czech historians. In numerous studies, over several decades, they seem to refute Masaryk's hypotheses satisfactorily, although the controversy has not been completely resolved yet. Disputes over the credibility of Masaryk's historical views are no longer important in the context of Czech politics, because the ideals which Masaryk favoured became deeply rooted in Czech national consciousness during the last one hundred years. It is, therefore, more important to examine in Česká otázka Masaryk's analysis of the political realities of the 1890s and his ideas about the nation's future work and aims than his interpretation of the Czech past.[12]

It was typical of Masaryk's method that he began his analysis with a criticism of those aspects of Czech political life which he considered redundant or erroneous. Since the Liberal Party dominated the political life of the 1890s, his sharpest criticism was directed against its activity. He found it intolerable that since Havlíček's time the Liberal Party had not attempted to formulate any broad national program in harmony with the world's progress and cultural development.[13] Moreover, he thought that any serious intellectual and practical work had to be based on a comprehensive philosophy.[14] This would avoid costly mistakes which a small nation could not afford. Furthermore, Masaryk viewed the Liberal Party's concentration on parliamentary work as a sign of its lack of understanding of modern national needs.[15]

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[11] Masaryk was in favour of "freedom, equality and brotherhood" -- ideals of the French Revolution. But he "was no egalitarian democrat in the sense of this revolution." Masaryk, The Meaning of Czech History, Introduction by Wellek, p. xvii.

[12] More recent studies show greater influence of the Czech Reformation upon the Czech awakeners than was the case during the few decades after the publication of Česká otázka. For example, Wellek in his Introduction to The Meaning of Czech History, p. xxii, says that J. B. Čapek, in his book on Czech Literature in the Period of Toleration, has succeeded in tracing a "direct continuity from Protestantism to the revival." Also Kamil Krofta in his book Národnostní vývoj zemí československých (Prague: Orbis, 1934), p. 71, says, contrary to his views expressed in earlier works, that most of the Czech awakeners had considerable knowledge of Jan Hus and other reformers.

Masaryk considered politics far less important for national development than most of his contemporaries. According to his view, political struggle might lead to Czech independence, but the political independence of a small nation would always be endangered unless it was combined with a level of cultural, economic and political development which would allow competition with the most advanced countries. Only diligent cultural work, understood in the very broad sense, would be sufficient to secure the future of the Czech nation.[16] Masaryk was proud to share these views with the most significant personalities of the Czech national revival, particularly J. Dobrovský, K. Havlíček and F. Palacký.[17]

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[13] Masaryk, Česká otázka, p. 180.

[14] Ibid., p. 9.

[15] Ibid., p. 187.

[16] Ibid., pp. 123-24.

[17] Ibid., pp. 146-48.

The next target of Masaryk's criticism was the excessive Slavophilism and Russophilism of Národní listy. Masaryk's inclination to identify the whole Liberal Party with the newspaper was distorted reality. His apprehension of the newspaper's questionable influence upon the population, however, was more justified. Masaryk had no illusions about the emptiness of Czech Slavophilism and Russophilism, and this emphasis on empty concepts and meaningless ideals was exactly what he feared. A considerable part of Česká otázka was a reaction to the Národní listy's attempt to encourage these ideals.

Masaryk condemned the Národní listy for its "excessive historicism,"[18] because it tried to revive the memory of the Cyrillo-Methodian Church, which had existed in Moravia for several decades in the ninth century and had used the Slavonic language as the language of the liturgy. Some articles even tried to find similarities between this church and the Czech Reformation of the fifteenth century. The purpose of these articles was to encourage the formation of a national church, and to bring the Czech nation closer to the Russians. The Slavic character of the Church was intended to strengthen the Slavic nature of the Czech nation and to provide the Czechs with a united religious platform in their political and national struggle.

Such Slavophile pronouncements were not numerous, but they strongly irritated Masaryk by their preoccupation with those distant historical reminiscences that actually played a negligible role in Czech history, and by their neglect of Czech traditional connections with Western European thought and culture. As a person who had genuine respect for religion, Masaryk also objected to the idea of making religion a means for political ends.[19]

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[18] Masaryk, Česká otázka. Naše nynější krise, p. 216.

Masaryk opposed views which advocated closer relations with Russia, and so-called "Slavic patriotism" that was to replace the supposedly narrow Czech patriotism. For years he dismissed such sentiments as lacking in rational substance.[20] He argued that among Czechs there was an almost complete lack of knowledge about Russia and other Slavic nations, including the knowledge of their languages.[21] The core of Masaryk's argument was that the Czechs would not secure their future by empty sentiments and relying on the protection of some larger nation. Fulfillment of any "Czech national purpose" could only come through their own hard work in all important spheres of the nation's life.[22]

Masaryk wanted to show in Česká otázka that the Czech nation need not seek inspiration for its development in insignificant periods of its past or in foreign countries. Rather, the Czechs possessed their own great humanistic tradition, worthy of preserving and cultivating. He envisioned that the noble and progressive aspects of the Czech Reformation and those of the national revival, combined with modern concepts of progress, would form the essence of Czech national aspirations. To

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[19] Masaryk, Česká otázka, p. 192.

[20] Masaryk's detailed opinions about Slavophilism and Russophilism were published in his articles "Rozličné slovanství," Čas, 10 December and 29 December 1894.

[21] Masaryk, Česká otázka, p. 175. Masaryk himself knew Russian and had visited Russia several times already before 1890. Masaryk, Humanistic Ideals, Preface by W. P. Warren, p. 31.

[22] Masaryk, Česká otázka, pp. 144-45.

Masaryk's regret, however, the humanistic ideals of the Czech Reformation and those of the national revival had slowly been abandoned during the previous several decades.[23] Even though Masaryk was convinced that the humanistic ideals constituted an organic part of the Czech tradition,[24] he was also well aware of all-important West European influences on the development of the Czech nation.[25]

Although Masaryk considered the religious and ethical aspects of the Czech humanitarian ideal very important, he wanted their cultivation interlocked with reason, knowledge and sound education. He saw the need for improvements in all these areas, but he was particularly concerned with the inadequacies of the "character of the Czech nation."[26] He explained them as a result of the people's immaturity, caused by prolonged political dependency. A sound general education, available to all people, was to be the most important way for improvement in all spheres. Intellectuals in social disciplines were to play the crucial role in this envisioned spiritual advancement of the Czech nation. In order to fulfill their task of education, Masaryk urged these intellectuals to work hard and keep pace with their counterparts in advanced European countries. Since Masaryk believed that a nation potentially provided the best conditions for individual development and fulfillment, he argued that a broad and sound education would help people to understand that the primary interest of each individual had to be to work for the progress of the whole nation. As the first step on the way to the nation's cultural advancement, Masaryk demanded that the most substantial part of the Czech population, mainly the peasantry and the workers, hitherto excluded from sharing the benefits of modern European civilization, be empowered to participate in cultural and political life.[27]

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[23] Masaryk, Česká otázka. Naše nynější krise, pp. 198-9.

[24] Ibid., p. 229.

[25] Ibid., pp. 11-12, 15, 17, 20-21.

[26] Masaryk, Česká otázka, p. 158.

He tried to persuade his readers that such a goal was a realistic one for the near future, and that the present political conditions provided enough room for everybody who was capable and willing to work for the elevation of the lower classes and for improvements in the cultural sphere. Masaryk used to call this kind of work "inner work."[28] Such work was to improve the overall quality of the Czech nation, and to develop its capability to gain independence.

In the middle of the 1890s Masaryk still thought of Czech independence within the framework of the monarchy, with the interest of the monarchy's preservation simply taken for granted. He believed that such independence was a highly realistic perspective.[29] Masaryk started to value, more than in the past, the Bohemian Staatsrecht as a possible means for gaining independence for the Czech Kingdom.[30] Although it was characteristic of his complex way of thinking to have alternatives for solving problems, revolution did not become one of these possibilities for more than a decade to come.[31]

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[27] Ibid., p. 163.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., p. 164.

[30] Ibid., p. 171.

In Česká otázka Masaryk also clarified his views in relation to other parties. He identified his general position with the conservatives' appreciation of achievements from the past and their attachment to certain traditions. But he looked with disapproval on their lack of concern for progress. He favoured progress enthusiastically; however, unlike the radicals, he viewed it as a gradual process. Only a combination of knowledge, education and efficient work in all areas of human life could improve the whole society. A revolution as desired by radicals, would have no beneficial effects; Masaryk was steadfastly convinced that under the existing conditions it would be possible to make a wide range of improvements. In his book he tried to stimulate individuals' interest, and stir them to work for personal and national advancement in spheres other than the political one.

Masaryk's attempt to shift a considerable degree of responsibility for the progress of the Czech nation away from politics and onto the shoulders of individuals was something entirely new. He never doubted that the Czechs would achieve some kind of independence in the future. Rather, his major aim was to build the capacity of the nation to preserve its independence, and to use it in constructive ways for the benefit of the nation, its individual members and, ultimately, for mankind as well. Masaryk believed that a small nation had a better chance to progress rapidly if a comprehensive theory and a detailed programme underlay its efforts.[32] Since the Liberal Party was the dominant political force among the Czechs, he urged the party to work out such a far-reaching cultural and political programme.

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[31] Around 1907 Masaryk began to consider revolution as the last means for achieving legitimate aims, if all other means failed. He supplemented in this sense later editions of Česká otázka. For example, Česká otázka. Naše nynější krise (Prague: Čin, 1936), p. 287.

To summarize, Masaryk in Česká otázka tried to persuade the Czech nation that progress and its future existence was dependent on its own work in the spiritual, cultural, economic and political spheres. The necessary condition for such work was to elevate the level of education of all strata of the population, and to work for the economic improvement of the lower classes, particularly the workers.[33] He considered liberalism unsuitable to meet the modern tasks of society,[34] instead proposing the humanistic ideals of the Czech past as a viable alternative for the nation's destiny. His concept of the humanistic ideal was broad, and included not only ethical and religious aspects, but also encompassed and emphasized the important role of knowledge, education, progress and democracy as well.

The most intensive response to Česká otázka came from the younger generation. It included both an enthusiastic acceptance of Masaryk's philosophy and the course which he suggested as well as views critical to his concepts and ideas.

F. X. Šalda, later a brilliant and much feared literary critic, spoke for many young intellectuals when he praised the book for giving a new vital dimension to their lives.[35] He saw it as replacing "nihilism, dilettantism and eclecticism" with a philosophy which brought positive and creative work to the forefront of their values. A conscious identification with the Czech nation, work for its cultural and social advancement, and an emphasis on permanent meaningful spiritual growth gave them "more strength to resist a passive materialistic and unconcerned deterministic" life style. Masaryk's philosophy also stimulated their desire to cultivate their upright character and provide them with the strength to take themselves seriously. Šalda particularly welcomed the constructive nature of Masaryk's philosophy showing ways to the spiritual development of individuals as well as to the development of the Czech nation. He coined the phrase "Czech philosophy" to describe this synthesis of religious, ethical, spiritual and rational aspects of Masaryk's humanistic ideals.[36]

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[32] Ibid., pp. 188-89.

[33] Masaryk viewed intensive work for the benefit of the workers also as a means for diverting them from materialistic ideology, and incorporating them as an integral part into the political nation. Ibid., pp. 232-33.

[34] Masaryk, Česká otázka, p. 203.

The most elaborate criticism of Česká otázka came from the prominent members of the Progressive and the Liberal Party. First, a series of articles was published by Antonín Hajn in Rozhledy.[37] The main focus of Hajn's criticism was the ethic of Masaryk's humanistic concept which he considered unrealistic. He particularly attacked Masaryk's conviction that the use of force in self-defence was justified, as being incompatible with the principles of such a concept. Further, Hajn accused Masaryk of showing insufficient interest in the economic problems of the workers, and excessive concern with the preservation of the empire. He intimated a revolution for the independence of the Bohemian Kingdom would be a faster way for social improvements and the nation's advancement.

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[35] František X. Šalda, "Těžká kniha," Rozhledy 4 (1895), pp. 641-8, and pp. 711-21.

[36] Ibid., pp. 643-4, 716-7, 721.

[37] Rozhledy 4, no. 4-7 (1895). It does not seem that Hajn's opinions were representative of Progressives. In August 1895 Radikální listy published an article in which the anonymous author maintained that it was not correct to identify the Progressives automatically with a revolutionary idea. However, the author considered a revolution under certain circumstances justified. "Naše nynější krise," Radikální listy, 1 August 1895.

Masaryk answered Hajn's articles in one chapter of his new book Naše nynější krise[38] (Our Present Crisis), published in 1895. He complained that Hajn frequently misquoted his sentences and, in general, paid more attention to the peripheral issues in Česká otázka. Masaryk explained again patiently the basic framework of his thinking, emphasizing his unshakable faith in the humanitarian ideals of the Christian civilization[39] and asserting that the humanitarian means represented the only possible path toward true progress. Moreover, he stressed that he did not believe that a revolution could have any chance of victory in the empire. Masaryk agreed with Hajn that the implementation of any ideal would not be easy, but he maintained that any compromises necessitated by circumstances could never be allowed to jeopardize the basic integrity of the principle.

Since Masaryk believed that progress was more dependent on the initiative and work of various groups of society than on governmental decision-making, he tried to discourage the Progressives in their hope that the situation of the Bohemian Kingdom would drastically improve if it became independent. To expect any rapid progress of a nation from a simple change of its government was an obsolete view,[40] and ignored the stage of the nation's development. Nor could Masaryk accept the idea of implementation of a "personal union" between the Bohemian Kingdom and the monarchy, as favoured by the Progressives, as a realistic aim for the near future, and thus he would not support any activity aimed exclusively at such a goal. He preferred to concentrate on the more practical project of his "inner work," focused on improvements in all important areas of the nation's life.

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[38] Masaryk, Česká otázka. Naše nynější krise, Chapter Four, "Reformace či Revoluce?", pp. 343-411.

[39] Ibid., pp. 358-60.

Masaryk would doubtless have welcomed the establishment of a new political party, provided it assumed the revival of the cultural work allegedly abandoned by the National Party and the Liberals. Although he did not highly value the Progressives' intellectual capacity for such work, because they were still mostly young and immature, he hoped he could persuade them to broaden their outlook and the scope of their activities. This was the main reason why he occupied himself so intensively with the movement. He also hoped that correct analysis of the Movement would assist in the clarification of the gloomy political situation of the mid-1890s.[41]

In the remainder of Naše nynější krise Masaryk expressed his major opinions about the cause of the political crisis of the mid-1890s. Although he saw its origins in the National Party's neglect of intensive and effective cultural work, Masaryk mainly blamed the situation on the Liberal Party, whose limited scope of activity had resulted in an increasing fragmentation of the Czech political movement.[42] Masaryk argued that, unlike Germans or the English, Czechs were not advanced enough in their national development to be able to afford either the separation of political and cultural work,[43] or a split in the political movement. The formation of the Progressive Movement was a sign that young people, interested in politics, were discouraged by the Liberal Party's narrow interests and limited work.

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[40] Ibid., pp. 395-6.

[41] Ibid., pp. 408-11.

Masaryk had observed carefully the Progressive Movement from its onset in 1889 and tried to influence its development with several articles,[44] which later became a part of Naše nynější krise. He was much concerned with the Progressives' narrow materialistic philosophy, aiming primarily at social change. The acceptance of positivism by some prominent members of the movement was not a better choice. Masaryk viewed materialistic philosophy as an anachronism, and positivism, with its thesis that facts talk for themselves, as an ethical deficiency. The major sources of these two philosophies were self-indulgence and an aversion to hard, efficient work, phenomena quite common in the Czech intellectual environment.[45] He urged the university students of the Progressive Movement to concentrate on their studies of social disciplines, including politics and philosophy, in order to develop a capability for assuming responsibility and playing the role of spiritual leaders for a nation in its striving for progress.[46]

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[42] Masaryk, Naše nynější krise (Prague: Čas, 1895), pp. lxii-lxiii.

[43] Ibid., p. xxv.

[44] Masaryk, "O úkolech českého studentstva," Časopis českého studentstva, no. 2 (1889); "První literární orgán pokrokového hnutí," Čas, no. 15 (1893); "Vývoj pokrokového hnutí," published first in German in Die Zeit, 17 November-1 December 1894. All these articles became a part of Naše nynější krise.

[45] Masaryk, Naše nynější krise, p. 37.

The criticism of Česká otázka and Naše nynější krise which came from the ranks of the Liberal Party was most painful for Masaryk, because it was delivered by his former close friend Josef Kaizl. Kaizl perceived Naše nynější krise primarily as a "wrathful" attack on the Liberal Party's concepts and work.[47] Kaizl published separately a resume of the book with his own comments, and its review in České noviny in July 1895.[48] In the review he made an attempt to prove that the Liberal Party was more progressive than any other party in the empire and that Masaryk was mistaken in describing the Liberal Party as being on the road to decadence.

Masaryk's works stimulated Kaizl to write a book on similar topics; but from the Liberal Party's point of view. Unlike Masaryk, Kaizl did not write his book České myšlénky (Czech Thoughts) with the intention of formulating concepts for the safeguarding of progress and the preservation of the small Czech nation. Kaizl took the existence of the Czech nation basically for granted; in his search for means to improve the nation's situation he suggested the establishment of equal rights for all nations of the empire as the most important goal.[49] According to Kaizl, Czech politics was far from being in serious crisis. He especially attempted to prove that the previous and contemporary programmes and policies of the Liberal Party were the most progressive Czech political force.[50] As he had more trust in an automatic development towards progress, he saw no need for a comprehensive national programme broad enough to prevent any further fragmentation of the Czech political movement. Kaizl actually regarded its differentiation around various interests as a healthy phenomenon. He also opposed Masaryk's call for an accelerated democratization of the whole society, on the grounds that the process should take its natural course, so as not to displease the important strata of the society which did not favour it.[51]

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[46] Ibid., p. 131.

[47] Josef Kaizl, Z mého života, ed., Zdeněk V. Tobolka, 3 vols. (Prague: J. R. Vilímek, 1909-14), 3: 375-79.

[48] Josef Kaizl, "Naše nynější krise," České noviny, 11 July and 12 July 1895.

[49] Josef Kaizl, České myšlénky, pp. 153-54.

Kaizl's liberal point of view was also reflected in his opposition to Masaryk's demand for greater governmental involvement in the improvement of social and economic conditions of the lower classes.[52] Kaizl considered the existence of liberalism in Austria desirable, because, unlike in some West European countries, it had not yet fulfilled its mission of gaining freedom and equal rights for all individuals. He was afraid, however, it might not get a chance for such a role, because of the rapid spread of socialist and radical ideas.[53]

Since Kaizl believed in the possibility of the future positive role of "enlightened" liberalism, he did not see any need for the acceptance of humanistic ideals as the basis of a national programme. In response to Masaryk's books, his major effort was to show that there was no link between the humanistic ideals of the Czech Reformation and the Czech national revival. He considered the latter to be the result of West European influences, particularly of the Enlightenment, and of nationalism and liberalism. The result of these influences was the prevalence in the Czech nation of liberal ideas over the humanistic ones, and he saw no need for any substantial realignment of the Czech political and national course.[54] Kaizl argued that the programme of the Liberal Party was sufficiently humanistic and democratic, and contained adequate consideration of all strata of the Czech population.

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[50] Ibid., pp. 86-87, 91, 109.

[51] Ibid., pp. 114-15, 132-33.

[52] Ibid., p. 123.

[53] Ibid., pp. 141-45.

In response to Kaizl's book, an article was published in Čas by an unidentified author close to Masaryk.[55] There was some justification in the author's complaint that Kaizl misunderstood Masaryk's books, and distorted some of his opinions. The author first described the basic differences in the standpoints of both leaders, then clarified in greater detail those of Masaryk's concepts and views which were the major subject of controversy. He reminded Kaizl that Masaryk was well aware of the prevalence of the liberal ideas of the Czech nation,[56] but considered this a deviation from the original striving of the Czech national revival. In Masaryk's view, liberalism was far from being a constructive force, able to secure the overall progress of the whole nation, in which he included, unlike Kaizl, all strata of the population. Masaryk wanted the system of attitudes and ideas underlying the national development to serve equally for the advancement of all individuals. Since no future evolutionary national programme could succeed without first incorporating much from the past and present, Masaryk thought it useful to find the nation's best traditions, and consciously adopt them. He symbolically labelled such a programme a "providential design" for each nation to contribute in its own way to common human progress. He found the humanistic ideals of the Czechs their most valuable tradition, worthy of becoming the centre of the Czech political and national efforts.[57]

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[54] Ibid., pp. 13-14, 16-21.

[55] "Dr. J. Kaizl: České myšlénky," Čas, 28 December 1895, pp. 817-29.

[56] Ibid., p. 819.

It has already been mentioned that the discussions about Masaryk's interpretation of Czech modern history continued for several decades. Unlike the later academic disputes, the substance of the discussions in the middle of the 1890s mainly concerned the orientation of current Czech politics and the national aspirations. Národní listy opposed Masaryk's humanistic ideals as contributing to the effeminacy of the Czech nation, and thus playing into the hands of Pan-Germanism.[58] Masaryk tried to refute such conclusions in a number of articles.[59] His criticism of Národní listy remained harsh and the relationship between him and the newspaper did not improve for years.[60] Masaryk was especially concerned with making his ideas clear to the university students, hoping to counterbalance the influence of Národni listy.[61]

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[57] Ibid., p. 818. See also Masaryk, Česká otázka. Naše nynější krise, pp. 3-4.

[58] Národní listy, 19 February 1896.

[59] "Pryč s Kollárem a Palackým," Čas, 22 February 1896. "Rozhledy politické," Naše doba, 20 December 1897.

[60] "Obraz mladočešství," Čas, 27 February 1897.

To conclude, Masaryk attempted to persuade his countrymen that the "Czech humanistic ideal" was a practical concept, taking into account all important aspects of the nation's life. Since the Czech nation, however small, was a part of mankind, it was essential for the nation's preservation to maintain solidarity with mankind and to keep pace with the most progressive nations. The striving for progress and humanistic ideals was to secure the Czechs a respected place in the community of European nations, nations who share a common civilization, with humanistic ideals at the centre of their values.

Masaryk's views left a permanent mark on the thinking of the Czechs. This is not to say that his ideas gradually prevailed among the majority of Czechs. As philosophy, they were accepted only by a minority of intellectuals. But if one can talk about a nation's conscience, Masaryk's "Czech philosophy" soon became an inseparable part of it. It became a moral force against which particular political events and acts had to be judged.

Masaryk's assumption not to take the existence of a small Czech nation for granted proved correct. His emphasis on the conscious expansion of the human and intellectual resources of the nation and its individual members indicated his unusual capacity of foresight. Since at the end of the nineteenth century the majority of people were just beginning to be involved in public affairs, politics and higher education, it was then possible for individuals of exceptional spiritual capacity to influence people's values and way of thinking on a large scale. As one such man, Masaryk was able partly to fill an ideological gap caused by the Liberal Party's mainly pragmatic orientation. He influenced a considerable number of Czech intellectuals, and their work gradually reached out to the broader public.

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[61] "O národnosti, mezinárodnosti a humanitě," Čas, 30 January 1897.

Masaryk's desire was to resurrect the ideals of the Czech Reformation and the national revival, because he viewed their humanistic substance as the most secure force to safeguard the existence and advancement of a small Czech nation. His own contributions, however, made the humanistic ideal not only applicable under new conditions at the end of the nineteenth century, but made valid also for later times.

Although Masaryk's ideas influenced some individual members of the Liberal Party, his influence upon the programme and politics of the Party remained negligible. From the middle of 1896 the Young Czechs became even more occupied with parliamentary work and the idea of cooperation with the government under certain conditions. In practice, this meant gradual resignation from the struggle for broad national goals and adjustment of its programme to the hard realities of the monarchy's political system. Consequently, the programme of the Party became not broader, as demanded by Masaryk, but still narrower, and within a decade the party became one more of the parties which based their existence on representing specific economic and social interests rather than general national ones.

CHAPTER FIVE

REORIENTATION OF THE LIBERAL PARTY 1894 AND 1897

Constructive efforts which would seriously attempt to adjust the Austrian political system to the new national, social and economic realities continued to be markedly absent from the activity of the empire's ruling strata in the 1890's. The limited powers of the Reichsrat and the unequal status of individual national groups remained the most serious obstacles to any solution of existing internal problems through parliamentary work. However, the parliamentary system did provide a platform for the articulation of grievances and suggestions. Concentration of parliamentary groups on their particular interests reflected not so much their irresponsibility towards the empire as a whole[1] as the acceptance of their traditional weakness, dependency on the government and inability to influence the basic course of Austrian internal and external policy.

The Czech deputies in the Reichsrat, although involved in the vigorous struggle for the interests of the Czech nation, did not have the slightest intention of disrupting the empire. On the contrary, they sincerely believed that equality of the empire's nationalities and an increased democratization of the political system would serve to the benefit of the Monarchy's population, and would strengthen the empire as a whole. It appears, however, that the Czech representatives in the middle of the 1890s were not yet fully aware of the distribution of power among the forces influencing the internal development of the empire. Soon they would learn a bitter lesson, one which would have a lasting impact on Czech political attitudes.

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[1] A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918, (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948; reprint ed., Middlesex: Harmondsworth, 1970), p. 183-84.

The Young Czechs remained in opposition to the new government of Prince Windischgraetz, partly as a matter of principle, partly as a reaction to his increasingly restrictive policies towards Czechs. Besides other governmental restrictions, the suppression of Czech newspapers became more frequent, and there was no indication of any relaxation of the martial law in Prague and environs. As well, from April 6, 1894, the government removed the immunity from speeches delivered in Czech in the *Reichsrat*.[2] This enabled prosecution of newspapers which had the courage to publish them. The only governmental decision welcomed by Czechs was a decree which suspended implementation of the Czech-German settlement made in 1890.[3]

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[2] "Imunita českých řečí proslovených na veřejném sezení poslanecké sněmovny rady říšské," *Národní listy*, 11 June 1894. Other governmental restrictions were related, for instance, to Czech schools. The most conspicuous case of governmental prejudice against Czech schools in 1894 was the refusal to subsidize Czech schools in Vienna for the two hundred thousand Czechs living there, despite the fact that Germans in Silesia received four hundred thousand gulden for their schools in that year. "Poslanec Adámek ve Vysokém Mýtě," *Národní listy*, 6 August 1894.

[3] Zdeněk Tobolka, *Politické dějiny Československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby*, 4 vols. (Prague: Československý Kompas, 1932-36), 3 pt. 2:68.

The Liberal Party responded to the government's strict policies with an increased emphasis on achieving the Bohemian Staatsrecht, considered the only way out of the politically humiliating and economically depressing situation of the Bohemian Kingdom.[4] Prince Windischgraetz's comment that something like the "Czech Question" did not exist for him became indelibly stamped in the memory of the Czech public, which was often reminded of the statement, especially in the more radical press.[5]

Since the elaborate and detailed speeches of the Czech deputies in the Reichsrat in 1891-93 had little practical impact, all topics which had been viewed as important in relation to the Czech nation in that period remained so also from 1894 to 1897. As the government policy in 1894-95 had shifted even farther away from granting concessions for the Czech nation, the Czech representatives became more defensive; they concentrated on regaining those conditions for their work which they had enjoyed before the proclamation of the martial law. Their speeches became less numerous, and for more than a year their major theme was the Bohemian Staatsrecht. Their emphasis on this recurrent demand, which had no chance for fulfillment under the existing situation, did have effects on the political attitudes of the Czech population. The most discernible consequences were an increased political radicalism and decrease of trust towards the Monarchy and the Viennese government. At the same time there grew a tendency to have unrealistic expectations of the future political changes and to underestimate daily work for economic, social and educational improvements.

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[4] Several examples of such speeches are: "Sněm království českého," Národní listy, 17 January, 1894; "Poslanec Herold před svými voliči," Národní listy, 20 February, 1894; "Manifestace a veliká schůze lidu v Městci Králové," Národní listy, 5 May 1894. This speech, delivered by Eduard Grégr was a cause for suppression of this issue of Národní listy. "Poslanci dr. Ed. Grégr a Jos. Sokol v Chocni," Národní listy, 21 May 1894.

[5] "Novoroční rozhledy," Radikální listy, 3 January 1895.

The political radicalism of Národní listy and of some prominent Young Czechs, particularly Eduard Grégr,[6] was not shared by all leading personalities of the Liberal Party.[7] Some, like Karel Kramář, were not in favour of radical opposition, and they favoured cooperation with other parliamentary groups not participating in the governmental coalition. Such cooperation would, however, imply that other issues, particularly universal suffrage would have to be in the forefront of the Liberal Party's efforts,[8] and this would relegate the Bohemian Staatsrecht to the position of a secondary issue. Moderates did not share the assumption of the brothers Grégrs that an increased radicalism of the Czechs would force the new government to make substantial political concessions to the Czech nation.[9] The lack of consensus among prominent members of the Liberal Party with respect to the Party's course was the most significant feature of their public performances during the first half of 1894. Inconsistencies in their views and uncertainty of their political attitudes in their parliamentary work became a target of frequent criticism at public meetings and in various newspapers.[10]

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[6] "Poslanci dr. Ed. Grégr a Jos. Sokol v Chocni," Národní listy, 21 May 1894.

[7] During this period some newspapers did not see the Young Czechs as radical, but as unnecessarily moderate and opportunistic. For instance, Rozhledy pointed out radicalism, consistent democracy and educational work with the public as the only possible orientation of the Liberal Party leading to success. Its current concentration mainly on parliamentary work was considered a grave mistake. Rozhledy 3 (1894): 2-8.

[8] "Veřejná schůze v Boskově," Národní listy, 6 August 1894. This opinion was shared by some other Young Czechs. "Schůze lidu ve Mšeně," Národní listy, 10 September 1894. Kaizl delivered a long speech in the Reichsrat in defense of universal, equal and direct suffrage on June 6, 1894. Josef Kaizl, Z mého života, 3: 309-11.

[9] "Poslanci dr. Ed. Grégr a Jos. Sokol v Chocni," Národní listy, 21 May 1894.

Národní listy held the increasingly restrictive censorship responsible for the Party's confused attitudes, since it was difficult to express opinions openly without risking a paper's suppression. Some Czech politicians feared the restrictive censorship was aimed purposefully at undoing the results of the public political education of the Czech population achieved during the last several years. They considered the struggle for relaxation of censorship as one of their primary goals.[11] With such restiveness among Czech deputies, it was simple to see that Prince Windischgraetz, unable to solve any of the urgent political problems, including the electoral reform, would not gain the majority of the *Reichsrat* for the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, due in 1897. From May 21, 1895, the *Reichsrat* was in confusion because of the

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[10] "Poslanec dr. Herold před svými voliči," *Národní listy*, 20 February, 1894; "Schůze v Poděbradech," *Národní listy*, 21 February 1894. *Rozhledy* 3 (1894): 2-8; "Velikonoční zvony," *Čas*, 31 March 1894. Josef Kaizl, one of the most prominent and respected Young Czechs of this period, even wrote a letter in the Spring of 1894 to the exectutive committee of the Liberal Party, in which he criticized disorders in the Party and the lack of any clear and unified political views. He held this situation responsible for the growth of the Progressive Movement; however, this letter was never mailed. Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3:321-22.

[11] The most prominent Young Czech in this struggle was Gustav Eim. "Za uvolnění tisku," *Národní listy*, 29 May 1894; "Řec poslance Gustava Eima o konfiskaci českého časopisectva," *Národní listy* - Příloha, 30 May 1894.

Czech obstruction which, led by Josef Kaizl, struggled to prevent passage of Plener's proposal for tax reform, because it would have disenfranchised the five gulden voters.[12]

With the fall of Windischgraetz's government in June, 1895, it became clear that any new Austrian government would also have to get involved seriously in the "Czech Question." The temporary government of Minister of the Interior Count Erich Kiellmansegg revoked some restrictive policies against the Czech nation, permitting publication of some newspapers and slightly relaxing censorship. But greater hopes for more substantial concessions came with the government of Count Kazimierz Badeni, which was formed on the last day of September, 1895.

Although the Badeni's appointment had no immediate influence upon the Czech opposition,[13] within six months the first calls for a change began to be heard. Gustav Eim became the most prominent agitator among the Young Czechs for cooperation with Badeni. He made endless efforts to persuade his colleagues, as well as the public, that Badeni had a sincere desire to make substantial concessions to Czechs. It would be foolish, argued Eim, to miss such an opportunity, even if not all major Czech demands were met.[14] Since Eim considered Josef Kaizl the strongest opponent of cooperation with Badeni, he concentrated his efforts on developing more understanding between the two men, and succeeded partially by November, 1895, when the two met personally.[15] Eim himself, despite his rapidly deteriorating health, met regularly for weeks with Badeni at six o'clock every morning to discuss the "Czech Question."[16]

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[12] According to the proposal tax was supposed to decrease for five gulden taxpayers. The leading personalities of the Czech obstruction were Bedřich Pacák and Emanuel Brzorád. Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3:286.

[13] "Volebni ruch," *Národní listy*, 4 November 1895; "Schůze voličská ve Vysokém mýte," *Národní listy* - Příloha, 7 November 1895.

Badeni was gradually gaining more trust among the Czech deputies because of his sympathy with the federal idea and his understanding for specific needs of the Czech nation.[17] He recognized the existence of the

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[14] A typical speech in which Eim agitated for public support of Czech cooperation with Badeni was delivered to his voters in April 1896. "Poslanec Gustav Eim před svými voliči v Chotěboři," Národní listy - Příloha, 21 April 1896. Gradually, Eim was gaining individual Young Czechs for this orientation, but officially the Liberal Party replaced its Staatsrecht position by the policy of gradualism" in September 1896. Kaizl, Z mého života, 3:383. The Liberal Party proclaimed the equality of Czech and German in Bohemia and Moravia as the first step to the fulfilment of the Bohemian Staatsrecht at the meeting of the Liberal Party's executive committee on September 18, 1896, and later at the meeting of its deputies on September 29, 1896, Ibid., p. 389.

[15] Kaizl and Badeni met on November 4, 1895. As early as December 13, 1895 Kaizl had delivered a speech in the Reichsrat, in which he mentioned the notion of a "policy of gradualism." On January 22, 1896 he formulated in more specific terms conditions under which the Liberal Party would end its opposition. The core of these conditions was equality of Czech and German in Bohemia and Moravia. Kaizl, Ibid., pp. 385-88.

[16] Josef Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878 - 1918, 2 : 286-87.

[17] Meetings between Badeni and several Young Czechs (G. Eim, J. Kaizl, K. Kramář, B. Pacák, J. Herold) continued until March 1897. Kaizl describes these negotiations and their complex difficulties in his diary. Kaizl, Z mého života, 3: 558-62 and 572-75.

"Czech Question" and abolished martial law immediately after commencing his premiership. This gesture of good will was followed by an amnesty for seventeen Czech political prisoners (members of Omladina) and the recall of the Governor, Count Franz Thun. He also permitted the foundation of a number of Czech schools, guaranteed that newspapers were not prosecuted anymore for publishing Reichsrat's speeches delivered in Czech, and gave from state funds two thirds of the financial expenses for the project of making the Vltava (Moldau) river navigable.[18]

The Czech population observed the gradual relaxation of the Liberal Party's opposition to the Badeni's government with distrust and dubious feelings. They had been nourished for years on radical ideas, a considerable part of which was to demand nothing less than independence of the Bohemian Kingdom in the framework of the Monarchy. By 1897 the criticism of the Liberal Party's policies increased, especially because of its inconsistent political attitudes, the limited scope of its work and the decreasing opposition to the government. The Liberal Party finally changed its opposition into full cooperation with the Badeni's government in April 1897, as a result of Badeni's linguistic decrees, which made the Czech language virtually equal with German in Bohemia and Moravia.[19] A part of the Czech voters, however, did not consider this gain as sufficient and refrained from further support of the Young Czechs.[20]

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[18] The whole issue of Badeni's decrees is discussed in greater detail in the subchapter "Badeni's language decrees of April 1897" of this chapter.

[19] Badeni's linguistic decree for Moravia was issued three weeks later to avoid the impression that he had made concessions to the Bohemian Staatsrecht. Tobolka, Politické dějiny Československého národa od r. 1848 až do dnešní doby, 3, pt. 2: 144.

The cause of the Liberal Party's decline of popularity were complex. Major factors which contributed to the Party's decline were its political radicalism expressed by the concept of the Bohemian Staatsrecht and the party's resignation in 1896 from efforts for its fulfilment in its entirety. The party's unexpected shift from opposition to cooperation with the government in April 1897 and the Liberals' inability to adjust their policies to the increasing social and economic differentiation of the Czech population also contributed to its decline. Gradually the Liberals ceased to represent the interests of the majority of the Czech nation and became the party representing the interests of the Czech middle class only. The Liberal Party's development from 1896 to 1897 directly contributed to the formation of new political parties based on specific economic and social interest groups rather than on broad national aims.

In contrast with the period of 1891-1893, the Liberal Party's main work was not centered on activity with the public. Besides its work in the Reichsrat, its efforts became aimed at the elucidation of its political attitudes and goals under changed political conditions after 1893. The Bohemian Staatsrecht and the electoral reform were the most significant political issues in which the Young Czechs became intensively involved. The elections to the Bohemian Diet in 1895 and to the Reichsrat in April 1897 temporarily intensified communication between the Party and the public. Their most intensive efforts aimed for optimum linguistic concessions from Count Badeni's government.

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[20] Jan Heidler, České politické strany v Čechách, na Moravě a ve Slezsku, (Prague: J. R. Vilímek 1914), p. 13-14.

Search For Internal Cohesion

Within a few months after the proclamation of martial law in September 1893 the leading members of the Liberal Party came to realize that the inconsistencies and discrepancies in their party's basic political stances had to be resolved. Such changes were imperative if the party was to retain its efficiency and significant influence upon the Czech population.[21] The most serious attempts to define the party's future policies were made at the meeting of the Liberal Party's deputies on July 14, 1894, and later at the meeting of the party's trustees on September 23, 1894 at Nymburg.[22]

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[21] Very critical articles related to the Liberal Party's disorders, absenteeism of its deputies in the *Reichsrat*, and the undue initiative of *Národní listy* were published in *Čas*: "Velikonoční zvony," *Čas*, 31 March and 7 July 1894. The lack of leading personalities and ideas in the Liberal Party was particularly felt by Progressives. Josef Sokol complained in a letter to his friend Alois Rašín (imprisoned as a member of Omladina) that it was completely unclear who was at the leadership of the Liberal Party's policies. Karel Hoch, *Alois Rašin* (Prague: Orbis, 1934), p. 40.

[22] The text of the resolution worked out by deputies at the July's conference was published in *Národní listy*, 15 July 1895. The text of the Nymburg's resolution is available in Václav Škarda, "Nymburská resoluce o programu strany a postupu jejím, jakož i o poměru k stranám jiným," *Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program* (Prague: Beaufort, 1897), pp. 104-10. The English translation of the resolution is available in B. M. Garver, *The Young Czech Party 1874 - 1901 and the Emergence of a Multiparty System*, pp. 195-97. *Národní listy* brought to its readers an extensive analysis of the resolution: "Po společné poradě," *Národní listy*, 17 and 18 July 1895. The resolution was again analyzed in relation to the Congress of the Liberal Party's trustees in November 1894. The number of the trustees was increased at the Congress to one thousand. "Sjezd důvěrníků Národní strany svobodomyslné 1894." *Národní listy*, 24 November 1894.

The most immediate results of the meeting of July 14 was that limits were set on the radical elements within the Party -- namely the radicals around *Národní listy*, like E. Grégr, J. Vašatý and V. Březnovský -- as well as radicals from the Progressive Movement. It was decided that differences among individual party members were not to be discussed publicly, in order to prevent any public misunderstanding and possible embarassment for the party.[23] The Moravian Popular Party, which was considered a part of the Liberal Party, was to retain its own organization and autonomy in its agitation and press. The Progressive Movement, which was officially a part of the Liberal Party, was welcomed, but on condition that it adjusted its political program to the program of the Liberal Party. Cooperation with the National Party was rejected outright since the Old Czechs disagreed with the Liberal Party's policy of opposition.

Although the struggle for the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* underlay the resolution, the most immediate concerns of the Party were electoral reform and parity of Czech and German in the judicial and political administration in Bohemia and Moravia. The struggle for cultural concessions and for improvement of the economic and social conditions of the lower classes were proclaimed to be the party's primary tasks. The resolution emphasized the need for protection of the workers against their employers and the necessity to gain full political rights for this underprivileged class. The Parliamentary cooperation with other groups for the purpose of achieving the party's aims was not regarded as a violation of its oppositional stand. Since the Liberal Party was interested in preserving as much as possible the unity of the Czech political movement, its resolution discouraged the separation of the Progressive Movement from the party. Furthermore, it criticised the foundation of a new Clerical Party. The Young Czechs disagreed with the Clericals' practice of using religious faith for political purposes. They also disliked the Clericals' aim of increasing the Catholic Church's influence upon people instead of advancing and improving education.[24]

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[23] This decision was made particularly because of embarassing speeches of Jan Vašatý (who was eventually excluded from the Party in 1896), the radical speeches of Eduard Grégr, and tensions between *Národní listy* and Josef Kaizl. Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3: 291-92. *Národní listy*, as the official paper of the Liberal Party, was also bound to the decision. But the paper was too powerful and independent to subordinate itself to the decisons of the Liberal Party's deputies. The problem of differences between *Národní listy* and the Liberal Party is discussed from the newspaper's point of view by Karel Tůma, "Padesát let boje a práce," *Půl století Národních listů 1860 - 1910*. (Prague: Národní listy, Akciová tiskárna,1911), pp. 31-33. From the point of view of the Liberal Party it is discussed by Karel Kramář in *Poznámky o české politice* (Prague: Bursík a Kohout,1906), p. 13.

In general, the Czech press welcomed the Liberal Party's effort to remove its internal discrepancies and to define more precisely its future policies.[25] The return to its program of 1889 and 1891 was especially appreciated, because it meant the abandonment of extreme political attitudes and the broadening of the scope of the party's positive political work, including its activities in the *Reichsrat*.[26] For a while it almost seemed that some kind of reconciliation might occur between the Realists and the Young Czechs, since *Čas* pointed out that the new position of the Liberal Party was identical with those views which *Čas* had promoted for a long time.

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[24] A typical interpretation of the July resolution can be found, in speeches of K. Kramář to the public: "Veřejná schůze lidu v Libštátě." *Národní listy*, 13 August 1894; "Veřejná schůze v Boskově," *Národní listy*, 6 August 1894. It can be found also in the speech of a Diet deputy, Podlipský: "Schůze ve Mšeně," *Národní listy*, 10 September 1894.

[25] "Sbor poslanců Národní strany svobodomyslné," *Čas*, 21 July 1894. "Vyjasnilo se," *Lidové noviny*, 19 July 1894; "Domácí politika," *Rozhledy* 3, (1894), pp. 597-601, pp. 638-41, pp. 683-86 . "Schůze poslanců svobodomyslných," *Naše Doba* I no. 11 (1895); "Apoge, satanus," *Moravská orlice*, 19 July 1894; "Zdravé kvašení," *Moravská orlice*, 1 August 1894. *Rozhledy* appreciated that the Liberal Party did not separate from the Progressive Movement; however, it foresaw some difficulties in their relations, since the Young Czechs did not make any adjustments of their concepts to the concepts of the Progressives, *Ibid.*, p. 598.

The decisions made by the Liberal Party's deputies in July 1894 were passed for ratification to the party's trustees at their convention at Nymburg on September 23.[27] One hundred seven of one hundred fifty six of the party's trustees and thirty five deputies met at the little town of Nymburg, fifty-six kilometres from Prague, to avoid the difficulties of martial law. Despite this precaution, a county policeman surprised the gathering, but was persuaded to leave when organizers argued that the meeting was a private matter, accessible only to people with written invitations.[28] As expected, the convention approved completely the resolutions of the deputies from July 14, 1894. Thus, the toning-down of the Liberal Party's radicalism, and the more pragmatic and gradualist approach to politics were stated to be the practical foundations of the Liberal Party.

The response of the Czech press to the convention was far less enthusiastic than it had been to the July conference.[29] The events of the months between the two meetings indicated that it would not be easy to implement all the points of the resolution in practice, particularly those relating to the party's discipline and public statements. More radical individuals like J. Vašatý, K. Tůma, E. Grégr and V. Březnovský, did not adjust their views to the party's resolution after both the July conference and the Nymburg Convention.[30] Similarly, *Národní listy* made very little effort to maintain harmony with the resolution, and the trend of alienation between Národní listy and the Liberal Party continued.[31]

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[26] The meeting of the Liberal Party's deputies was attended by fifty-one Young Czech deputies from Bohemia and three from the Moravian Popular Party. Eleven Czech deputies and most of the Moravian ones were absent from the meeting. "Po společné poradě," *Národní listy*, 17 July 1894.

[27] "Sjezd důvěrníků v Nymburce," *Národní listy*, 24 September 1894. "Výklad nymburského tajemství," "*Hlas národa*, 8 October 1894.

[28] "Sjezd důvěrníků Národní strany svobodomyslné," *Národní listy*, 25 September 1894.

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[29] "Po sjezdu důvěrníků," *Čas*, 29 September 1894; *Rozhledy* pointed out that the Convention of the Liberal Party was not sufficiently critical of *Národní listy* and its unheroic political position after the proclamation of martial law. *Rozhledy* considered harmony between the Liberal Party's views and the views of its official organ necessary for the party's future work. "Rozhledy politické a sociální," *Rozhledy* 3(Oct. 1894). *Naše doba* indirectly expressed scepticism over the Liberal Party's proclaimed return to the 1889 and 1891 programs, because the Convention did not make clear whether the return was to be to the original understanding of the program, with its emphasis on opposition as accepted at the meeting of the party's trustees in the summer of 1891. "Schůze poslanců svobodomyslných," *Naše doba*, 22 November 1894.

[30] E. Grégr, J. Vašatý and V. Březnovský even made antidynastical remarks in the *Reichsrat's* Spring session in 1895, and the Czech delegation had to proclaim its dissociation from any responsibility for these statements. Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3:289.

The Nymburg Convention unintentionally marked one more step on the road to a serious rift between the Liberal Party and the Progressives. Although it was clear that there were basic differences in their political views, the Young Czechs did not want the Progressives to separate from the party. At the same time, however, they were unwilling to discuss openly their differences in order to reach some compromise.[32] Other considerations helped to sway the Progressives toward a split from the Liberals. To avoid problems at the convention, its organizers had cancelled their earlier invitation to the Progressives, and *Národni listy* even attacked the Progressives as a revolutionary and antidynastical element, dangerous to the party. These accusations did not remain without critical comments in the press.[33] After this unfriendly gesture of the Liberal Party, the Progressives refused to subordinate themselves to the party's leadership, and their complete separation from the party followed in 1897.[34] The Liberal Party maintained a rather ambivalent attitude toward such developments. At times its prominent members felt sympathy for the Progressives, however, any open cooperation with these more radical elements of the Czech political movement could, under the existing political situation, have compromised the party.[35] Therefore, the party preferred to dissociate itself from the movement publicly. Moreover, *Národní listy* started to accuse the Realists, especially Masaryk, of having secret connections with the Progressives, supporting them financially, and cultivating their sympathy for socialism and their hatred for the Liberal Party.[36]

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[31] At the end of 1894, Rozhledy analyzed the situation in the Liberal Party and found it to be almost the same as before July. Národní listy was described as remaining untouched by both conferences. "Domácí politika," Rozhledy 3 (1894) p. 701-2. Kramář described the growing differences between the Young Czech deputies and Národní listy as gradually leading to two politics after the death of the editor of Národní listy, Julius Grégr, in 1896. One was centered in Prague, with a more radical and unrealistic approach, and the other was in Vienna, taking into the consideration the overall political conditions of the empire. Kramář also said that all party resolutions aiming at its greater unity succeeded only for a short time before more and deeper controversies appeared. Kramář, Poznámky o české politice, p. 13-14. Considering the facts outlined by Kramář and the shift of the Liberal Party from its Staatsrecht position to the "policy of gradualism" at the end of 1896, the evaluation of the Nymburg's resolution as presented by Garver in The Young Czech Party 1874 - 1901 and the Emergence of a Multiparty System, pp. 190 - 200, overestimates the significance of the resolution for the party's future policies.

[32] Václav Škarda, a prominent Young Czech of this period, considered the meeting between the Liberal Party and the Progressives in the Summer of 1894 very successful, because the Progressives proclaimed their adherence to the Liberal Party's political position. Škarda, Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program, p. 11. The agreement, however, took place only in theory, because the Liberal Party was not able to fulfil its promises given to the Progressives; demands for clearer formulation of the party's working program and its more intensive work with the public remained unfulfilled.

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[33] "Po sjezdu důvěrníku," *Čas*, 29 September 1894. It was only the next month, however, that *Národní listy* published an article quite sympathetic to Omladina. "České poměry," *Národní listy*, 14 October 1894.

[34] The essence of the separation of the Progressives from the Liberal Party is described in Škarda, *Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program*, pp. 12-14. From the Progressives' point of view, Viktor Dyk, a prominent Progressive, mentions in his memoirs that the long-term cooperation between the Liberal Party and the Progressives was quite impossible because the Young Czechs were against Dualism and the Progressives against the monarchy. Viktor Dyk, *Vzpomínky a komentáře 1893 - 1918*, (Prague: Ladislav Kunciř, 1927), p. 42. (The Progressive movement in the middle of the 1890s was analyzed by F. V. Krejčí, "K dnešnímu stavu mladého hnutí," *Rozhledy*, 6 (December 1896): 194-97, 247-51, 306-13, 350-355.)

[35] Ibid., p. 41-2. Dyk claims that this was justified because the stands of both parties were basicly different. In the middle of 1895, the relations of the Liberal Party with Progressives again became warmer, because of the need for cooperation in the coming Diet's elections in Bohemia. The Young Czechs even presented the Progressives with a gift of several thousand gulden. *Čas*, 4 May 1895, p. 275.

Čas, meanwhile, was trying to prove that the radicalism of the Liberal Party and *Národní listy* since 1891 was the real source of the Progressives' extremism, including their antidynastic feelings.[37] Masaryk, threatened in his academic career by the newspaper attacks, felt compelled to publish a statement in *Čas* on October 3, 1894, declaring that at the present time he had no political connections with the Progressive Movement.[38] Masaryk never denied his influence on individual Progressive members before they organized themselves into a movement with a definite ideology,[39] but he refused to become a scapegoat of

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[36] Two illustrations of such attacks in 1894 are an article "Český národ a realisté" originally published in *Čech* and reprinted in *Národni listy*, 25 September 1895, and a speech of Eduard Grégr to his voters: "Dr. Eduard Grégr před svým voličstvem" *Národní listy*, 8 October 1894. Rozhledy also charged that the Realists' "emphasis on criticism verging on negativism" was responsible for the Progressives' extremism. *Čas* tried to explain that the Realists' major emphasis was on positive work and not on criticism. "Jednou zase o realismu," *Čas*, 10 March 1894. Later Kramář also explained the departure of the younger generation from the Liberal Party as a result of Masaryk's influence. Kramář, *Poznámky o české politice*, p. 12. Josef Penížek (a Young Czech usually critical of Masaryk), however, maintains that main reason why the Liberal Party was not attractive to young intellectuals was that it did not do much for them. Similar opinion was expressed already in *Plzeňské listy*: "Z Prahy," *Plzeňské listy*, 2 May 1895.

[37] *Čas*, 7 April 1894, pp. 209-11. "Realisté, pokrokáři a mladočeši," *Čas*, 27 October 1894.

[38] "České poměry," *Čas*, 3 November 1894. But Masaryk had personal connections with arrested members of Omladina. He was supplying them with books to improve their education.

[39] Masaryk maintained friendly relations with the Progressives until his "opportunistic pro-Austrian" speech in Strakonice in 1892, after which the Progressives turned away from him.

Národni listy's search for the main "malfactor" responsible for the Progressives' fate and development.

The attempt of the Liberal Party to clarify its political concepts and unify its actions succeeded only partially, at the cost of losing its "left wing," the Progressives. Lack of cooperation between Národni listy and the Party's deputies remained a serious problem.[40] The Liberal Party made no attempt to balance the influence of Národni listy, which could have been accomplished, for example, by founding a new national newspaper which would express its official views.[41]

The main accomplishment of the July and September conferences was that the party's basic political orientation became more moderate and opportunistic. Opposition to the government was considered one of the possible means for achieving its major goals, of which the fulfillment of the Bohemian Staatsrecht was still the most important.[42] Gradually, however, the realization of the Bohemian Staatsrecht as the only condition for the cessation of the Young Czechs opposition to the government became less emphasized. By 1897 substantial linguistic concessions became an object of negotiation between the government and the Young Czechs, as a condition for their cooperation with the government. Finally, the so-called "Staatsrecht radicalism" was officially abandoned as a part of the party's cause in October 1896, when a so-called "policy of gradualism" was accepted as party policy.[43] By this decision the Liberal Party moved rather to the position which the National Party had held before its downfall in 1891. It still acted as if representing the interests of the whole nation, but since the formation of new political parties based on economic and social interests, the Liberal Party's basis became narrower and less representative of the whole nation.

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[40] Kaizl complained in his diary at the end of 1896 about controversies among the Young Czechs and their insufficient productivity in the Reichsrat. Kaizl, Z mého života, 3:237-38.

[41] České noviny could be considered as such an attempt; however, it was published only from May 16 to August 10, 1895, when it was suppressed by the government because of its attacks on Governor Franz Thun. František Roubík, Bibliografie českého časopisectva z let 1863 - 1895 (Prague: Česká Akademie Věd, 1936), p. 37. After 1893, several regional newspapers close to the Liberal Party were considered to be of better quality than Národni listy.

[42] The concept of opposition as a means of obtaining partial concessions from the government had been pushed by Josef Kaizl two years before it became an official policy of the Liberal Party in October 1896. Kaizl, Z mého života, 3:291.

The insignificant participation of prominent members of the Moravian Popular Party in the Liberal Party's efforts to achieve greater unity and efficiency did not signify that the parties differed on fundamental political issues. They shared very similar views on the role of opposition to the government. For example, the implementation of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* was the Popular Party's major goal, and they also favored the idea of universal suffrage.[44] Because the Popular Party in Moravia maintained its activity only from 1892, and among a much less politically oriented population than that of Bohemia, it never experienced radicalism of any sort, and its problems were of a different kind than those facing the Liberal Party in Bohemia.

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[43] When the "policy of gradualism" was definitely accepted by the Party (at the meeting of its executive committee on October 18, 1896, and at the meeting of its deputies on October 29, 1896), the party's most immediate goals were formulated in terms of the "equality of Czech with German in Bohemia and Moravia," "striving for a relaxation of the centralistic system," "greater administrative autonomy for Bohemia and Moravia," and "moderation of the German dominant position in Moravia." Clarification of these aims was mostly the work of Kaizl. Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3: 387. The "policy of gradualism" will be further discussed in the section concerning Badeni's linguistic decrees.

The major problem of the Popular Party was how to increase the political awareness and activity of the Moravian Czechs. The party was confronted with the strong political position of the Moravian Germans, which was facilitated by the strong conservative and clerical feelings of the Moravian Czechs. To counter this, in the spring of 1894, the Popular Party attempted to make some compromise with the National Party and the Catholic National Party.[45] The attempt, however, failed. After the nomination of F. S. Bauer as a Moravian bishop in 1894, the Catholic Church became far less inclined to make compromises with political parties which maintained a critical attitude to Moravian clericalism and conservatism. Although the Church was turning the Moravian Czechs away from political and national work,[46] the Popular Party had little chance of gaining some support for its anticlerical position from the National or Catholic Party in Moravia. In the middle of 1895 the Popular Party again attempted to secure some cooperation among all Moravian parties, but the result of its efforts was dissappointing.

The Popular Party's attempts for cooperation with other Czech parties in Moravia did not find much understanding in Bohemia. Often it was evaluated in the Czech press as a sign of the Popular Party's lack of initiative and inability to work effectively with the voters.[47] The party had established only twenty-one political clubs between June 1892 and April 1894.[48] The passivity of the Popular Party's deputies in the Moravian Diet became a target of open criticism in the more radical press.[49] The generally disappointing results were even more emphasized in the light of the Diet elections in October 1896, where it was apparent that the influence of the Moravian Catholic Party was on the increase.[50]

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[44] "Manifestační valný sjezd lidové strany na Moravě," *Národní listy*, 23 April 1894; "Lidová strana moravská," *Čas*, 28 April 1894.

[45] "O poměru strany lidové ke straně národní a Katolicko-národní," *Lidové noviny*, 23 May 1894.

[46] "Klerikální agitace na Moravě," *Lidové noviny*, 17 June 1894.

To summarize, it can be said that despite a number of serious attempts by the Liberal Party between 1894 - 1896 to strengthen its cohesiveness and popular support, the internal situation of the party and its efficiency did not improve to the extent which would increase its influence among Czechs. Its attempts to strengthen its influence through meaningful cooperation with the Moravian Popular Party had also only moderate results, the main reason being differences over major problems which both parties faced in their respective lands. The party's attempt to adjust its program and policies to the fact that the government's and Germans' opposition to the federal reorganization of the empire was indomitable, also failed to strengthen the party's position. The Liberal Party's shift from the *Staatsrecht* position to a "policy of gradualism" in the middle of 1896 and to cooperation with the government in April 1897 failed to bring expected results. This speeded up the split of the Czech political movement into various political parties. Although in theory the Liberal Party reserved the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* as an important part of its program, it was never able to recover its role as a unifying force of the Czech political movement.

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[47] "Sebevražda lidové strany na Moravě," Radikální listy, 10 June 1895: "Kompromise na Moravě," Čas, 15 June 1895. Certain compromises among the Moravian Popular Party, the National Party and the Catholic Party were made before the Diet's elections in 1896.

[48] "Lidová strana moravská," Čas, 28 April 1894.

[49] "Věci moravské," Radikální listy, 1 February 1895 and 11 February 1895: "Zahanbená Morava," Radikální listy, 20 February 1895; "Pasivní oposice na sněmě moravském," Radikální listy, 20 February 1895.

[50] After the Diet's elections in 1896, out of 35 Czech deputies of the Moravian Diet, 15 were members of the Popular Party, 6 members of the Catholic Party, and the rest were Conservatives. "Glosy k moravským volbám," Čas, 7 November 1896. The total number of deputies at the Moravian Diet was 98. Czechs had 35 seats, Germans 32 seats, and the nobility, which was mostly German, 31 seats. "Z Moravy," Národní listy, 29 October 1896.

Struggle For A New Press Law And Relaxation Of Censorship

Under martial law the Liberal Party's political contact with the public became increasingly difficult to maintain. Consequently, liberal deputies became involved in the struggle for relaxation of censorship and substantial press reform. Their efforts began in the spring session of the 1894 *Reichsrat* during deliberation on the proposal of a new press law, which was supposed to abolish the financial deposit for newly founded newspapers.[51] After the cancellation of this deposit was agreed upon, deputies argued for the abolition of the tax stamp[52] since 25 to 30 percent of expected gross profits went to the government.[53] The resulting high price of newspapers discouraged people with low incomes from regularly buying a newspaper. It was also difficult to found a new newspaper, because daily circulation had to be relatively high if a newspaper were to survive financially.[54] The newspaper stamp was attacked as particularly unfair because so-called governmental newspapers were not obliged to pay it, even though the related law was applicable to all newspapers.[55] In the Reichsrat Gustav Eim labelled the one and half million gulden collected from the press stamp as a political lever in the hands of the government, with which it was limiting the political independence of the press.[56] In another speech Eim attacked the principle of a press stamp because of its immoral connotation, charging that the major aim of it was to prevent the broad strata of the population from receiving political education and information. Eim concluded that in the case of the Czech nation the press stamp became a component of a broader attempt to keep down any spiritual or political development of the whole Czech nation.[57] Although his bitter conclusion exaggerated the government's intentions, his complaint about the government's disinterest in the political education of the population as a necessary condition for modernization of society and the political system, was more than justified.

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[51] "Za uvolněí tisku" (speech of Gustav Eim in the *Reichsrat* on May 28, 1894), *Národní listy*, 29 May 1894. This famous and courageous speech of Eim is also in Josef Penížek, *Politické úvahy Gustava Eima* (Prague: J. Otto,1898), pp. 440-62.

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[52] The newspaper stamp, a kind of sale tax collected ahead of sale, was introduced in Austria in 1789 for the purpose of preventing the spread of ideas of the French Revolution. In Europe, at the end of the nineteenth century, Austria shared this peculiar tax only with Turkey. In Hungary it was abolished in 1869, in Germany in 1874. "O Kolku novinovém," Čas, 12 December 1896.

[53] "Za uvolnění tisku," Národní listy, 29 May 1894.

[54] A daily newspaper had to sell at least twenty thousand copies per day to be able to maintain itself financially. "O kolku novinovém." Čas, 12 December 1896. Most of the larger newspapers were published in several, often different, editions each day.

[55] Governmental newspapers did not even have to pay postage. "Za uvolnění tisku," Národní listy, 29 May 1894.

[56] Ibid.

The struggle for the abolition of the press stamp continued for several years. It was revived with vigour at the end of 1896 when a German deputy, Viktor Russ, introduced a motion asking for its abolition. Although the Czech representatives supported his proposal, it was passed to two parliamentary commitees,[58] and thus a change of the related law was again postponed.[59]

The calls of the Young Czechs for a relaxation of censorship did not garner sufficient support in the *Reichsrat*, but they hoped to receive at least some smaller changes in a new press law. They were especially concerned with fines which could be imposed by courts on publishing houses. The grounds for the assessment of these fines were insufficiently defined. According to the new law, the fines were due, not in three days as previously but in eight days, and in the case of non-payment the publication of a newspaper was to be stopped. In order to avert sanctions against paper for some petty reasons, the Young Czechs asked for a precise definition of the conditions under which a paper could be confiscated or fined.[60]

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[57] "Řeč poslance Gust. Eim o konfiskacích českého časopisectva," *Národni listy*, 30 May 1894.

[58] "O kolku novinovém," *Čas*, 12 December 1896.

[59] The newspaper stamp was finally abolished in 1899. Roubík, *Bibliografie českého časopisectva z let 1863 - 1895*, p. XIII.

Another amendment to the press laws attempted by the Young Czechs was a bid to abolish the common practice of suppression of those issues of *Národní listy* which published speeches delivered in the *Reichsrat* in Czech. They argued that such practice was against valid laws, since the parliamentary immunity applied not only to certain speeches but to everything said in the *Reichsrat*.[61] Despite their active opposition, however, the Young Czechs' effort to influence the content of a new press law was generally unsuccessful. The only change which they achieved was permission for *Národní listy* to be sold again individually, rather than only on subscription.[62]

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[60] Speech of Bedřich Pacák in the *Reichsrat*. *Národní listy*, 29 May 1894. In 1894 *Národní listy* was suppressed mainly because of remarks about the Bohemian *Staatsrecht*, and because of the expressed determination of Czechs to struggle for its implementation.

[61] "Imunita českých řečí proslovených ve veřejném sezení poslanecké sněmovny rady říšské," *Národní listy*, 11 June 1894. Josef Sládeček, "Imunita řečí poslaneckých a parlamentárního zpravodajství," *Národní listy*, 22 August 1894. A decision of Minister of Justice Count Schoenborn in May 1894 to abolish the immunity of non-German speeches in the *Reichsrat* did not meet with a general agreement on the part of Germans. A German deputy Lienbacher while in favour of German as the official language of Austria, opposed the fact that non-German speeches were not recorded and thus could become subject to suppression when published.

[62] The sale of *Národní listy* was limited to subscribers only since March 8, 1890. Sale on individual basis was permitted again from July 9, 1894, when a new press law was issued. *Národní listy*, 31 October 1894. Circulation of *Národní listy* as well as other newspapers was in reality much higher than the sold number would indicate, because every restaurant or cafe, however small, carried issues of several newspapers, which were read by dozens of guests over their glass of beer or cup of coffee.

After the resignation of the Prince Windischgratz government in June, 1895 the most restrictive policies against the Czech nation were relaxed. Only three weeks after the nomination of Count Badeni as the Minister-President the state of emergency was lifted in Prague and surroundings. The government allowed seven newspapers which were suppressed after the proclamation of martial law in September, 1893 to resume publication.[63] Suppression of the more radical press, usually concerned with social problems, still continued, but in a moderate way. The lack of consistency in the application of the Government's press law soon caused twelve editors of the most persecuted Czech newspapers to send a memorandum to the Ministry of Justice. They asked that laws limiting the freedom of press[64] should be applied in a way that would not jeopardize article 13 of law number 142 which recognized the freedom of speech and press. They also asked the Ministry to investigate arbitrary actions of the Prague Police, particularly its frequent and unjustifiable suppression of certain newspapers during 1896.[65]

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[63] This applied to *Neodvislost*, *Pokrokové listy*, *Nové Proudy*, *Časopis českého studentstva*, *Časopis českoslovanského studentstva*, *České noviny*, and *Vyšehrad*. Three-hour precensorship was abolished. "Přehled politický a sociální," *Čas*, 26 October 1895.

[64] It was not specified which such laws they had in mind. The usual way of limiting freedom of the press as formulated in article 13 of fundamental law no. 142 was the use of the Schmerling law on publications of December 17, 1862. Imperial law no. 60, of May 1869, allowed the government, in case of war, domestic unrest, or actions deemed treasonable or inimical to public safety, to declare a state of emergency and suspend in whole or in part article 13. The legislation, which would specify and enforce article 13, was never issued.

After 1895 a considerable part of the Czech press became gradually concerned with social problems. The government, trying to limit activity of these papers, became less apprehensive of *Národní listy*. Moreover, *Národní listy*, never renewed its radicalism of the early nineties. Its moderation, in conjunction with the loyalty to the principle of the Monarchy and the idea of the preservation of the empire, made *Národní listy* more acceptable to a number of new, more radical newspapers. This does not mean that the Czech Liberals abandoned their tradition of struggle for greater freedom of expression, and relaxation of restrictions on circulation of newspapers. But the results of their efforts to reduce the governmental control over the press were only moderate: the most significant being the abolition of the financial deposit for newly founded newspapers in 1894 and the stamp tax in 1899, achieved in cooperation with some other parliamentary groups. Although not very successful if judged by the results of their struggle, the Liberals' permanent concern in the *Reichsrat* with civil freedoms helped the Czech public to maintain an awareness of the importance of concepts whose implementation made political system modern and progressive.

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[65] In particular, they wanted to know whether suppression of certain newspapers was initiated by the Prague Police or whether the Police received instructions from above. At the end of the memorandum they pointed out that eight newspapers (*Radikální listy*, *Lid*, *Vyšehrad*, *Pokrokové listy*, *Volný duch*, *Ruch*, *Právo*, and *Sociální demokrat*) had been subject to fifty-six suppressions in the last ten months. "Pro svobodu tisku," *Radikální listy*, 12 December 1896.

The Bohemian Staatsrecht

Since one of the major reasons for the Liberal Party's electoral victory in 1891 was its proclaimed determination to stand firmly behind the principles of the Bohemian Staatsrecht, this issue occupied the Young Czechs for several years. But while the party always cautiously guarded its principle of the indivisibility of the Lands of the Czech Crown, it was aware that its feudal basis did not provide a sufficiently broad platform for solving current political and social needs, because its assumed the decisive role for aristocrats in politics. At the same time the Young Czechs were also unable to gain sufficient support for the Bohemian Staatsrecht on the part of Germans and the Viennese government. Consequently, in the second half of the 1890s the Liberal Party almost abandoned its endeavour for the fulfilment of the Staatsrecht in its entirety.[66]

The Bohemian Staatsrecht nad not beenin the forefront of the Young

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[66] The Liberal Party began to appreciate the Bohemian Staatsrecht as early as 1883, when the Bohemian Germans lost their majority in the Bohemian Diet and incorporated the demand for the division of Bohemia on national lines as a permanent part of their program. Zdeněk Tobolka, ed., Česká politika, 5 vols. (Prague: Jan Leichter 1906-13), 3:466. Kamil Krofta, Byli jsme za Rokouska (Prague: Orbis,1936), p. 379. Krofta claims that this demand was most clearly formulated in 1889, but in 1915 German politicians and historians of the Monarchy (H. Friedjung, E. Philippovich, H. Uerbersberger, and M. Heinisch, the future president of the Austrian Republic) formulated demands going even further than those of 1889. This program was accepted by the Germans in the Reichsrat. The essence of the program was that Bohemia was to be divided into German and mixed districts (no Czech districts at all) and German was to be the only language of political administration in the Bohemian Kingdom. Some steps toward implementing these principles were taken in 1918. Ibid., p. 382-83.

Czechs endeavour until a practical need to defend it arose in 1890.[67] The occasion was its apparent violation in the unprecise formulation of the settlement between the National Party and Germans in 1890. Besides their parliamentary involvement since 1890 in the struggle for the inviolability of the *Staatsrecht*, the Young Czechs also made serious efforts to clarify its concept and to remove all doubts related to its existence. A detailed historical study on the topic, by Josef Kalousek, was revised and republished in 1892.[68] *Národní listy* published principles of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* in October 1892,[69] and Karel Kramář delivered an extensive speech on this subject in the *Reichsrat* on November 22, 1892.[70] A new broad study written by a lawyer, Jaromír Čelakovský, followed in a few months.[71]

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[67] In practice, the Liberal Party was often irritated by attacks on the existence of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* by the state authorities. For instance, the Police Directorate in Brno (the capital of Moravia) prohibited a public meeting which was to celebrate the emperor's rescript of September 12, 1871, in which he promised to be crowned as Czech King. They justified their action by claiming that the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* was irrelevant to Moravia, thus ignoring a law promulgated by Emperor Charles IV on April 7, 1348, and other laws of later dates, including the Pragmatic Sanction. "Morava nepřináleží ke korunní zemi české," *Lidové noviny*, 12 December 1895.

[68] Josef Kalousek, *České státní právo*, 2nd ed. (Prague: Bursik a Kohout,1892).

[69] "Podivní přátelé státního práva českého," *Národní listy*, 2 October 1892. *Hlas národa* responded to the principles of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* formulated in *Národní listy* by an article "Je třeba shody v otázce státoprávní?" 4 October 1892. The author claimed that *Národní listy* took over findings of Karel Mattuš, which he published in his brochure *Historické právo a národnost co základové státního zřízení říše habsburské*, (Prague, 1867).

[70] "O státním právu českém," (speech of Karel Kramář), *Čas*, 3 December 1892. Kramář tried to explain the substance of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* to the German representatives in the *Reichsrat*. His speech was probably a response to the German deputy Menger, who in November 1892 proclaimed in the *Reichsrat* that to talk about the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* was treason. Peníżek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách v letech 1878-1918*, 2:162.

The common conclusion of these studies was that, despite all the violations and neglect on the part of the Austrian governments and the Monarchy in the previous two hundred years, the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* had actually never been legally abolished, and thus its existence was beyond doubt.[72] The essence of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* was summarized in three basic points, all relevant to the aims of the Czech political struggle of the 1890s: 1) The Lands of the Czech Crown were indivisible. 2) Their relation to the Monarchy was of a contractual nature. 3) They had the right to legislative and administrative independence.[73]

The Young Czechs made considerable efforts to acquaint the public with the major principles of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* and its history. Their speeches in the *Reichsrat* and the articles in newspapers played the most significant role in this respect. The legal nature of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* was convenient in the Austrian political context because its legal principle was more acceptable to the ruling strata than the principle of the "natural right" of nations for their independence. The Young Czechs, however, gradually changed their efforts for fulfilment of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* in its entirety to the implementation of partial concessions, namely on the language question. Before the end of 1895, their demands were still related to the status of the whole Kingdom: substantial increase in the powers of the provincial diets, the establishment of a Supreme Court for Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia, and finally a new electoral law.[74] By 1897, however, the Czech demands were focused solely on the language question. Because of this emphasis on gradual concessions, the concept of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* as promoted by the Liberals after 1896, became less clear.[75] The so called "policy of gradualism" did not arouse much enthusiasm among the Czech public and when it was combined with the termination of the opposition to the government, it prompted much criticism.[76]

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[71] Jaromír Čelakovský, "Právní dějiny království českého," *Ottův slovník naučný*, 28 vols. (Prague: J. Otto,1888 -1909), vol. 6, bk. 17 and 18.

[72] The usual argument of Germans in the 1890s against the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* was that even if it did exist, since Czechs had been unable to force its implementation for almost two hundred years, there was no reason for its present recognition. These opinion were, for instance, expressed by a professor of the German University in Prague, Emil Pfersche. *Die Zeit*, 29 February 1896. His opinions were summarized in Czech in an article "České státní právo," *Čas*, 21 March 1896.

[73] "O státním právu českém" (speech of K. Kramář), *Čas*, 3 December 1892.

Before the Liberal Party moved to what it considered to be a more realistic policy, the discussions on the topic of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* were focused on clarifying the terminology, content and practicability of the whole concept. *Hlas národa* criticized the Young Czechs for not making a sufficient distinction between the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* and the principle of autonomy, as it was expressed in the *Reichsrat* speeches of B. Pacák on December 11, and Josef Kaizl on December 13, 1895.[77]

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[74] "K otázce zřizení nejvyšsího soudu pro Čechy, Moravu a Slezsko," *Národní listy*, 5 February 1894.

[75] Jan Kapras, *Přehled vývoje jazykové otázky* (Prague: Český čtenář, 1910), p. 18.

[76] In 1898 the Liberal Party even felt it was necessary to defend its "gradualist policy" as being consistent with all the party's programs. Václav Škarda took pains to "prove" that the Liberal Party's political attitudes had not changed since 1874. Václav Škarda, "Politika etapová a základní názor strany svobodomyslné," *Česká revue* 2, no. 1 (1898). This attempt, however, rather underestimates the party's *Staatsrecht* position until 1896, the radical attitudes of the party and their impact between 1891 and 1893, and even the course which the party proclaimed in July and September 1894.

More serious attacks on the Liberal Party's understanding of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* appeared in the pages of *Čas*.[78] An unidentified author of an article on the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* labelled any identification of the *Staatsrecht* with federalism a mistake. The former represented a *de jure* recognition and the latter a *de facto* existence. In other words, *de jure* recognition could not by itself guarantee *de facto* existence. At the same time *de facto* existence of a nation made independence a "natural right" once a certain level of cultural and economic development was achieved. The author considered the attitude of the Austrian Germans to the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* to be the major problem facing it. Although they did not deny the existence of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* in principle, they were reluctant to recognize it as a legal means for greater independence of the Bohemian Kingdom, simply because they strongly opposed any scheme aimed at decentralization of the Monarchy. The author advised the Liberal Party to include in its program plans for achieving greater independence for the Bohemian Kingdom based on both national and territorial principles, in order to be prepared for either possibility in the future.

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[77] "O českém státním právu," *Hlas národa*, 23 December 1895. Both deputies in their speeches focused more on the issue of equality of Czech with German in the Czech regions than on other issues related to the Bohemian *Staatsrecht*. Kramář in *České státní právo* (Prague: E. Beaufort, 1896), p. 9, occupied himself with terminology, and explained that the term "federalism" was closer to the principles of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* than the term "autonomy." Since these terms continued to be interchanged in the Czech political writings, František Vavřínek devoted a considerable part of the last chapter of his work on state laws of lands represented in the *Reichsrat* to this problem. Vavřínek recommended against the use of the term "autonomy" because of its narrower meaning. F. Vavřínek, *O státní povaze království a zemí na říšské radě zastoupených* (Prague: Bursík a Kohout, 1905), pp. 405-ff.

[78] *Čas*, 21 December 1895, p. 803-4.

To facilitate German understanding of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht*, Karel Kramář, a lawyer and one of the most prominent . this time, undertook assiduous research in the Viennese archives, and published the results of his work in German at the end of 1895 under the title of *Das böhmische Staatsrecht*, and in Czech (*České státní právo*) several months later. His historical findings did not differ much from previous works, but his interpretation better suited the current political struggles of the Czechs. The major theme of his interpretation was that Maria Theresia's motives for beginning the centralization of Austria had been ill-conceived. To strengthen the empire militarily, she had begun to imitate the centralistic system of the Prussian King Frederick II, overlooking the multinational nature of her empire.[79] Later centralization continued at the expense of existing compacts and constitutional provisions between the Monarch and the Bohemian Kingdom.[80] Kramář held this centralism responsible for grave shortcomings in schooling and the neglected economies of Bohemia and Moravia at the present time.[81] When analyzing more recent political developments, he considered the German preoccupation with the preservation of their privileged political position to be the major obstacle to constructive internal development of the Monarchy. He warned the Germans that if an extensive electoral reform took place, the centralistic system might turn to their disadvantage.[82] Only equality of rights for both nationalities, achieved through mutual understanding, together with social justice and freedom of expression could lead to the restoration of a more healthy foundation for the Monarchy.[83] From the economic point of view, Kramář saw the implementation of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* as beneficial to both nationalities in the Bohemian Kingdom. He asked Germans to formulate clearly which guarantees they would consider sufficient to assure their equal position in the Kingdom.[84]

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[79] Kramář, *České státní právo*, p. 32-33.

[80] Ibid., p. 82-83.

[81] Ibid., p. 90

[82] Ibid., pp. 95-97.

Kramář's attempt to clarify the essence of the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* and its relevance to the present situation did not remain without response. Julius Lippert, a leading personality among the Bohemian Germans, published his opinions about the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* in March 1896 in *Neue Freie Presse*.[85] Although Lippert did not deny the need for the decentralization of Austria, he proclaimed the Bohemian *Staatsrecht* both as an historical entity as well as a means for achieving economic or other advantages for the Czech nation unacceptable to Germans. He proposed that the formation of a "closed German territory" in Bohemia was the only principle for decentralization acceptable to Germans. This view was shared by another prominent German politician, Emil Pfersche,[86] who also admitted that centralism was not a healthy basis on which to maintain the existence of the Monarchy. Although the Czech press rejected the concept of a "closed German territory," this open expression of opinions favouring decentralization was appreciated, particularly when the proclamation of the German Left[87] that Lippert was only expressing his personal views, was taken into consideration.[88] Most of the monarchy's German politicians continued to think in terms of preserving political privileges for the Germans, pointing out their "cultural superiority" in comparison to other monarchy's nationalities, and their credit for the level of the empire's civilization as justification for the Germans' dominant position in Cisleithania. Their increasing inability to see the grave problems of the monarchy from a different perspective than their own privileged national existence[89] blocked all possibilities for successful solution of these problems, and eventually proved to be one of the most decisive factors in relation to the decline and the fall of the empire.

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[83] Ibid., p. 100.

[84] His ideas were presented in detail in two Czech articles: "Němci o českém státnim právu," *Plzeňské listy*, 17 March 1896, and "Dr. Kramář o dr. Lippertovi," *Plzeňské listy*, 21 March 1896.

[85] Ibid.

[86] *Die Zeit*, 29 February 1896.

T. G. Masaryk also became involved in the discussion by offering an alternative solution for achieving cooperation between Czechs and Germans in Bohemia and Moravia.[90] Since the government was responsible for establishing the centralistic system, with its unfortunate consequences, he suggested that the government should take the first steps to introducing autonomy for both nationalities. He foresaw, however, that political cooperation between Czechs and Germans was possible only under limited circumstances. He believed that the two groups could work in conjunction on issues of freedom or social justice for all strata of the population and they should concentrate less on objectives related only to national aims. Masaryk formulated six "implementable" demands which were prerequisites for such cooperation: 1) Foundation of a second Czech university. 2) Separation of the administration of Czech cultural affairs from the Viennese government. 3) Czech as the language of judicial and political administration in Czech regions. 4) Establishment of the Czech Supreme Court. 5) Czech majority in the Moravian Diet elected on the basis of a just electoral law. 6) Coronation of Franz Joseph as the Czech King.

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[87] The lack of any movement among Germans for decentralization was explained in Czech newspapers mainly as a result of the influence of the German political leaders. One illustration of such an explanation was the occasion of the Congress of German Farmers in December 1895 in Bohemia. Among four thousand participants, not one voice was raised against centralism despite the economic advantages of decentralization to German farmers. "K otázce národního smíru v Čechách," Národní listy, 17 October 1895.

[88] "České státní právo," Čas, 21 March 1896. Čas also mentioned a comment of the Neue Freie Presse, which welcomed the courage of both men as speaking for thousands of Germans who did not favour centralism anymore.

[89] Most recently, Whiteside elaborates in considerable detail on problems related to the position of Germans in the monarchy in The Socialism of Fools, pp. 1-41.

[90] Čas, 2 May and 9 May 1896.

During this period Masaryk regained his former belief, expressed most clearly in his Strakonice speech in 1892, that the Germans would soon join forces to work for the introduction of federalism in Austria as a means to ensure the preservation of the empire. When expressing such views he referred mainly to the younger German generation, whom he saw departing from both centralism and liberalism.[91] Masaryk accepted the principle of indivisibility of the Bohemian Kingdom, but he did not consider the framework of the Bohemian Staatsrecht broad enough from the social standpoint. Its stated aims were not accepted as sufficient, particularly by the workers. He urged the Liberal Party to take this fact into consideration, and to broaden the objectives of its political struggle.[92]

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[91] Ibid., p. 290

The period of 1891 to 1896 was the last one when the Liberal Party was involved intensively in the straightforward struggle for the fulfilment of the Bohemian Staatsrecht in its entirety. By 1896 it became obvious that striving for the introduction of federalism was a far less realistic course than the "policy of gradualism." Soon, however, even this course proved to have very little success. When Badeni's language decrees were revoked due to violent German opposition, the feeling began to prevail among the Czech Liberals that the legal basis of the Bohemian Staatsrecht did not constitute a sufficient basis for their struggle for equal status and rights with Germans in the lands of the Czech Crown.[93] The government and the Germans were too inclined to use all their power to prevent political reforms leading to the relaxation of the centralistic system or to the diminution of the political and national privileges of the Monarchy's Germans. Under such circumstances broader political concepts, including those of the Bohemian Staatsrecht, lost much of their significance for practical purposes. After 1897 no genuine attempts on the part of the ruling strata were made to solve the Monarchy's internal problems. Stagnation and growing tensions became the most salient features of the Austrian political scene.

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[92] České státní právo," Čas, 3 April 1897.

[93] Abolition of Badeni's decrees was described by Penížek in 1906 as causing a complete destruction of trust among Czechs in the Monarchy. Josef Penížek, Aus bewegten Zeiten 1895 - 1905 (Vienna: Karl Konegen,1906), p. 367.

The Issue Of Electoral Reform

After resignation of the Minister President, Count Edward Taaffe, in September 1893, caused by the defeat of his proposal for universal suffrage, the issue of electoral reform moved to the forefront of the government's attention. Windischgraetz's proposition for electoral reform at the beginning of 1894, which suggested the formation of a fifth curia of 43 seats, and preserved the existing educational and tax qualifications for voters, met with general disapproval.[94] The Czech Liberal Party vehemently opposed the system of distribution of the *Reichsrat's* seats among curiae and the preservation of the principle of representation according to interests.[95]

The Liberal Party insisted on universal manhood, direct and equal suffrage, as evident from its proposal in the *Reichsrat's* spring session of 1894. The Young Czechs' initiative resulted in discussions about the relative merits or disadvantages of different kinds of suffrage. The National Party, traditionally suspecting the universal and equal suffrage as a means for greater consolidation of the centralistic system,[96] believed that increased powers of provincial diets would considerably improve the political situation.[97] Although the Old Czechs supported the idea of direct elections for diets, they opposed the same principle for the Reichsrat, and they disliked the idea of equal suffrage. The Old Czechs also argued that proportional representation, if truly reflecting the national and social structure of the Bohemian Kingdom, would better guarantee responsive and responsible policy-making.[98] To a great extent the National Party shared the views of the Bohemian nobility on electoral reform. Count Karel Schwarzenberg, the leader of the Bohemian federalist nobles, summarized their view in his speech on December 11, 1895 in the Reichsrat. He rejected the principle of universal manhood and equal suffrage, and demanded preservation of representation of interests and hitherto existing distribution of parliamentary seats among curiae. But he was in favour of making the fifth curia for those who were so far excluded from the possibility to vote. He suggested that tax criteria should include both direct as well as indirect taxes. Schwarzenberg also suggested the introduction of indirect voting for cities to prevent increasing influence of the lower classes on the election results.[99]

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[94] Educational qualifications for voting were rather complicated, and the tax qualifications remained the same as established in the reform of 1882: Those paying five gulden of direct taxes (without war tax) and had continuous residence for six months at the same electoral district were to have qualification to vote. The text of the Windischgratz proposal is in Srb, *Politické dějiny*, 2: 900-901.

[95] "Zásada zastoupení zájmů má zůstati netknuta," *Národní listy*, 27 February 1894; "Zásada vládní volební reformy," *Národní listy*, 9 March 1894.

[96] Volební oprava a přímé volby do říšské rady," *Hlas národa*, 14 April 1894.

The idea of proportional representation was also supported by the Realists. T. G. Masaryk expressed his views in Naše doba, arguing that the principle of true proportional representation of interests was actually more important for Czechs than the principle of universal suffrage.[100] He concluded that the right of everyone to be represented was as important as the right to vote, since universal suffrage did not automatically guarantee true representation of interests for all national and social groups.[101]

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[97] "Volební oprava," Hlas národa, 5 June 1895.

[98] "Otázka volební opravy na sněmě českém a moravském," Hlas národa, 12 January 1895: "O volební reformě" (speech of F. L. Rieger in the Bohemian Diet on February 1, 1895), Hlas národa, 2 February 1895.

[99] "Karel Schwarzenberg o volební reformě," Hlas národa, 12 December 1894.

The number of opponents of universal and equal suffrage increased in the middle of the 1890s. Well-to-do Czech farmers had always had a half-hearted attitude to the idea of universal and equal suffrage, and this was given focus when a new Agrarian Party was founded at the end of 1895. The new party openly rejected the principle of equality of votes.[102]

Windischgraetz's failure to carry out several needed reforms, including that of the electoral law, and his unwillingness to support the opposition of the German Liberals to the formation of a Slovene "gymnasium" in Celje in Styria lead to his resignation at the beginning of June 1895, after his loss of the support of the Reichsrat's majority.

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[100] This opinion proved rather true in 1907, when universal suffrage was introduced in Austria, and the Germans still preserved their dominant political position.

[101] T. G. Masaryk, "O poměrném zastoupení," Naše doba I, no. 1 (1894), pp. 17-21.

[102] "Alfons Šťastný z Padařova, zakladatel strany agrární," Národní listy, 2 November 1895. The foundation of the Agrarian Party was a great blow to the Liberal Party. It is possible that fears of losing farmers' support were one of several major reasons that stopped the Liberal Party from putting a demand for universal, equal and direct suffrage into its 1897 electoral proclamation. In 1895 Národní listy still attempted to persuade farmers that universal suffrage would not enable workers to outvote them, because numerically farmers were much stronger (in Austria there were 14 million framers and 2 million workers). Ibid. The farmers' opposition to universal equal suffrage was even greater in Moravia than in Bohemia. "Rok 1894" (G. Eim from Vienna), Národní listy, 30 December 1894.

The Young Czechs considered Badeni's proposal far from sufficient[103] and they pressed hard for changes more favourable to the lower classes. They joined Slovenes, Croats, the German Radicals and the German Popular Party (Volkspartei) in presenting a proposal for universal suffrage, even though they were aware that it had very little chance of getting the necessary support in the Reichsrat. When defeated by 173 to 62 votes[104] their determination to vote for nothing less than universal and equal suffrage was fundamentally shaken. They decided to support Badeni's proposal in the third reading, and it was accepted by 234 votes against 19.

It was not easy, however, for some members of the Liberal Party, Josef Kaizl being one of the most prominent, to persude their colleagues to vote for Badeni's reform. Kaizl personally intervened in Národní listy, asking its editors to write more favourably about Badeni's proposal.[105] Yet, despite all the effort, only twenty-one Czech deputies voted for the reform.[106] Kaizl's arguments in favour of voting for Badeni's reform remained the party's justification for its participation in the Reichsrat's majority: To vote against the proposal would mean to deny the voting right to 3.6 million Austrian citizens: Czechs were to receive sixteen more deputies in the Reichsrat; and it appeared very probable that as a result of the reform, the government's influence in the Reichsrat would decrease. Furthermore, the Young Czechs expected that the German centralists would be weakened.[107]

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[103] Josef Penížek, a Young Czech activist of this period, described Badeni's electoral reform as a monstrosity giving to 3.5 million voters 72 seats, and preserving 85 seats for 5,000 Austrian landowners. Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878 - 1918, 2:331. Národní listy analyzed shortcomings of the reform in an article: "Ve znamení volební reformy," Národní listy, 18 February 1896.

[104] W. A. Jenks, The Austrian Electoral Reform of 1907 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1950), p. 24.

[105] Kaizl, Z mého života, 3:502.

[106] Ibid., p. 393-94. Fifteen Czech deputies voted against the proposal, and the rest did not show up for the voting.

In public the Young Czechs interpreted the reform in positive and optimistic terms, emphasizing the government's recognition of the principle of universal suffrage as a major step. Also, the increase in number of the Reichsrat's deputies would soon be of assistance in making a new, truly democratic reform.[108] Some public speeches by the Young Czechs indicated that the underlying motivation for their support of Badeni's highly questionable electoral reform was on the grounds of anticipated future cooperation between the Czech delegation and Badeni.[109]

The Liberal Party's support for Badeni's electoral reform was not welcomed by the Czech population, the majority of which was in favour of universal, equal and direct suffrage.[110] In an attempt to prevent the

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[107] "Ve znamení volební reformy," Národní listy, 18 February 1896: "Poslanec Gustav Eim před voliči v Chotěboři," Národní listy - Příloha, 21 April 1896; "Poslanec dr. Kramář v Nové Pace," Národní listy, 26 May 1896; "Posl. dr. Engel na veřejné schůzi v Nymburce," Národní listy, 21 April 1896. The hope of the Young Czechs that the centralistic sources of the Reichsrat would be weakened by the reform proved false in the long term, because new German deputies were on the whole neither in favour of decentralization nor sympathetic to Czech national claims.

[108] "Posl. dr. Engel na veřejné schůzi v Nymburce," Národní listy, 21 April 1896.

[109] "Poslanec dr. Kramář v Nové Pace," Národní listy - Příloha, 26 May 1896.

[110] Čas wrote that the Liberal Party's gradual shift from a strictly democratic position caused considerable political demoralization of the Czech population. Čas, 18 April 1896.

Young Czechs from voting for the reform and to encourage their decisive opposition to the government, Czech voters sent numerous petitions to the Liberal Party's Club of deputies in the Reichsrat.[111] Meanwhile, the Young Czechs particularly tried to persuade voters that support for Badeni's proposal should neither be interpreted as a vote of confidence in the government nor as the weakening of their opposition to the government.[112]

Although the public disapproval of the Liberal Party's parliamentary policy did not mean that the Party immediately lost the support of the Czech electorate, the support of slightly more than a half of the Party's deputies for Badeni's electoral reform was probably the first visible step on the road to the alienation of the Liberal Party from Czech public opinion. Czechs observed with distrust, from the middle of 1896, the efforts of some of the most prominent and influential Young Czechs to find convenient circumstances under which the Party could begin its parliamentary cooperation with Badeni. The Czech public appreciated Badeni's sympathy for a federal idea, but it had no confidence that he would seriously attempt to overcome the German opposition to implementation of some federal scheme. Neither the Young Czechs, nor Badeni, nor the Czech public, however, expected this opposition would eventually be extended to partial linguistic concessions.

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[111] The Young Czechs frequently responded to these petitions at public political meetings in attempts to show that they were not justified. "Poslanec Gustav Eim před svými voliči v Chotěboři," Národní listy- Příloha, 21 April 1896; "Poslanec dr. Engel na veřejné schůzi v Nymburce," Národní listy, 21 April 1896.

[112] "Poslanec dr. Kramář v Nové Pace," Národní listy - Příloha, 26 May 1896.

Elections to the Bohemian Diet in 1895, and elections to the Reichsrat in 1897.

Although elections for the land diets were not generally considered to be very important,[113] the elections for the Bohemian Diet at the end of November 1895 nevertheless gave the Young Czechs an opportunity to manifest their dominant position in Czech politics. The electoral campaign started at the beginning of November, two weeks after suspension of martial law, and it visibly lacked the vigour of previous campaigns. The Young Czechs were offering fewer promises, but more criticism of the government. The Bohemian Staatsrecht was not at the centre of the campaign any more, but its implementation remained one of the primary goals of the Young Czechs with an emphasis on the necessity of gaining more powers for the Bohemian Diet. Other major aims were formulated in terms of economic and social improvements, especially for the lower classes. As immediate objectives an increase in the number of Czech schools and substantial changes in the electoral law had priority.[114] Národni listy regularly reported excerpts from public speeches of the Young Czech candidates; however, in comparison with the past, the reports were brief, and published responses of the public to candidates' speeches less numerous.

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[113] Some politicians occupied themselves with the decreasing power of the Diet. Its rather insignificant political role was viewed as the main reason, however, voters' indifference as to what kind of people they elected to these bodies was not a negligible factor in this trend. "O významu zemských voleb," (speech of Karel Jonáš), Plzeňské listy, 24 September 1894.

[114] "Národe český," Národní listy - Příloha, 10 November 1895. Also in Škarda, Národní strana svobodomyslná a její program, pp. 111-24.

The results of the November elections were close to expectations.[115] The Young Czechs received 90 seats (compared with 53 seats in 1889), whereas only 3 seats went to the National Party, which after 1889 had held 31 seats.

The results of the 1895 elections
for the Bohemian Diet[116]

Party	Number of seats
Liberal Party	90
National Party	3
Agrarian Party	2
Progressives	1
German Liberals	54
German Nationalists	11
Clericals	3
Conservatives (Nobility)	70
Independents	3

Národní listy wrote with pride that the Liberal Party received 6,257 direct votes (which was just over one half of the total number of direct votes), up from 4,111 in 1889. The newspaper maintained that the support for the Liberal Party might even be considered relatively higher, since the voters' participation in the elections was lower than in 1889. Other newspapers, however, were more critical of the electoral results, taking the low participation in the elections as a sign of declining support for the Liberal Party,[117] particularly in urban areas. The participation of 31 per cent of rural voters in the indirect elections and

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[115] "Výsledek voleb," Národní listy, 21 November and 23 November 1895; "Doplňky k volbám," Národní listy, 24 November 1895; "Sněm království českého," Národní listy, 27 November 1895.

[116] "Denní zprávy," Národní listy, 27 November 1895; "Nový sněm království českého," Hlas národa, 27 November 1895.

[117] "Výsledek voleb sněmovních za města," Hlas národa, 23 November 1895.

48 per cent of rural voters in direct elections[118] indicated neither a population much concerned with politics nor a great loyalty to the Liberal Party. Although a low voter turnout in the 1895 elections for the Diet could partly be a reflection of voters' disappointment with the Liberal Party's policies during the previous five years, it could equally be attributed to their low opinion of the Diet's political position in Bohemia.[119]

All Czech political parties were greatly concerned with the restricted sphere of jurisdiction of the Bohemian Diet, since this was the only Diet where Czechs enjoyed the majority of seats. It was realized that its theoretical powers were much greater than those exercised in reality and the question of how to increase the Diet's role in Bohemian affairs became an important issue of discussion in the middle of the 1890s.[120] The main difficulty of the Diet's situation was that it was elected on the basis of a prejudiced electoral law, and its powers were tailored to maintain the centralist idea and German political predominance in the monarchy.[121] The following tables show distribution of votes and seats in the Bohemian Diet between 1889 and 1895.[122]

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[118] "Rozhledy politické," Naše doba, 20 December 1895.

[119] Disrespect for the Diet probably played a greater role in electoral abstention than any other factor. This opinion can be supported by the fact that participation of Germans in rural areas was only slightly higher than that of Czechs and even lower in urban areas. "Rozhledy politické," Naše doba, 20 December 1895.

[120] "Pokleslý význam sněmu," Naše doba, 20 February 1895. Václav Choc, "Slovo o české politice státoprávní," Rozhledy 4 (1895): 392-95.

[121] "Domácí politika," Rozhledy 3 (1894): 295-99.

[122] "Český sněm," Národní listy, 18 January 1891.

Census According to Direct Taxes

	Direct Taxes	Number of Deputies	Amount of Taxes for One deputy	Number of deputies should be
Large estates	4,210,082	70	60,144	36
Czech cities	7,306,602	48*	152,220	63
German cities	3,185,132	39*	81,670	27
All cities	10,491,734	87*	120,594	91
Czech rural districts	8,277,572	48	172,449	71
German rural districts	4,197,513	31	135,403	36
All rural districts	12,475,085	79	157,912	108

* These figures include representatives from the Commerce Chambers.

Census According to the Population

	Number of Population (1888)	One Deputy for following number of people	Number of Deputies should be	Now Is
Bohemia	5,838,855	35,173	166	166
Czechs	3,694,687	38,486		
Germans	2,144,168	32,786		
Cities	1,255,021		87	87
Czech cities	726,862	15,143	53	48
German cities	528,159	13,542	34	39
Rural areas	4,580,834			
Czech rural areas	2,967,825	61,829	52	48
German rural areas	1,613,009	52,031	27	31

Since the cooperation of the government and the Germans for the Diet's advancement was unlikely, a part of the Czech press urged the Liberal Party's deputies to use all the available Diet's powers effectively, particularly for improvements in Czech schooling, industry and construction work.[123] The Liberal Party incorporated the demand for the elevation of the powers of the Bohemian and Moravian Diets as a very important part of its programme.[124]

The *Reichsrat*'s elections in March 1897 represented the peak of the Liberal Party's dominance in Czech politics. The electoral campaign was similar to that for the Diet's elections in 1895, but the electoral proclamation of the Liberal Party addressed to the "Czech people" was even more moderate, leaving out the demand for universal and equal suffrage.[125] In their speeches, the Liberal Party's candidates focused on the economic and cultural spheres, indicating the achievements of language equality for both nationalities in Bohemia and Moravia as their most important immediate goal. It was rather peculiar that the term "Bohemian *Staatsrecht*" was not mentioned explicitly in the proclamation, even though the establishment of the Bohemian Kingdom's independence within the framework of the monarchy was the primary plank in the Liberal Party's endeavour. Also, the Young Czechs' criticism of the government and other political parties was far more moderate than in the past.[126]

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[123] "Sněm království českého," (speech of J. Herold), *Národní listy*, 12 January 1896; "Na kom je vina?" *Národní listy*, 4 February 1896.

[124] The electoral proclamation was written by J. Kaizl and K, Kramář. Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3: 558. It is very probable that negotiations with Badeni contributed to its moderate tone.

[125] "Lide český, voličové," *Národní listy* - Příloha, 23 February 1897.

The electoral proclamation of the Moravian Popular Party was similar in content but its spirit was more universal, since it favoured the equality of all Austrian nationalities.[127] The Popular Party still maintained an electoral alliance with the National Party in order to strengthen its position against the influence of Germans and Clericals, and thus some compromises with the National Party were necessary.

As in 1895, the electoral campaign of 1897 received far less attention in newspapers than that of 1891. Only the results of the elctions were followed with great attention.[128] The Liberal Party received 45 seats out of the Reichsrat's 425 seats. Another 15 seats were won by candidates closely cooperating with the Liberal Party, who joined its parliamentary Club in Vienna.[129] The Liberal Party's Club total of 60 members made this group the largest party in the *Reichsrat*, the next being Poles with one less seat and the German Progressives with ten fewer seats.

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[126] *Národní listy* even published a speech of F. L. Rieger delivered in Kolín on 11 January 1897 with the comment that the speech made a great impression on eight hundred participants, of whom two hundred were Young Czechs, who "behaved neutrally." "Dr. Fr. Lad. Rieger v Kolíně," *Národní listy*, 11 January 1897.

[127] "Lide moravský," *Národní listy*, 28 February 1897.

[128] "Zvolení poslanci," *Národní listy*, 14 March 1897; "Celkový výsledek voleb," *Národní listy*, 13 March 1897; "Volební ruch," *Národní listy*, 18 March 1897; "Výsledek voleb říšských poslanců ve skupinách měst," *Národní listy*, 20 March 1897. "Nová sněmovna poslanců," *Národní listy*, 26 March 1897.

[129] The additional 15 members of the Liberal Party's Club were: (9 members of the Moravian Popular Party, 5 deputies standing for more than one party, and one Catholic from Moravia.) "Nová sněmovna poslanců," *Národní listy*, 26 March 1897, and corrections on 27 March 1897.

Composition of the Reichsrat
after the election in 1897[130]

Party	Number of deputies
Czech Liberal Party	60
Jan Vašatý (Czech independent)	1
Czech Agrarian Party	1
Clerical Czechs	2
Poles	52
Polish Peasant Party	3
German Progressives	50
German Antisemites	28
Constitutional Landowners	28
Conservative Landowners	20
Middle Landowners Party	3
Slovenes	16
Croats	11
Serbs	2
Rumanians	6
Clerical Italians	14
Moderate Ukrainians	8
Radical Ukrainians	3
Followers of Stojalowski	6
Followers of Schönerer	5
Social Democrats	14
German Social-Political (Low. Austria)	1
Total	334

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[130] Čas, 27 March 1897. Národni listy, 26 March, 1897.

The electoral proclamation of the Liberal Party for the Reichsrat's election in 1897 clearly demonstrated the Party's departure from the position it had maintained between 1889 and 1894. Its two most important demands -- for the Bohemian Staatsrecht and consistent democratization of the monarchy's political system -- underwent substantial modification. The shift of the Liberal Party's basic position can only be explained in the political context of the period. By the end of 1895 the Young Czechs were in the paradoxical position that neither opposition to nor cooperation with the government would be successful in implementing the Bohemian Staatsrecht in its entirety. Badeni's willingness to meet some of the important Czech demands became attractive to a small group of the Young Czechs' leading personalities, who considered partial concessions better than empty hands. This group, led by G. Eim, J. Kaizl and K. Kramář, advocated the policy of gradualism in September 1896 as the official policy of the Party. The Party's silence on the idea of universal suffrage in its electoral proclamation of 1897 was to contribute to successful cooperation between the Liberal Party and Badeni.

The "policy of gradualism," however, did not find much understanding among the Czech population and contributed to the decrease of the popular support for the Liberal Party. Thus, by the end of 1896, instead of becoming a unifying force of the Czech political movement, the Liberal Party was in competition for votes with the new party. Deviation from its consistent democratic position before the Reichsrat elections in 1897 probably helped temporarily preserve greater support among the Czech farmers than would have been forthcoming if the Party had insisted on consistent democratization of the political system.[131] But the Young Czechs failed in gaining the permanent cooperation of workers. By 1897, the Young Czechs viewed with apprehension the spread of the socialist movement, particularly its international aspects. Some Young Czechs were unable to understand the socialist movement as anything other than a result of foreign influences.[132] They questioned the workers' political maturity and responsibility, and consequently no longer saw their full involvement in the political structure as vital for the Czech national course.[133]

Badeni's language decrees of April 1897

Even though Count Kazimierz Badeni's goal as a Minister President was to form a three-quarters parliamentary majority to achieve the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise and to pass an electoral reform, his sincerity in promising to make substantial language concessions to Czechs was never seriously doubted by the Czech politicians and later historians.[134] His capability, however, to do so was a different matter; his incurable optimism and the lack of a realistic judgement of the political forces in Austria have sometimes been held responsible for the failure of his policies.[135]

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[131] The Congress of the Czech farmers in September 1894 showed the lack of farmers' sympathy for universal and equal suffrage and for a consistent democratization of the political system. "Porážka Mladočechů v Hradci Králové," Hlas národa, 29 September 1894.

[132] Speech of E. Grégr, Národní listy, 18 March 1897.

[133] The Liberal Party ran its own popular candidates in the fifth curia, and won nine out of eleven seats. This procedure was heavily criticized in the Czech press as well as public meetings. "Z našeho politického katechismu," Čas, 20 March 1897. Národní listy expressed disagreement with F. L. Rieger, who thought that the fifth curia should remain only for workers. "Dr. Adler and Dr. Rieger," Národní listy, 25 February 1897. Kramář said openly in Poznámky o české politice, p. 18, that the Liberal Party's enthusiasm for the political advancement of workers and for universal and equal suffrage cooled down even more after the Czech democrats joined their German colleagues in obstructing Badeni's language decrees.

Badeni's language decrees of April 1897, which made Czech virtually equal to German in Bohemia and Moravia, were a result of long and painful efforts by both Badeni and the Young Czechs.[136] The decrees represented the zenith of the Liberal Party's success,[137] and it was neither the Party's nor Badeni's fault that they were abolished one year later.

Even during the rule of Prince Windischgraetz's government, the Young Czechs had no doubts that the Austrian government would eventually have to discontinue its repressive policies towards the Czech nation and get involved in the "Czech Question." Yet, they made no preparation for such an opportunity and did not formulate any precise conditions under which the Liberal Party deputies would end their opposition to the government. Only a few Young Czechs, namely G. Eim and E. Grégr, believed that such a situation was to come soon; and even their conditions for ending the opposition differed from each other. At the time of the appointment of Count Badeni as a Minister President, it was only G. Eim who believed that the right opportunity had finally arrived to gain concessions for the Czech nation.[138]

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[134] The most detailed description by direct participants or observers of Badeni's politics towards Czechs is in: Josef Penížek, *Aus bewegten Zeiten 1895 bis 1905*; Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918*, 2: 273ff. and pp. 348-60; Karel Kramář, "Dějiny české politiky nové doby," *Česká politika*, ed., Zdeněk Tobolka, 3, pt. 2; 583ff; Tobolka, *Politické dějiny Československého národa od. r. 1848 do dnešní doby*, 3: 381-424, 546, 558-77, 591-601; Kramář, *Poznámky o české politice*, pp. 15-21; Oskar Baron Parish, *Vzpomínky z doby Badeního* (Prague: Týden, 1907).

[135] Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918*, 2: 273-74, 345-50.

[136] The most active Young Czechs assisting in formulating the decrees were G. Eim, J. Kaizl, K. Kramář, E. Brzorád, E. Engel, B. Pacák, A. Stránský and J. Žáček. Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918*, 2: 361.

[137] Badeni's language decrees were appreciated not only by the Young Czechs but by the Old Czechs as well. For example, Albín Bráf, one of their leading personalities of this period, noted in his memoirs that he, Rieger and Mattuš were particularly pleased with such a remarkable result, which was accomplished by the Liberal Party's strong and energetic attitude. Albín Bráf, *Život a dílo*, 5 vols. (Prague: Vesmír, 1922-24), 1: 68. The Old Czechs themselves made considerable effort in the Bohemian Diet at the beginning of 1895 to win German support for the idea of equality of both languages in Bohemia and Moravia. The most detailed speech on this topic was delivered by Jindřich Šolc, "Řeč dra. Jindřicha Šolce," *Hlas národa*, 12 January 1895.

At a meeting with Badeni several weeks after his appointment, Eim suggested that substantial language concessions to the Czechs might be sufficient for gaining the cooperation of the Liberal Party.[139] To Badeni's great surprise, however, at a meeting with E. Grégr on 6 December

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[138] Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3: 385. It was generally believed that the existence of Badeni's government would be very short. "K programu nové vlády," *Lidové noviny*, 25 October 1895. Badeni's governmental programme in particular made a bad impression on Czechs.

[139] The negotiations between the Liberal Party's deputies and Badeni were not welcomed warmly in the Czech press. The moderate press was afraid that if Germans were to tolerate some concessions to the Czech nation, they hoped in return to get Czech support in resistance to the renewal of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise on terms demanded by Hungarians, and also, wanted to gain Czechs for antisemitism. "K otázce česko-německého míru," *Plzeňské listy*, 10 December 1895. *Čas* claimed that Eim's agitation in *Národní listy* for support of negotiations with Badeni was causing confusion among voters. *Čas*, 21 September, p. 493-94. This view was actually shared by E. Grégr, who considered Eim's articles of a "Machiavellian" nature. Tobolka, *Politické dějiny Československého národa od r. 1848 do dnešní doby*, 3, pt. 2: 89. *Rozhledy*, a year before Badeni's decrees were issued, warned Czech deputies that neither Badeni and his government nor the Czech Liberal Party were prepared for possible German resistance to the decrees, and that consequences of the failure of the attempt to make concessions to the Czech nation would be severe for Czech politics. "Domácí politika," *Rozhledy*, 20 April 1896. Viktor Dyk, a member of the Progressive Movement, later wrote that the greatest mistake of the Young Czechs was that they strived for something which had no chance for success. Dyk, *Vzpomínky a komentáře 1893-1918*, p. 74.

1895, he was informed that nothing short of fulfilment of the Bohemian Staatsrecht would satisfy the Liberal Party and Czechs in general.[140] The period between these two meetings and the publication of decrees in April 1897 was filled with intense preparations, negotiations and frustrations.

At the beginning, negotiations were unofficially conducted by Gustav Eim through his daily meetings with Badeni. Gradually, he gained the cooperation of other Young Czechs, of whom Josef Kaizl and Karel Kramář were the most prominent. Already on 13 December 1895, in his Reichsrat speech about the land tax, Kaizl had mentioned the "policy of gradualism" as a possible way to federalism. In particular, he pointed out the introduction of Czech as the inner administrative language in Bohemia and Moravia as the first possible step to the fulfilment of the Bohemian Staatsrecht.[141] Nine months later the concept of "gradualism" was proclaimed as an official strategy of the Liberal Party. As a result of his December Reichsrat speech, Kaizl gained the respect of Badeni and became a leading figure, not only in formulating the Liberal Party's demands but also in negotiating with Badeni. He gradually replaced Gustav Eim, who was seriously ill and died in February 1897, to the great regret of his colleagues.[142]

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[140] Kaizl, Z mého života, 3: 74.

[141] Ibid., pp. 457-69. Čas responded to this speech with bitterness, stating that J. Grégr and others harshly criticized T. G. Masaryk for similar opinions expressed in his Strakonice speech in 1892, in which he spoke in favour of achieving the Bohemian Staatsrecht by gradual concessions with the cooperation of the Bohemian Germans. Čas, 21 December 1895.

[142] Čas published the most detailed article reviewing his work. "Gustav Eim," Čas, 13 February 1897.

After more than a year of meetings between Badeni and the Young Czechs, Badeni presented a detailed proposal to Kaizl, Herold and Pacák on 17 December, 1896.[143] Eleven of the fourteen paragraphs of the proposal were taken from the Stremayer ordinances of 1880, which increased the use of Czech between the state administration and customers, and the remaining three involved introducing Czech into the inner state and judicial administration.[144] Czech representatives, however, were not pleased with the proposal, mainly because it did not really introduce bilingualism in Bohemia, it referred only to Bohemia, and it was supposed to be implemented only in 1901. Negotiations continued without much success until the beginning of March, 1897, when all except Kaizl and Kramář wanted to cancel further meetings with Badeni.[145] On 7 March, Kaizl wrote a letter informing Badeni that the proposal, complete with its further modifications from the recent cabinet meeting, was still unacceptable to the Czechs.[146]

Badeni, facing opposition to the decrees from several of the Reichsrat groups which he needed for his majority, and under pressure from several members of his cabinet not to sign the decrees, decided to hand in his resignation on 2 April. The Emperor, however, did not accept it, and asked Badeni to issue the decrees. The decree for

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[143] When Kaizl received the first promise from Badeni on 21 December 1895 that the Czech language would be introduced into inner political and judicial administration, he openly doubted the seriousness of Badeni's intentions. Kaizl, Z mého života, 3: 473-74.

[144] Ibid., p. 397-98.

[145] Ibid., p. 559.

[146] Ibid., p. 403.

Bohemia was issued on 5 April, and the decree for Moravia followed in three weeks.[147] Although the decrees did not completely conform to the wishes of the Young Czechs, the position of the Czech language was considerably improved. Kaizl published an article in *Národní listy* as early as 30 March, describing the decrees to the public in a very favourable light.[148]

The language provisions of the decrees were rather complicated and Czech did not become entirely equal with German in state administration in Bohemia and Moravia.[149] This is not to say, however, that the decrees had no significance for the position of the Czech language in these two lands, or that their political implications were negligible. The most important provision of the decrees was the introduction of the Czech language into the inner state and judicial administration. The right of Czechs to communicate with the state and judicial administration in their own language anywhere in Bohemia and Moravia was also guaranteed. Both lands were to become bilingual[150] in the sense that civil servants were obliged to master both Czech and German after 1 July 1901.[151] Badeni's decrees effectively ended hopes held by Germans for the division of Bohemia along national lines, and for the *de jure* introduction of German as the official language of the empire.[152]

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[147] Detailed descriptions of the decrees can be found in Kaizl, *Z mého života*, 3: 396-407. The complete text is in Adolf Srb, *Politické dějiny národa českého*, 3 vols. (Prague: F. Šimáček, 1899-1901), 3: 221-26.

[148] *Národní listy*, 30 March 1897. Also in Kaizl, *Z mého života*, footnote, pp. 573-75.

[149] The language of communication between departments of state administration in Bohemia still remained German.

The Germans in the *Reichsrat* based their opposition to the decrees on arguments that the decrees threatened the unity of the state administration; they insisted that the decrees violated the right of German civil servants not to be obliged to learn Czech, and that the decrees violated the principle of the empire's official language.[153] The fact that Badeni considered the decrees to be a matter of agreement between the government and Czechs became also a target of vigorous German attacks.[154]

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[150] This was not difficult for Czech civil servants, who mostly knew German; however, the German civil servants rarely knew Czech, and they viewed the obligation to learn Czech as an insult. But not all Germans opposed the decrees. For instance, the chairman of the German county Court of Law in Cheb (Eger), Ruber, tried to persuade Germans that Badeni's decrees were necessary. At the same time he spoke on behalf of the Czech language as equal to German, and stated that there were no grounds for insulting it. Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918*, 2: 372-73. Because of extreme German opposition to the provisions of the decrees which demanded German civil servants to learn Czech, Bedřich Pacák (a Young Czech deputy) wanted to leave it out. But Badeni insisted on it because he was afraid that Czech officials would stop learning German. Kramář, "Dějiny české politiky nové doby," *Česká politika*, ed. Z. Tobolka, 3: 590-91.

[151] Tobolka, *Politické dějiny Československého národa od r. 1848 do dnešní doby*, 3, pt. 2: 152. The process of making Bohemia and Moravia bilingual was actually to take ten years.

[152] Ibid., p. 152.

[153] Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918*, 2: 365.

[154] Tobolka, *Politické dějiny Československého národa od r. 1848 do dnešní doby*, 3, pt. 2: 145.

The struggle for abolition of Badeni's decrees by German Liberals commenced on 6 April 1897, the day after the decree for Bohemia was issued. At first they unsuccessfully tried all possible legal channels, but since they did not succeed, at the end of April they started an obstruction in the Reichsrat, which often involved personal brawls and breaking of furniture.[155]

Studies related to Badeni's decrees written by Young Czechs usually focused on trying to explain the cause of the German furor, and often speculated about solutions to this opposition. They also attempted to evaluate the impact of the German actions and victory on the political course of the Habsburg Monarchy.[156] Czech studies concerned with the issue of Badeni's decrees and written before the end of the first decade of the twentieth century generally agree that the German obstruction caused a continual crisis in Austria's parliamentary system.[157] Corruption and abuse of parliamentary procedures became all-too-frequent phenomena in the Austrian *Reichsrat*.[158] They were accompanied by a disintegration of civic life and the spread of general disrespect for the state authorities and the Emperor, since they had surrendered to the German minority and let the Viennese street demonstrations decide the empire's political course.[159] The Germans in the *Reichsrat* became suddenly aware of their strength, and utilized it in a kind of permanent veto against any justified future claims of non-German nationalities.[160] Yet, the highest political authorities made no serious attempt to correct the system. According to the studies mentioned above, the main cause of the German reaction was the requirement that the German civil servants in Bohemia and Moravia learn Czech. They maintain, however, that the crisis evolved due to broader political circumstances, of which the formation of the federalist parliamentary majority was most decisive.

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[155] Josef Penížek, a recorder in the Reichsrat for Gustav Eim (a correspondent of Národni listy) described the German obstruction in Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918, 2: 372-77. He maintains that the brutality, arrogance and lack of knowledge on the part of Germans was unbelievable. Penížek also confessed that even at the time of writing Česká aktivita, around 1930, he had gruesome dreams about German disturbances in Vienna and the Reichsrat during the last two days of Badeni's rule. Ibid., p. 401. The most recent description in English of the German opposition to the decrees is in Garver, The Young Czech Party, pp. 245-55. German parties used most of the German press for mobilization of Germans against decrees. Czech studies maintain that the Germans had got the impression that Badeni's decrees were to be applied not only to civil servants but to all Germans in Bohemia and Moravia. Tobolka, ed., Česká politika, 3: 599-600.

[156] Josef Kaizl, "Rovnoprávnost jazyková," Česká revue 1 (1898), pp. 513-21, and pp. 697-707. Kaizl analyzes practical consequences of the principle of bilingualism as introduced by Badeni, and the principle of equal status of Czech in Czech regions with the status of German in German regions (as it was eventually applied by Gautsch after abolition of Badeni's decrees; however even this reform was soon abolished because of German opposition to it). Political consequences of Badeni's decrees and their abolition are discussed in: Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918, 2: 349-86; Tobolka, ed., Česká politika, 3: 593-619; Kramář, Poznámky o české politice, pp. 16-21; Oskar Baron Parish, Vzpomínky z doby Badeniho (Prague: Týden, 1907). Parish was not a Young Czech but a member of the Czech Conservative Party. His brief memoirs are, however, very useful, because of his personal participation in the Reichsrat during the crisis.

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[157] Tobolka, ed., *Česká politika*, 3: 593 and 596. Parish, *Vzpomínky z doby Badeniho*, p. 3; Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918*, 2: 386.

[158] Paris, *Vzpomínky z doby Badeniho*, p. 16.

[159] Ibid., p. 16; Tobolka, ed., *Česká politika*, 3: 618; Penížek described the German obstruction and its consequences as a phenomenon undermining the very existence of the monarchy. Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918*, 2: 386.

[160] Kramář, *Poznámky o české politice*, p. 20.

Germans, already irritated by the electoral reform[161] and by a planned change in the status of the Czech language, at least hoped that no parliamentary majority would be formed without their participation. When this actually happened, and the autonomist majority was formed with the cooperation of the Young Czechs, Slovenes, the German Catholic Popular Party and Prince B. Schwarzenberg, Germans could not at first believe that Badeni was himself unpleasantly surprised by such development. Germans felt threatened by this majority which had no sympathy for their privileged political position and for the centralistic system, and they started obstruction of the Reichsrat on 29 April. Since it was not possible to obstruct the formation of the majority, they turned to an obstruction against Badeni's decrees, whose implementation they wanted to prevent anyway.

Some studies interpreted the formation of the majority without previous consent of Badeni as a mistake in general, and the participation of the Young Czechs as foolish in particular.[162] Other studies, however, blamed Badeni and his government for errors in judgement. Oscar Baron Parish maintains that instead of planning the majority with the participation of the German Liberals, Badeni should have adjusted his policy to the majority in the Reichsrat, which was in favour of a federal solution to Austrian internal political problems.[163] Previously mentioned studies by Kramář, Penížek and Tobolka, point out several other factors which contributed to the extent of the crisis. The personality of Badeni, especially his excessive self-confidence, and at times his lack of a realistic outlook and flexibility obstructed his capacity to act decisively and consistently.[164] The personality of Franz Joseph was another important factor. The emperor had a low opinion of non-German nationalities as well as for the rule of law, and let riots in Viennese streets decide a serious internal problem. Retrospectively, two steps of the Liberal Party were most criticized by some Young Czechs, particularly by Karel Kramář: First, the participation of the Young Czechs in the majority of the right, because it weakened Badeni's position and undermined his trust in the Liberal Party. Second, the insistence of the Young Czech deputies on negotiations with Badeni about further cultural and economic concessions, which were expressed by the Young Czechs in thirty-two points based on Badeni's promises from the beginning of March 1897. Kramář commented with some bitterness that pressures from the Czech public which lacked deeper insight into the political situation, was the major reason for the Liberal Party's insistence on further concessions despite the unfavourable circumstances.[165]

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[161] Peníżek, Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918, 2: 335. The autonomist majority of the right was formed by Poles, Young Czechs, Slovenes, German Catholic Popular Party and Prince B. Schwarzenberg on 29 March 1897, the day when Badeni delivered the throne speech. Parish, Vzpomínky z doby Badeniho, p. 12.

[162] Peníżek, Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918, p. 593-94; Tobolka, ed., Česká politika, 3: 593-94. Kramář maintains that the Poles formed the Reichsrat's majority against the will of Badeni (about which Czechs supposedly did not know) because of their fear that Czechs and Germans could come to a greater understanding after the issuing of Badeni's decrees. Kramář, Poznámky o české politice, pp. 8-10.

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[163] Parish, Vzpomínky z doby Badeniho, pp. 8-10.

[164] Tobolka, ed., Česká politika, 3: 596, 603-4; Kramář, Poznámky o české politice, pp. 16-21; Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918, 2: 349-50, 363; Kaizl, Z mého života, 3: 558-59. Although Kramář himself participated in all major undertakings of the Liberal Party, later he considered some steps as a mistake, and explained them as miscalculations on the part of the Liberals and as a result of pressures caused by radicalism and political immaturity of the Czech public.

[165] Kramář, Poznámky o české politice, p. 17. Penížek, Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918, 2: 386.

The Young Czechs were well aware of the important effects of Badeni's language decrees on the overall political situation of the empire. Their most significant aspect lay in the fact that the decrees implicitly recognized the principle of equality of non-German nationalities with Germans. German pressures, disorder in the *Reichsrat* and anti-government demonstrations on Viennese streets, finally caused Count Badeni to resign on 28 November 1897. His successor, Baron Paul Gautsch, after several months of resistance, yielded to the German politicians and public and abolished Badeni's decrees. On 4 March 1898 he issued his own language decrees which abolished the principle of bilingualism and divided Bohemia into German, Czech and mixed regions. But even this decree was revoked in October 1899, because of great German pressure upon the government. The use of the Czech language thus returned to the situation which had existed before 1896.[166] The impact of the German victory in 1897-99 was viewed as implying grave consequences for Austrian internal development. Josef Penížek, an eyewitness of the *Reichsrat*'s two years of disorder, described the German victory as permanently weakening Austrian parliamentarism and constitutionalism, and as the major reason of the decreasing Czech loyalty to the monarchy.[167]

The impact of the decrees' abrogation on the Liberal Party was equally damaging. Unable to ensure the decrees' preservation, yet continuing in a policy of cooperation with the government, the Liberals lost public respect and credibility, and consequently their perspective as well. Particularly their role as a unifying force of the Czech political and national movement was definitely destroyed. At the end of 1898 Masaryk asked: "what kind of politics is the Czech policy? It serves the government like a slave, yet it does not get even a good tip in return?"[168] The abrogation of the Badeni decrees would not have represented so great a loss to the Liberal Party if there had been any hope that continued cooperation with the government might have brought some other positive results. However, such hope was also lost, and future developments only confirmed this pessimistic outlook. Not only was the federal idea never implemented in Austria, but the Czechs did not receive any further substantial concessions, including the sought-after equality of Czech with German in Bohemia and Moravia. The language issue remained at the centre of Czech politicians' interest for the rest of the monarchy's existence, and for historians it did not lose its attraction even after the monarchy's breakdown.[169]

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[166] Kamil Krofta, *Dějiny československé* (Prague: Sfinx, 1946), pp. 663-64.

[167] Penížek, *Česká aktivita v Čechách 1878-1918*, 2: 386. Penížek even maintains that "had the Czech nation received a university in Moravia and Czech been preserved as the inner administrative language, Czechs would have remained loyal and devoted to Austria." Since he wrote his study around 1930, his regret over the destiny of the monarchy is, at least, interesting.

Since the Young Czechs did not achieve their most important political objectives, and even lost previously gained concessions for the status of the Czech language in Bohemia and Moravia, the recent historical literature views the movement as a failure.[170] What they invested, however, brought a rich political harvest:The involvement of a broad strata of the Czech population in political activity. In this manner, the Liberal Party's work assisted in the process of the political maturation of Czechs, and thus played a major role in setting up important conditions for the democratization of the political system. Without such work of the Liberal Party, the First Czechoslovak Republic, surrounded by the authoritarian systems of its neighbours, could hardly have functioned smoothly as a democracy. The failure of the Liberal Party to achieve substantial changes in the political system can only be perceived and explained in connection with those monarchy's policy- and decision-making strata who were responsible for stagnation of the Austrian political system and strove primarily and at all costs for preservation of the status quo. The Liberal Party's deputies stood in the forefront of those who tried carefully to analyze the grave problems of the empire, hoping to gain in the Reichsrat the necessary support for the idea of modernization of the political system. Their interest in the preservation of the monarchy was genuine, however, they did not believe that preserving the privileges of ruling groups was a secure way for ensuring the monarchy's future existence.

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[168] Jan Herben, *T. G. Masaryk*, 5th ed. (Prague: Sfinx, 1947), pp. 104-5. Typically for Masaryk, he merely blamed the Liberal Party for this situation. Jan Herben, using a rather strong vocabulary, claims in his book that the revocation of the Badeni language decrees broke the Liberal Party's backbone. Ibid., p. 107.

[169] Besides those works elaborating on the issue mentioned in footnote 134, the following books are the most significant: J. Herold, *O české řeči úřední* (Prague: Národní rada česká, 1909); J. Kapras, *Přehled vývoje jazykové otázky* (Prague: R. B. Brož, 1910); K. Kadlec, *Z ústavního vývoje habsburského mocnářství* (Prague: J. Otto, 1913); J. Kapras, *Český stát a centralizace zemí habsburských* (Prague: Český čtenář, 1918); K. Krofta, *Národnostní vývoj zemí československých* (Prague: Orbis, 1934).

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[170] The Liberal Party is described explicitly as being "in the long run losers" by S. B. Winters: "Kramář, Kaizl and the Hegemony of the Young Czech Party 1891-1901," in The Czech Renascence of the Nineteenth Century, ed. P. Brock and H. G. Skilling (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 282-314. B. M. Garver in the epilogue to his book The Young Czech Party 1874-1901 and the Emergence of a Multiparty System, pp. 309-19, appreciates the Young Czechs' moderate achievements in economic and cultural spheres, and views the major significance of the Liberal Party in transmitting "the heritage of the Czech National Revival and the ideals of 1848 to its more democratic successors parties" (p. 317). This evaluation, however, as well as Garver's approach in the rest of his book leaves out almost completely the Liberal Party's work with the Czech public and the impact of this work on the political development of the Czech nation.

CONCLUSION

Between 1891 and 1897 the Czech Liberal Party reached the height of its political activity and significance. Being in opposition to the Viennese government allowed the Party to express openly its criticism of government policies. Elaborate, informative and analytical speeches of the Party's deputies significantly contributed to the illumination of the monarchy's existing serious political, economic, social and national problems.

The Liberal Party's priority for broader national goals, expressed primarily in its insistence on realization of the Bohemian Staatsrecht in its entirety, fostered the Party's role as a unifying force of the Czech political and national movement. This role was greatly strengthened by the Party's intensive and effective communication with the Czech public, whose level of political awareness and capability for responsible political participation increased rapidly, particularly during the period 1891-93. In these years particularly the concepts of democracy, progress, social justice, civil rights and political freedoms became more deeply rooted in the political thinking of the Czech population.

The failure of the Liberal Party to obtain the major objectives of its endeavour, together with the Party's policy of cooperation with the Viennese governments after the abrogation of Badeni's decrees in early 1898 completely altered the character of the Party and its role in the Czech political life. The proclamation of the policy of gradualism in 1896 reduced the Party's emphasis on broader national goals and placed to the forefront of its mandate partial concessions, particularly linguistic ones. This change resulted not only in a gradual decrease of popular support for the Liberal Party, but the Party itself became within a few years just one of several political parties, maintaining their existence on representing specific economic and social interests rather than broad national ones. Until the end of the Liberal Party's existence in 1914, the Party had to compete for votes with three other mass political parties (Czech Social Democracy, The Agrarian Party and the National Socialists) and with two smaller clerical parties and three small parties organizing progressive intellectuals (The State Right Radicals, The Radical Progressives and The People's Party). By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Liberals had become a party of the middle class, especially of its industrial segment.

The causes for which the Liberal Party was not able to achieve its major objectives, namely realization of the Bohemian Staatsrecht and substantial changes in the monarchy's political system are complex, relating mostly to the nature of the monarchy's political system established in 1867.

Although the December Constitution of 1867 was a definite improvement on what had existed in the past, its principles lacked the flexibility to make needed adjustments to the social, economic and national changes which were rapidly taking place within the monarchy.

The greatest problem with the Constitution of 1867 remained the relationship between the ruling and non-ruling nationalities. To establish German rule over the other nationalities in Cisleithania on the basis of their numerical strength and economic and cultural superiority was outdated, if not already in 1867, then very soon after; however, this aspect of the constitution remained unchanged until the end of the monarchy, despite the earnest efforts of non-German politicians to bring the political system more in harmony with realities. The decisive political power was concentrated in the hands of the emperor and the Viennese government, who only rarely possessed the intellectual capacity, political wisdom and moral strength to stand above "parties". They were usually well aware that the German privileged position was a source of grave problems but they lacked the courage to deal with the interests of the empire in their complexity. The monarchy's Germans increasingly identified their privileges with the existence of the empire; accusations of some Czech politicians that the German politicians were interested in the preservation of the empire only insofar as it granted Germans these privileges were not entirely without foundation. Even the Emperor and the government were too often guided by fears that Germans, if dissatisfied, would again turn to the Pan-Germanic ideal.

The Habsburg empire was born mainly out of the need for security for the small central European countries. But this aspect gradually lost much of its meaning for Austrian Germans. Unlike other nationalities, especially the Czechs, they did not feel threatened by possible expansionist ambitions of a united Germany. They pressed for closer relations with Germany in all spheres, including the economy.

Theoretically, the empire was an almost ideal economic unit. But as the relations between the empire and Germany were becoming closer, this aspect of the empire's existence eroded by political considerations.

As the empire's problems accumulated during the last three decades of its existence, it became more difficult to see the means for their solutions. The Reichsrat never became a significant factor in policy- and decision-making, although it provided a platform for exposing the needs of various groups, existing problems and public opinion. Such inconsistencies in the political system were detrimental to the empire's efficiency and stability. The major course of Austrian policy gradually shifted towards expansion, with the resultant neglect of domestic problems. It followed that as governments focused more of their attention on foreign policy, the non-German nationalities became more occupied with their own problems. But the monarchy's centralistic system did not provide much room for their initiative, thus contributing to growing tensions.

It seems common among historians and politicians to believe that supranational political organizations usually bring more international stability as well as more opportunity for social and economic progress for their members. It is also common to believe that assimilation of nationalities in multinational states is something desirable, natural or even necessary for the survival of such a state. (These opinions can be explicitly or implicitly found in Hans Kohn, Robert Kann, Charles Tilly, A.J.P. Taylor, etc.). In other words, these view perceive tensions caused by the co-existence of unassimilated ethnic groups in one state as the strongest potential source of internal instability and consequently as a danger for international stability. At the same time, these views too frequently underestimate the historical, cultural, linguistic and psychological aspects of the concerned national groups. These factors, however, seem to play a far greater role in human spiritual development and endeavour than is generally acknowledged. Particularly, when a certain degree of political self-awareness, education and responsibility is achieved by a considerable segment of the population, it seems more realistic to call for mutual respect than for assimilation of concerned nationalities.

From a psychological point of view, the existence of national groups also has a significant meaning. It has long been recognized that an individual's identification with a larger group of human beings with a common language, traditions and aims, contributes to his stability and mental health. Considering the existence of various civilizations, nations, ideologies, and religions, limitations of the size of the group with which one can most constructively identify are obvious. Identification with one's own nation seems to have definite advantages over other groups since nations have potentials to provide room for development of its members as individuals as well as for their development as social, cultural and political beings. National identification makes it still possible to give allegiance to more universal and smaller groups, and to maintain solidarity with human beings outside of one's own national group.

On the other hand, any striving to maintain a supranational formation, which disregards the importance of an individual and his potential for development, and lacks true respect for existing deeply-rooted groups, particularly national ones, contains in itself destructive aspects which will cause serious problems and reactions. Since conflict and problems seem to be an unavoidable part of human existence, the maturity of a political system should be measured by its capability to provide sufficient platform for their exposure and solutions. A multinational formation will always have greater problems than nation-states. This is not to say that multinational states have no chance of continuous existence or that their existence would under no circumstances be desirable. The issue of security still remains one of the most important aspects in politics. But the enormous complexity of problems of a multinational empire must be recognized and continuously solved, or these problems can easily undermine the existence of a state, as in the case of the Habsburg Monarchy. The clarification of problems is the first condition for their solution, however imperfect. Any true attempt at solving existing problems must be underlain by the mutual trust and respect of the parties involved. In the case of a developed multinational state such a consideration implies that no single national group will maintain any privileges at the cost of other groups if efficient and constructive policy-making is to take place. Even this "mature" approach does not guarantee that serious problems and dilemmas related to common co-existence will cease to exist.

The Czech Liberal Party during 1891-1897 greatly contributed on the floor of the *Reichsrat* as well as in public to the clarification of the empire's problems. Their diagnoses and prognoses were generally realistic, and their suggestions, if applied, could have contributed to the improvement of the empire's political system, and in the long run possibly even to its stability. Although the Young Czechs' informative and suggestive speeches were generally admired and even feared in the Reichsrat, it was not in the power of their party to influence the monarchy's policy, because the source of political decision-making did not lie in representative bodies. More influence, however, could have been maintained if the Reichsrat's representatives from the privileged groups had been more open to information and ideas which did not fit into their political concepts and way of thinking. But the German representatives preferred to maintain the myth that the empire's Germans were the only ones truly interested in the preservation of the empire. Their apparent lack of respect for others was largely a result of their disinterest in others and their lack of knowledge of others, which was underlain by the belief that any justice and respect applied outside of their group would be self-destructive. Considering their numerical strength and close relations with a united Germany, this position was hardly justified.

The Habsburg Monarchy maintained its existence on the principles of western civilization. One of the fundamental principles became a concept of human progress and development in the direction of granting freedom, civil rights and equal opportunities to an increasingly wider range of people. But developments in these spheres lagged too much behind generally spread expectations. At the same time the stagnation of the monarchy's political system in some of its most important areas was counterproductive to the monarchy's internal strength and stability as well as to its administrative and economic efficiency. The factors which eventually caused the empire's break up in 1918 were evolving with considerable speed from the middle of the nineteenth century, but it seems that possibilities for arresting these disruptive "forces" continued to exist until the end of the century.

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